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Abstract 
The University of Manchester 
Ike Jay Johnson 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
September 2010 
Essays on the Microstructure of the Market Pre-opening Period 
This thesis consists of three related essays that examine investors‟ order submission 
strategies during the pre-opening period on the Malta Stock Exchange. The pre-opening is a 
period of liquidity formation and price discovery characterised by the absence of trade 
execution. The three essays collectively examine the information content of the order book 
in relation to: the intensity of order submissions, the aggressiveness of investors‟ order 
placement strategy and the determination of returns generated over the pre-opening period.  
The first essay empirically investigates if public information concerning the current state of 
the order book impacts the duration between order arrivals.  Utilizing an augmented ACD 
model, the research reveals that the information which can be inferred from the 
characteristics of incoming orders has a more significant impact on the intensity of buy order 
submissions as compared to sell order submissions during the pre-opening period.  
Furthermore, prospective buyers appear to be more responsive to liquidity provided by the 
sell side than the reverse.  Locked or crossed order submissions tend to increases (decreases) 
the intensity of order flow on the own (opposite) side of the order book, corroborating Cao et 
al. (2000) that such order-types contain informative signals about the fundamental value of 
the asset. 
The second essay analyses the impact of limit order book information on the aggressiveness 
observed in the submission, revision and cancellation of limit orders during the market pre-
opening period.  The empirical results indicate that the aggressiveness of order submissions 
and forward price revisions react both to the existing and subsequent changes in the 
execution probability at market opening, driven in part by the depth on either side of the 
order book.  The aggressiveness of order cancellations increases on both sides of the order 
book when the depth at the top of the ask order book increases.  In addition, the results 
suggest that the order book height and size of the inside spread impacts the aggressiveness of 
order submissions, revisions and cancellations. 
The third essay studies the contribution of the pre-opening period to the daily price 
discovery process and the factors that impact the return generated over this period.  The 
results indicate that approximately one third of daily price discovery occurs in the pre-
opening period.  In addition, the impact of relative depth and height of the overnight and 
opening order book are concentrated at the top of the order book.  Furthermore, cumulative 
changes to relative depth attributable to order submissions most significantly impact the 
opening returns of less actively traded stocks.  The results show a strong relationship 
between opening returns and cumulative changes in the relative height along the order book 
attributable to order submissions, cancellations and forward and backward price revisions 
over the pre-opening period.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
The analysis of the price discovery process for securities actively trading on an exchange, 
and the consequential revelation of private information through order flow represents a 
major area of research in the market microstructure literature (see Glosten and Milgrom, 
1985; Kyle, 1985; Easley and O‟Hara, 1987,1992; Vives, 1995; among others).  A particular 
focus is the order submission strategy of informed investors.  In essence, investors that 
possess private information about a security may reveal portions of this information when 
executing their order execution strategies in the trading session.  All though other investors 
can learn from this information revelation and adjust their order strategy accordingly, the 
presence of information asymmetry, presents a potential problem to these investors.  Hence, 
such a situation where some investors possess superior information about a security, an 
adverse selection risk exists for the less informed investors (or market makers) and is 
typically reflected in the costs of trading in that security.    
This thesis analyses order submissions and information revelation in the absence of active 
trade execution by focusing on order placement strategy during the market pre-opening 
period.  Many important equity markets globally now incorporate a pre-opening period, a 
designated period within the trading day following an overnight, holiday or weekend halt in 
trading.  During the pre-opening, investors are allowed to perform all of the functions 
associated with order submission, such as price or volume revision and cancellation of 
existing orders, and new order submissions, but no trading occurs.  Importantly, orders that 
compose the order book in such a period are non-binding and their terms of trade, in most 
cases, can be changed without prior notice, cost or obligations.   
At the end of the pre-opening period, the orders are batched and executed in a system that 
follows a call auction process.  As no trading occurs during the pre-opening, an intriguing 
15 
 
question concerns the role such a period plays in enhancing the efficiency of the associated 
market.  The pre-opening period is claimed to facilitate aggregation of information and price 
discovery at the opening of the market after designated trading halts.  Madhavan (1992) 
maintains that call auctions, which are typical during the pre-opening, significantly alleviates 
the asymmetric information problem, while Economides and Schwartz (1995) argue that a 
pre-opening period in the form of a call auction provides an ideal solution for minimizing 
adverse selection risks arising from information asymmetry.  Similarly, Domowitz and 
Madhavan (2001) posit that minimisation of adverse selection risks represents the pre-
opening‟s most important function.  However, this minimisation of the adverse selection 
risks is only achievable through transparent markets and a competitive market environment 
in which different liquidity suppliers are allowed to participate (Biais, Glosten and Spatt 
2005).       
The literature specific to the market pre-opening period focuses entirely on the process and 
outcome of price discovery.  For instance, Vives (1995) shows that informed traders will 
indeed reveal their private information over the pre-opening, thereby, quoted prices during 
this period come to reflect the fundamental value of the security.  In the presence of potential 
manipulation by a strategic trader, Medrano and Vives (2001) find that although price 
discovery is present, prices are noisy around the fundamental value.  Specialist intervention, 
as shown in Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000), results in a similar outcome of noisy 
opening prices.  Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1999) empirically assess the pre-opening period 
and find that the order flow is informative about prices and indicates learning, especially 
towards the end of the period.  Barclay and Hendershott (2003) attribute approximately 16% 
of the overall price discovery on the NASDAQ to the pre-opening period, while Cao et al. 
(2000), maintain that price discovery per unit of time during the pre-opening and the trading 
period are equivalent on the NASDAQ exchange.  In addition, Barclay and Hendershott 
(2008) find that increased trading on off-network platforms resulting in a greater proportion 
of price discovery occurring during the pre-opening during the 1990s. 
In essence, the absence of trading during the pre-opening facilitates a reduction in adverse 
selection risk by incorporating private and public information into prices before trading 
occurs.  In turn, the impounding of information into quoted prices enables learning by other 
16 
 
investors, as a result of which they modify their orders to reflect their updated information.  
Hence, it is this recursive process of information revelation and learning by investors that 
provides the basis for price discovery in the absence of trading during the pre-opening 
period, thereby providing an efficient method of opening the market for trading.   
Although research that focuses on the market pre-opening period addresses the question of 
price discovery, to my knowledge, none of these prior studies attempts to study the 
informativeness of either the pre-opening order book, or the extent to which investors use 
order book information as a basis on which to form their order placement strategies.  In 
addition, the absence of trading may facilitate a situation where traders signal their liquidity 
needs (sunshine trading) to induce contra-side to place matching orders, which may alter the 
dynamics of the pre-opening compared to the trading period.  It is this void in the literature 
on the market pre-opening period that the thesis attempts to address. 
1.2 Research Focus and Contributions            
The empirical analyses conducted in this thesis utilises tick-by-tick data from a nascent 
European equity market, the Malta Stock Exchange (MSE), covering the period January 4, 
2000 to June 28, 2007.  The MSE is a fully computerised, continuous limit order market 
with authorised brokers executing orders on behalf of investors.  A comprehensive overview 
of the institutional framework governing trading on the MSE is presented in chapter 2.  The 
fundamental objective of this thesis is to empirically assess the information content of the 
pre-opening limit order book at the MSE, its impact on trader order submission strategy and 
its ultimate impact on the trading returns generated over the period.  The structure of the 
thesis, therefore, comprises three related essays that examine: (1) the impact of incoming 
limit orders and alterations to queued limit orders on the intensity of subsequent order 
submissions during the pre-opening period, (2) the characteristics of the pre-opening limit 
order book and their impact on the aggressiveness of subsequent order strategies, (3) the 
contribution of the pre-opening to daily price discovery and the information content of both 
the limit order book and cumulative changes to the book throughout the pre-opening, in 
determining the trading returns generated over the period.  The research focus and the 
contribution of each essay are now outlined in greater details. 
17 
 
1.2.1 Determining the Intensity of Limit Order Submissions in the 
Market Pre-opening Period 
This essay empirically assesses the submission intensity of orders queuing in the limit order 
book during the market pre-opening period.  The central objective is to determine whether 
traders utilise information inferred from the characteristics of limit order submissions, and 
consequent changes in the pre-opening limit order book in order to formulate their (own) 
order submission strategies.  In particular, do inferences derived from traders‟ observations 
of the evolving limit order book impact the intensity of their own order submission during 
the market pre-opening period?  Furthermore, this essay seeks to determine whether 
information observed in the pre-opening period asymmetrically impacts either side of the 
order book. 
The construction of the pre-opening order book represents a potentially valuable source of 
information about the characteristics of the market, tentative valuation for the security and 
the level of liquidity demanded and supplied at different prices.  However, inference is 
somewhat more challenging since orders in the pre-opening order book are non-binding and 
may be subsequently cancelled or revised before trading commences.  This essay provides 
further insights as to whether  observing the signals and trends in the order submission 
process will facilitates learning in relation to the fundamental value of the security (Biais et 
al. 1999) and the general state of latent market liquidity (Dia and Pougeot, 2006). 
The empirical analysis utilizes an augmented Log-ACD model proposed by Bauwens and 
Giot (2000), which measures the conditional expected time between order arrivals during the 
pre-opening period.  Using this model provides a key advantage as it allows for the 
incorporation of explanatory variables into the ACD framework without the necessity of 
imposing positivity constraints on the coefficient estimates.  The explanatory variables 
employed reflect the impact of price and volume associated with incoming limit orders, the 
inside spread, mid-quote returns and revision or cancellation of orders queued in the pre-
opening limit order book.  In essence, the expectation is that these explanatory variables will 
reveal, if the characteristic of incoming limit orders, or alteration to orders that changes the 
state of the limit order book, impacts the intensity of orders submitted during the pre-
opening period. 
18 
 
This essay is among the first in the microstructure literature to explicitly attempt to highlight 
the role of the order book in explaining the intensity of order submissions.  While both Engle 
and Lunde (2003) and Hall and Hautsch (2007) study the impact of the order book on the 
intensity of order submission, this essay is the first to focus on the information content of 
order submissions and alterations to the pre-opening order book as determinants of order 
arrival intensity in the absence of trading or non-binding order attributes.  In addition, the 
absence of trading during the pre-opening period facilitates the study of order arrival 
intensity exclusively, without having to consider the potentially confounding impact of 
trading intensity and its impact on the rate of order submissions. 
The results indicate that the intensity of buy order submissions tends to be more responsive 
to both the information contained in incoming orders and order alterations that changes the 
state of the order book, as compared to intensity on the sell side.  In addition, the results 
reveal a consistent theme, whereby the buy side of the market reacts to the provision and 
withdrawal of liquidity on the sell side.  It appears that the intensity of buy order 
submissions increases when liquidity is provided by the sell side and reduces when liquidity 
is reduced.  The likely intuition is that the sell side traders participate in liquidity signalling 
that induces order submissions from the buy side of the market.   This finding reveals that a 
major component of order submission strategy and by extension the price discovery process 
during the pre-opening is dependent on the availability of liquidity on the sell side during the 
period.  This essay is presented as chapter 4 of the thesis. 
1.2.2  Aggressiveness in Investor Order Placement Strategy in the Absence of 
Trading: Evidence from the Market Pre-opening Period 
The second essay attempts to reveal to a greater extent the impact of the existing state of the 
order book on the order placement strategy employed by traders contributing to order flow 
during the pre-opening period.  When placing (firm) orders during the pre-opening, traders 
encounter a trade-off between maximising the probability of trade execution and obtaining a 
desirable trade price at the opening of the market.  Essentially, traders must decide how 
aggressive to be in seeking to trade the security, thereby potentially receiving a less 
favourable price in return for a greater execution probability at the opening.  In contrast, a 
19 
 
trader may decide to employ a more patient strategy, optimising the execution price of the 
security at the cost of a reduced execution probability at the opening.  Invariably, the choice 
taken considering the trade-off faced, will be conditional on the prevailing state of the limit 
order book.  Hence, traders will make inferences from the order book about the potential 
liquidity at each position in the book and the distance between the quotes on either side to 
determine the optimal submission strategy. 
As the pre-opening progresses, the revelation of information and changes to the limit order 
book may result either in an alteration in traders‟ valuation of the security and/or the 
execution probability of their orders.  Traders are then faced with a decision whether to 
modify the terms of their orders to sustain the initial (or to improve the) execution 
probability, or better align the attributes of their order (price and volume) to reflect their 
most recent valuation for the security, contingent on the revised state of the order book.  
Specifically, traders have the option to revise the price and volume of their order or 
completely withdraw the order from the order book.  In addition, traders will decide upon the 
extent to which the orders are altered to reflect their update information set. 
The main focus of this essay is to determine the extent to which the existing state of the limit 
order book impacts the aggressiveness of order submissions, price revisions or cancellation 
of orders queued during the pre-opening.  Studying the aggressiveness of actions taken by 
traders in such detail may reveal the underlying process that underpins order submission 
strategies, which facilitates the speed and extent of price discovery during the pre-opening 
period.  Investigating order submission aggressiveness during the pre-opening rather than 
when the market is trading has an additional advantage that submission strategies are “pure” 
in the sense they are uncontaminated by the necessity of changing inventory or behaviour as 
a result of unexpected price changes.   
To achieve this aim, the aggressiveness of order submissions, price revisions and order 
cancellations are ranked to allow the most aggressive action to have the greatest positive 
impact on the execution probability of the order.  An ordered probit model is employed to 
model the ranked aggressiveness.  The explanatory variables that are incorporated reflect the 
state of the order book, on both the price and volume dimensions, namely the height and 
depth, at different positions. 
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This essay is not the first to examine the role of the order book in determining the placement 
decision faced by traders.  For instance, Biais et al. (1995), Cao et al. (2008), Griffiths et al. 
(2000), Hall and Hautsch (2006), Pascual and Veredas (2008) and Ranaldo (2004) all 
examine the aggressiveness in order strategy and the impact of the order book.  However, 
this essay differs from previous studies in that the aggressiveness of order placement 
strategies is analysed in a period where changes along the limit order book are not 
attributable to trading activity.  Hence, the focus is to examine the mechanism that underlies 
the provision and withdrawal of liquidity from the order book in the absence of trading, 
which as noted above, removes the impact of unexpected price changes.  Another important 
contribution is that, apart from Cao, et al (2008), this essay is the first to assess the influence 
of the order book on the decision to place order at specific locations in the order book and to 
study which type of orders are revised or cancelled from the pre-opening order book is 
investigated.  Therefore, this analysis aims to highlight the order book characteristics that 
impacts individual order strategy in the pre-opening period.  
The results from this essay indicate that the aggressiveness of order submissions, price 
revisions and cancellations react to both the state of the order book, and also to changes in 
the order execution probability as reflected by the depth and height on either side of the 
order book.  In addition, the results suggest that despite the absence of trading or binding 
orders, aggressiveness in order placement strategies manifests a crowding out effect similar 
to that proposed by Parlour (1998).  Analogous to the influence of the order book on order 
submission intensity in the previous essay, the results reveal that the buy side reacts more to 
the state of the order book as compared to the sell side.  Overall, these results indicate that in 
the absence of trading during the pre-opening, traders main focus is on the probability of 
execution at the opening that is inferred from the state of the order book at each point in 
time.  This essay is presented in chapter 5.    
1.2.3   Price Discovery in the Absence of Trading: The Case of the Malta Stock 
Exchange Pre-opening Period 
The third essay comprises two major themes.  First, is to determine the relative contribution 
of the pre-opening period to the daily price discovery process.  This is achieved by utilising 
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both the weighted price contribution (WPC) method proposed by Barclay and Warner (1993) 
and the Wang and Yang (2009) extension of the Hasbrouck (1995) information share (IS) 
measure applicable to sequentially trading periods.  Studies such as Cao et al. (2000), 
Barclay and Hendershott (2003, 2008) and Ellul, Shin and Tonks (2005) measure the 
proportion of price discovery attributable to the pre-opening period relative to the trading 
day for NASDAQ and the London Stock Exchange.  However, the market that is examined 
in this thesis, the Malta Stock Exchange, evidences two important features which provide an 
important justification for measuring the contribution of the pre-opening to the daily price 
discovery process. 
First, unlike the markets studied in the aforementioned studies, the MSE is a relatively small 
and nascent stock market established in 1992.  This characteristic leads to an important 
question; does the relatively lower trading volume on this market lead to more or less price 
discovery occurring in the pre-opening period?  The answer has potentially important policy 
implications in the design of securities exchanges.  Second, another important feature of the 
MSE that differs from other major markets is the length of the pre-opening period relative to 
the trading day.  At the MSE the duration of the pre-opening period (for the majority of the 
data) is 1.5 hours long, while the trading day is 2.5 hours long.  Hence, the duration of the 
MSE pre-opening is 60% of the trading day compared to the Paris Bourse where it is 21.4%.  
This essay aims to reveal if the proportionally longer pre-opening period at the MSE results 
in a high or low proportional price discovery that is attributable to the pre-opening period.   
The second major theme of this essay focuses on determining precisely which order book 
attributes fundamentally impact the pre-opening‟s contribution to daily price discovery.  
This is achieved by investigating the impact of limit order book information on the returns 
generated over the pre-opening period.  Specifically, the information content of the order 
book is obtained by measuring the impact of the relative depth and height in the overnight 
and opening order book, and changes to that relative depth and height throughout the pre-
opening, which is attributable to order submissions, revisions and cancellations.  Hence, this 
essay measures: (1) the extent to which price discovery is achieved in the absence of trading 
and non-binding order submission, and (2) the degree to which evolution of the order book 
over the pre-opening period influences the return generated at market opening. 
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This essay is not the first to investigate the relationship between the order book and returns 
over the short run.  For instance, Huang and Stoll (1994), Chordia, Roll and Subrahanyam 
(2002), Boehmer and Wu (2008) and Cao et al. (2009) all study the impact of order book 
imbalances on returns generated over a short period of time in the future (5 minute intervals 
or so).  However, these studies focus entirely on the continuous trading period.  The focus 
here is to investigate the information content of the overnight and opening order book and 
changes to the order book throughout the pre-opening attributable to order submissions, 
revisions and cancellations in determining the return generated over the pre-opening.  Hence, 
this essay differs from previous studies in that it is the first, to my knowledge, to examine the 
impact of order book evolution on future returns in the absence of trading.    
The results reveal that in the region of one third of daily price discovery occurs in the pre-
opening period.  In addition, the results indicate that the impact of relative depth and height 
of the overnight and opening order book on returns at market opening is determined by 
orders concentrated at the top of the order book.  Interestingly, the cumulative changes to the 
relative depth attributable to order submissions during the pre-opening most significantly 
impact the opening returns of the less active stocks.  Finally, there seems to be a strong 
relationship between opening returns and cumulative changes in the relative height along the 
order book attributable to order submissions, cancellations and forward and backward price 
revisions over the pre-opening period.  Overall, the results indicate that changes to the order 
book during the pre-opening contain significant information about the returns generated over 
the period.  This essay is presented in chapter 6 of the thesis. 
1.3 Organisation of Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 provides a description of the 
MSE, an outline of the procedures and rules governing trading on the exchange and a 
statistical summary and analysis of the empirical data utilized in the thesis.  A review of the 
theoretical and empirical literature that focuses on the market pre-opening period is 
presented in chapter 3.  The first essay of the thesis, which investigates the impact of the 
order book on the intensity of order submissions in the pre-opening, is outlined in chapter 4.  
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The second essay is presented in chapter 5.  This examines order placement strategy and the 
role of the order book during the pre-opening period.  Chapter 6 contains the third essay that 
examines price discovery and the contribution of the pre-opening order book to daily returns.  
Chapter 7 provides a brief conclusion of the major findings of the thesis.   
Note that in the empirical chapters I use the term “we” rather than “I” and “our” instead of 
“my”, reflecting that each empirical chapter is associated with a working paper co-authored 
with my supervisors; Michael Bowe and Stuart Hyde.  In addition, the terms “investor”, 
“broker” and “trader” all refer to the individual that places an order on the exchange and are 
used interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
The Malta Stock Exchange: Institutional Details and 
Summary of Empirical Data 
2.1   Introduction 
The empirical studies presented throughout this thesis are focused solely on the Malta Stock 
Exchange (MSE).  This chapter provides an outline of the institutional details and rules 
governing the trading of stocks by brokers on the exchange.  Specifically, I provide a brief 
background summary of the exchange including its development and historical performance 
of the index over time.  In addition, the general trading procedures as outlined in the Malta 
Stock Exchange Bye-laws are outlined to provide a deeper understanding of institutional 
factors that are imposed by the exchange to facilitate the trading of securities.  In view of the 
fact that this thesis focuses entirely on the pre-opening period, more emphasis is placed on 
explaining procedures governing the pre-opening period relative to the trading period in 
general.  Finally, a summary and preliminary analysis of the empirical data utilised in this 
thesis is presented including the number of orders submitted, altered and executed, the 
volume associated with orders executions and orders that were submitted to the order book 
and the percentage of submissions and executed attributable to different types of investors 
and the brokers that facilitate these transactions.  Again, due to the emphasis of this thesis on 
the preopening period, the analysis follows a theme whereby comparisons are made between 
the preopening and trading periods. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2 and 2.3 discusses the 
MSE‟s background and historical stock market performance respectively.  Section 2.4 
outlines the trading procedures governing the exchange such as the use of Market or Limit 
orders, the execution priority for orders and the rules governing alterations of orders.  
Section 2.5 discusses rules implemented during the preopening period, while section 2.6 
reviews the procedure used in opening the exchange following the preopening period.  
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Section 2.7 gives a summary and analysis of the empirical data and section 2.8 provides 
concluding remarks.    
2.2   Market Background 
The MSE is a small but active stock exchange located in the capital town of Valletta in 
Malta.  The exchange opened in January 1992 following the signing of the Malta Stock 
Exchange Act of 1990.  The MSE had a relatively slow start, as trading was conducted 
manually on a call-over basis that follows an order driven concept.  In a call-over style 
trading system, an exchange clerk calls out the name of the securities and dealers place bids 
and offers to buy and sell the securities.  In addition, stocks were traded only on a weekly 
basis between 1992 and 1998 when daily trading was introduced following the listing of the 
Maltacom plc (MLC).  During the latter months of 1999, the exchange implemented an 
electronic trading platform.  Stocks would now be traded over a computerised limit order 
book, and in September 2001 the trading floor at the exchange disappeared after the 
introduction of a “remote off-the-floor” computerised system that facilitates trading via a 
computer screen. 
The MSE obtained Associate Membership of the Federation of European Securities 
Exchanges in 2001 after undergoing a rigorous evaluation process by the Federation to 
confirm that market regulations, trading operations and compliance were in accordance with 
European Union directives.
1
  In addition, Malta passed the Prevention of Financial Market 
Abuse Act of 2005, updated the Insider Dealing and Market Abuse Offence Act and 
implemented other rules and regulations targeting inside information and its disclosure.  
These enacted laws enhanced provisions against market manipulation and rules concerning 
dissemination of information so as to better ensure that an appropriate amount of investor 
protection was in place.  During November 2006, the MSE was accepted as a full member of 
the Association of National Numbering Agency after a long relationship which began at the 
                                                 
1
 The Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE) represents 42 exchanges in equities, bonds, 
derivatives and commodities from all EU Member States and other countries such as Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland and 7 Corresponding Members from European emerging markets. 
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inception of the exchange when the ISO standard for International Securities Identification 
Number (ISIN) was adopted for all securities listed and traded on the exchange. 
The MSE operates two markets; the Regular Market where Equities, Corporate Bonds and 
Government securities are traded and the Treasury Bill Market.  Presently (November, 2009) 
there are 18 stocks listed on the MSE with a total market capitalisation of approximately 
€2.7 billion, where 12 brokers are responsible for executing orders on behalf of clients and 
for their proprietary equity trading books.  Table 2.1 presents a list of the securities that are 
traded on the exchange and table 2.2 provides the list of authorised brokers.  
Table 2.1  
Equity Securities Listed on the Malta Stock Exchange 
Equity Security Symbol Currency Units Outstanding 
Bank of Valletta Plc BOV EUR 160,000,000 
HSBC Bank Malta Plc HSB EUR    291,840,000  
Lombard Bank Plc LOM EUR      35,613,581  
Middlesea Insurance Plc MSI EUR      25,000,000  
Simonds Farsons Cisk Plc SFC EUR      30,000,000  
GO Plc (Maltacom Plc) GO (MLC) EUR    101,310,488  
Int. Hotel Investments Plc IHI EUR    553,225,643  
Plaza Centres Plc PZC EUR        9,414,000  
GlobalCapital Plc GCL EUR      13,207,548  
FIMBank Plc FIM USD    135,426,954  
Malta Int. Airport Plc MIA EUR      40,589,995  
Medserv Plc MDS EUR      10,000,000  
Grand Harbour Marina Plc  GHM EUR      10,000,000  
6pm Holdings Plc 6PM GBP        7,500,000  
Crimsonwing Plc CW EUR      26,000,000  
MaltaPost Plc MTP EUR      29,129,795  
RS2 Software Plc RS2 EUR      37,500,000  
Island Hotels Group Holdings Plc  IHG EUR      35,269,200  
Note: This table presents the names of companies listed on the Malta Stock Exchange, their associated Stock 
Symbol and currency of the prices.  Here EUR, GBP and USD are the symbol for the Euro, Pound and US 
dollars respectively.  Units outstanding are as at November 24, 2009. 
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Table 2.2 
Name of Brokers that Participate at the Malta Stock Exchange 
Broker Name 
Atlas Investment Services Ltd 
Bank of Valletta plc 
Calamatta Cuschieri & Company Ltd 
Charts Investment Management Service Ltd 
Curmi & Partners Ltd 
Financial Planning Services Ltd 
Finco Treasury Management Ltd 
GlobalCapital Financial Management Ltd 
Hogg Capital Investments Ltd 
HSBC Stockbrokers (Malta) Ltd 
Lombard Bank Malta plc 
Rizzo, Farrugia & Co. (Stockbrokers) Ltd 
Note: This table presents the names of the brokers that are active members of the Malta stock exchange as at 
November 24, 2009. 
2.3   Stock Market Historical Performance 
The MSE maintains a market capitalisation weighted index that incorporates all ordinary 
shares listed and traded on the exchange.  The index is based at a level of 1,000 as of 
December 27, 1995.  Figure 2.1 graphs the MSE index over the period December 27, 1995 
to November 16, 2009.  The MSE index experienced its first extraordinary increase in value 
when it moved from a value of approximately 1280 on January 4, 1999 to 3443 on 
December 28, 1999, representing an increase of approximately 169%.  However, between 
the years 2000 and 2002 almost all the gains realised during 1999 were erased.  Between 
January 3, 2003 and December 30, 2005, the index recorded a second extraordinary increase 
of 165%.  The index recorded its largest value of approximately 6642 on March 28, 2006. 
On November 16, 2009 the index had a value of approximately 3295, less than half of its 
peak value. 
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Figure 2. 1  
2.4   MSE Trading Procedures 
2.4.1   Limit and Market Orders 
Continuous trading at the MSE begins at 10:45 am and ends at 12:30 pm, a total duration of 
1 hour and 45 minutes.
2
  All trading on the MSE is facilitated by the computerised 
Automated Trading System (MATS), where brokers place bids or offers to buy or sell shares 
of all listed stocks on the exchange.  The MSE operates an open limit order book, with 
brokers having the ability to view all orders comprising the order book, including the price 
and disclosed volume associated with an order.  According to section 4.09.06 of the Malta 
Stock Exchange plc Bye-laws (Bye-laws), brokers can submit two different types of order to 
the MATS, including Limit orders that specify a price when submitted and Market orders 
which do not specify a price when posted.  However, Market orders are executed 
immediately when submitted at the best prices obtainable and have priority over Limit orders 
at the same price levels.  The Market orders may trade through a range of prices, starting 
with the best price, until the order is completely filled.  Essentially, in the MSE Market 
orders are allowed to “walk the order book” if the order cannot be filled at the best price.  In 
addition, brokers can submit Range orders which are limit orders that allow for a range of 
                                                 
2
 Before October 23, 2006, continuous trading began at 10:00 am. 
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prices within which they can be executed.  Hence, this type of order goes beyond the price 
on the opposite side, into the depth on that side of the order book within the specified price 
range, in a similar way to Market orders.  
2.4.2   Special Term Orders 
Section 4.09.06 of the By-laws also states that orders submitted to the MATS are allowed to 
specify a Time in Force Restriction (TIF) which limits the time period within which the 
order is allowed to execute.  After the designated period has passed, the order is 
automatically cancelled from the order book.  A special case of a TIF restriction that brokers 
can apply to an order is what is known as Fill or Kill (FOK) restriction.  In this case, the 
order is executed in whole or in part, or cancelled within a specified time period after 
submission.  In other words, as soon as the portion of the order that can be executed is 
completed, then any remaining or unfilled volume is cancelled immediately after the initial 
amount is executed.   
In addition, special terms can be attached to an order that restrict the way in which the order 
is filled.  Allowable special terms are All Or None (AON), Minimum Fill (MF) and 
Minimum Block (MB).  For an AON, the total volume of the order must be executed in 
entirety or not at all.  In the case of a MF special term, the broker specifies a minimum 
volume that must be filled in entirety. Any residual volume may be traded in any trade size 
once the minimum volume is executed.  The MB special term works in the same way as an 
MF, except the residual volume is not disclosed until the minimum volume is executed. 
Sections 4.09.07 to 4.09.16 of the By-laws outline the terms of use and treatment by the 
exchange of disclosed and undisclosed volumes associated with order submissions.  For 
instance, orders that are submitted to the MATS may specify the total volume for an order or 
specify a lesser amount that is disclosed with the remaining volume “hidden” from other 
brokers.  However, even though there is a portion of an order undisclosed, brokers will be 
given an indication that an undisclosed amount is present.  The disclosed portion of the order 
acts as the “roll-in” quantity when the order is submitted.  If the order can be filled upon 
submission, it will be filled to the extent of the total volume (disclosed and undisclosed).  
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However, after a partial fill the disclosed volume will only be replenished from the 
undisclosed volume if no further orders are behind (in time sequence) at the current price 
level.  Hence, the disclosed quantity will be replenished automatically to the amount of the 
original disclosed volume.  However, when there are orders queued after the disclosed 
volume, the total disclosed volume must be filled before a new “roll-in” quantity replenishes 
the disclosed volume.  In this situation, the new “roll-in” amount will be given a new 
effective time stamp which diminishes its order execution priority. 
2.4.3   Order Execution Priority 
As outlined in section 4.09.24 of the by-laws, orders submitted to the MATS that cannot be 
executed immediately are queued and form part of the limit order book.  Orders in the order 
book are queued based upon queuing priority rules that determine which orders are eligible 
for execution over time.  For instance, the price of an order determines its priority for 
execution in that the higher priority price is defined as the better price.  Hence, a buy order 
with a higher price takes priority over another buy order with a lower price, and a sell order 
with a lower price takes priority over other sell orders at higher prices.  In the case where a 
market order is queued at a limit price, the order execution priority will be the same as if it 
were entered as a limit order.  Orders with special terms such as AON, MF or MB are treated 
with a lower priority than similar orders due to their inherent restrictions.  Thus, less 
restrictive orders are traded first and special term orders are given lower exicution priority 
compared to orders with the same limit price. 
Orders submitted to the MATS are given a time stamp which notes their actual date and time 
of submission.  The time priority takes effect when orders of the same type share the same 
limit price.  Hence, the earlier order submitted to the MATS will take execution priority over 
orders submitted at a later time.  In addition, orders that are submitted in a previous trading 
session are given time priority in the order book queue over orders submitted in the current 
trading session.   
At the end of the pre-opening period when the opening algorithm initiates trading (the 
opening), orders from the previous trading session are treated in the same way as if they had 
31 
 
been submitted during the preopening.  Hence, orders submitted before and during the pre-
opening will share the same time priority.  In addition, all orders entered during the pre-
opening are considered equal in time priority at the time of the opening when they are 
executed.  If part of an order remains unfilled after the opening execution, its time priority 
will be based on the actual time of entry during the pre-opening period.  An order entered 
with a portion of its volume undisclosed, and which participates in a fill that does not deplete 
the disclosed volume, will retain its effective time priority.  However, only when the 
undisclosed volume is “rolled-in” to the disclosed volume of an order will a new effective 
time stamp be assigned to the order. 
2.4.4   Alteration of Orders 
Orders entered and queued in the limit order book at the MSE are allowed to be altered 
without the brokers incurring any cost or obligations, according to sections 4.09.22 and 
4.09.23 of the By-laws.  In essence, brokers can change all the terms of an order including 
the type of security, order type (buy or sell), price and volume and may also include or 
remove special terms.  However, different types of alterations to an order will result in 
different consequences relating to price and time priority, or the requirement to cancel and 
resubmit the order so as to effect the change.  If the type of security or type of order needs to 
be changed from say a buy to a sell, then the order will have to be cancelled and resubmitted 
to the order book.  If there is a change in the price or an increase in the disclosed volume of 
an order, the removal of a special term or a change in the underlying client, then a new time 
stamp will be assigned.  Finally, if there is a reduction in the disclosed volume, changes in 
the undisclosed volume, changes in the time-in-force descriptions or changes in other special 
terms, then the order will maintain is original effective time stamp. 
2.5   The Pre-opening Period 
Prior to the initiation of daily trading, the MSE operates a pre-opening period where brokers 
submit orders to buy or sell securities or revise and cancel their orders queued in the limit 
order book.  The preopening period commences at 8:30 am and ends at 10:00 am before 
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October 23, 2006.  However, after October 23, 2006 the exchange authorities decided to start 
the preopening period at 9:00 am and initiate trading at 10:45 am.  One of the main features 
of the pre-opening is the lack of active execution of orders throughout the entire duration of 
this period.  Additionally, brokers have the ability to view the orders that comprise the limit 
order book inclusive of all prices and associated disclosed volume.   
According to sections 4.09.25 to 4.09.30 of the MSE By-Laws, when traders submit limit 
orders during the preopening, the MATS continuously verifies whether the stock is expected 
to open and then proceeds to calculate the expected opening price using the rules designated 
by the Opening Algorithm.
3
  To determine the opening price, the Opening Algorithm checks 
and identifies when the price of a buy order is exactly equal to the price of a sell order and 
then indicates this price to all brokers over their trading screen, including the expected 
volume that will be executed.
4
  In the case where there is a market imbalance which results 
when the best bid is greater than the best ask, the opening price calculated by the Opening 
Algorithm is determined as that single price which (in order of priority) (1) maximises the 
volume of shares traded at the opening, (2) minimises the imbalance in share volume, (3) 
minimises the close to open price change and (4) maximises the share price.   
During the pre-opening, if a broker submits a limit order with a price that is better than the 
expected opening price, as determined by the Opening Algorithm, then this order is 
classified as private information between the broker and exchange authorities.  In essence, 
when an order is classified as private information, the other brokers will not be able to see 
the actual price of the order but will see the price of the order reflected at the current 
expected opening price.  Hence, brokers are not able to view the actual price that results in a 
negative spread during the pre-opening, since the lowest sell price and the highest buy price 
is the opening price computed by the Opening Algorithm. 
                                                 
3
 A stock is expected to open when at least two orders on opposite sides of the order book have prices that 
facilitate a trade. 
4
 The expected opening execution volume, in this situation, is the minimum of the buy and sell volume.  
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2.5.1   Block-Trades and Put-Throughs 
A session for Put-Throughs and Block-Trades overlaps the pre-opening period, as outlined in 
sections 4.09.31 to 4.09.42 of the By-laws.  The Put-Through and Block trading period lasts 
20 minutes, beginning at 9:35 am and ending at 9:55 am.  In these sessions, according to the 
By-laws, a broker will match both the buying and selling clients by submitting the orders to 
the MATS.  Essentially, this explicitly implies that both parties to the trade had previously 
agreed on the price and volume of the same security to be traded by the broker.  Whenever a 
broker proposes a Put-Through and/or Block Trade to the exchange authorities, then if 
authorisation is given, the other brokers will receive a notification message on their trading 
screen informing them about the commencement of the session. 
The Put-Through session is divided into four stages.  In the first stage, the broker posts both 
orders and is allowed to amend or cancel these orders anytime before the stage ends.  The 
second stage is the challenge stage where other brokers are permitted to challenge the Put-
Through orders by either improving the bid or offer price or both.  In addition, brokers that 
challenge the Put-Through are allowed to amend or cancel their challenge anytime during 
this stage.  At the third stage, which is the resolution stage, brokers (including the initiating 
broker) are allowed to amend the Put-Through orders, provided that a challenge was made 
during the challenge stage.  The final stage is the Matching stage in which the orders 
comprising the Put-Through will be matched either to the original order in the Put-Through, 
or order(s) that were entered as a challenge during the second stage.  If, due to a challenge, 
unfilled or partially filled orders remain after the Put-Through session ends, then brokers 
have the option to transfer these orders to the pre-opening market.  However, these orders 
will be assigned a new time stamp reflecting the time of transfer. 
For a Block-Trade, special permission has to be granted by the exchange to the originating 
broker.  Such permission is normally granted in cases where the exchange determines that 
the size of the order is of a sufficient size that exceeds the capacity of the market.  The 
Block-Trading session follows the same four stages of the Put-Through session, except that a 
market official posts the Block-Trade and brokers are invited to participate.  However, at the 
end of the Block-Trade session, unfilled orders are not allowed to enter the pre-opening 
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market as it may have a destabilising effect due to the relatively larger volume associated 
with these transactions. 
2.6   The Opening 
At the end of the pre-opening period, the Opening Algorithm determines the final opening 
price and all orders that can be executed at this price are traded.  This initiation of trading is 
defined as the opening.  According to section 4.09.44 of the By-laws, when the buy and sell 
price and volume are the same, then both sides will be completely traded at the opening.  In 
the situation where there is an imbalance between the price and volume on the buy and sell 
side, then the Cross Priority rule will be applied to determine the allocation of shares.  Based 
on this rule, the side of the order book that is expected to be traded fully is described as the 
„aggressive‟ side.  These orders will have a price at or better than the calculated opening 
price.  Then the order with the highest queue priority on the aggressive side is fully allocated 
and this process is applied recursively to lower priority orders until the aggressive side is 
fully allocated.   
For the purpose of the opening allocation, the time priority is not applied and only the price 
priority is taken into consideration, which may result in orders at the opening price not being 
fully allocated.  As a consequence, once all cross-priority for limit order at the opening price 
or better is executed, any limit order remaining on the aggressive side will be fully allocated 
based on the Share Allocation rule.   In this case, the volume allocated will be as equivalent 
as possible (in board lots) to orders on the side opposite to the aggressive side, based on 
queuing priority.  However, if orders cannot be allocated evenly, then orders with the least 
priority will be allocated less volume.  When the number of remaining orders on the opposite 
side exceeds the number of board lots to be allocated then some orders, even though entered 
at or above the opening price, might remain unfilled at the end of the opening period.            
2.7   The Data 
The data utilised in this thesis relates to the most frequently traded stocks on the MSE.  For 
the purpose of this section, the six most active stocks are selected and order book activity 
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summarised and analysed.  To rank the level of activity for stocks traded on the MSE, the 
total number of events over the entire sample is cumulated.  An event is defined as an order 
submission, cancellation or price or volume revision.  The six stocks selected include, from 
most active to least, Bank of Valletta Plc (BOV), Maltacom Plc (MLC), HSBC Bank Malta 
Plc (HSB), Malta Int. Airport Plc (MIA), Int. Hotel Investments Plc (IHI) and Middlesea 
Insurance Plc (MSI) stocks.  In addition, due to the focus of this thesis on the pre-opening 
period, the analysis of data in most cases will follow a theme whereby comparisons will be 
made between the pre-opening and trading periods.  Table 2.3 presents a summary of the raw 
data for the six stocks including the start and end date of the data, the total number of events 
and the percentage of events that occur during the pre-opening and trading sessions.  For all 
six stocks, the data series ends June 28, 2007. However, for four of the six stocks, the data 
series starts January 4, 2000, while for IHI and MIA the series begins June 5, 2000 and 
December 16, 2002 respectively.  
Table 2.3 
Summary of Data 
Security Start Date End Date Total Events 
Total Events 
Preopening 
Total Events 
Trading 
BOV 4-Jan-2000 28-Jun-2007 112,514 21.67% 78.33% 
MLC 4-Jan-2000 28-Jun-2007 104,004 27.95% 72.05% 
HSB 4-Jan-2000 28-Jun-2007 99,965 19.88% 80.12% 
MIA 16-Dec-2002 28-Jun-2007 15,099 28.58% 71.42% 
IHI 5-Jun-2000 28-Jun-2007 13,765 44.01% 55.99% 
MSI 4-Jan-2000 28-Jun-2007 12,649 43.73% 56.27% 
Note: This table presents a summary of six securities in the dataset including the start date of the data, end date 
and the total number of events occurring during the pre-opening and trading sessions. 
 
Evident from table 2.3 is that for the three most active stocks, which are BOV, MLC and 
HSB, the total number of events in the sample is 112,514, 104,004 and 99,965, of which 
approximately 22%, 28% and 20% respectively occurred during the pre-opening period.  
The remaining three relatively less active stocks, which include MIA, IHI and MSI, the total 
number of events in the sample are 15,099, 13,765 and 12,649 from which approximately 
29%, 44% and 44% of these events occurred during the pre-opening period.  Hence, this 
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indicates that the less active stocks have a higher proportion of activity occurring during the 
pre-opening period relative to the trading period.  Thus, this suggests that the relative 
importance of the pre-opening increases when the stock are less active.     
2.7.1 Order Submissions, Alterations and Executions 
In order to formulate a greater understanding of the activity that occurs for each stock, table 
2.4 presents a summary of the events categorised into order submissions, order revisions and 
order cancellations.
5
  Furthermore, within each category the total number of events is 
reported along with the percentage of the total that occurs during the pre-opening and trading 
periods.  For the three most active stocks, 35,207, 31,847 and 31,917 orders were submitted, 
where approximately 40%, 48% and 38% of these submissions occurred during the pre-
opening period.  For the three least active stocks of the six, 4,957, 4,610 and 3,911 orders 
were submitted with approximately 52%, 69% and 70% submitted during the pre-opening 
period.  Order revisions, inclusive of price and volume revisions, depict a similar trend to 
order submissions.  For the three most active stocks, between 19,213 and 23,419 orders are 
revised from which between 31% and 41% occurred during the pre-opening period.  For the 
three least active stocks, between 2,910 and 3,341 orders were revised and between 45% and 
66% occurred during the pre-opening period. 
The vast majority of order cancellations occur during the pre-opening period.  For instance, 
for the three most active stocks, a total of 4,338, 5,585 and 3,409 orders were cancelled for 
BOV, MLC and HSB, approximately 65%, 69% and 59% of total cancellations occurred 
during the pre-opening period.  For the three least active of the six stocks, a greater 
proportion of cancellations occurring during the pre-opening period.  Of the 675, 798 and 
583 cancellations for MIA, IHI and MSI, approximately 78%, 85% and 71% occurred during  
                                                 
5
 Excluding order executions, there are other events that occur in the sample but are omitted in this summary 
due to their infrequency in occurrence and lack of economic substance. 
  
Table 2.4 
Summary of Order Submissions, Revisions and Cancellations 
  Order Submissions  Order Revisions  Order Cancellations 
Security  Total Pre-Open Trading  Total Pre-Open Trading  Total Pre-Open Trading 
BOV  35,207 39.62% 60.38%  23,419 32.11% 67.89%  4,338 65.31% 34.69% 
MLC  31,847 47.83% 52.17%  24,219 40.76% 59.24%  5,585 69.19% 30.81% 
HSB  31,917 37.93% 62.07%  19,213 30.90% 69.10%  3,049 58.71% 41.29% 
MIA  4,957 51.95% 48.05%  2,910 45.36% 54.64%  583 70.50% 29.50% 
IHI  4,610 70.30% 29.70%  3,211 65.52% 34.48%  798 85.34% 14.66% 
MSI  3,911 69.32% 30.68%  3,341 62.53% 37.47%  675 78.37% 21.63% 
Note: This table presents a summary of the total events in the sample of six stocks.  Only order submissions, revisions and cancellations are considered in this 
presentation.  Excluding order executions, other events are not economically meaningful and as such were omitted.  For each category, the totals are further 
separated into events that happen during the pre-opening and during the continuous trading session. 
 
Table 2.5 
Summary of Trading Activity 
Security 
Total 
Orders 
Filled 
Orders 
Filled at 
Opening 
Order Filled 
During 
Trading 
Fill to 
Submission 
Ratio at 
Opening 
Fill to 
Submission 
Ratio during 
Trading 
Orders Submitted in 
Pre-opening and Filled 
at Opening 
Orders Submitted 
and Filled During  
Same Trading 
Session 
BOV 28,749 22.17% 77.83% 45.69% 105.26% 67.65% 68.90% 
MLC 24,362 27.94% 72.06% 44.69% 105.66% 65.52% 62.11% 
HSB 26,286 22.30% 77.70% 48.42% 103.10% 69.59% 71.61% 
MIA 4,088 40.92% 59.08% 64.96% 101.40% 56.97% 66.54% 
IHI 3,180 55.16% 44.84% 54.12% 104.14% 55.36% 62.42% 
MSI 2,970 58.48% 41.52% 64.06% 102.77% 61.66% 60.41% 
Note: This table presents a summary of the total number of orders filled, the number of orders filled as a percentage of the total orders submitted, the percentage 
of order fully or partially filled at the opening or during trading, the percentage of orders filled at the opening that were submitted during the pre-opening and the 
percentage of orders filled during trading that were submitted during the same trading session. 
3
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the pre-opening.  In summary, similar to the trend highlighted in the summary of the total 
events, the conclusion remains the same when events are categorised into order submissions, 
order revisions and order cancellations.  Essentially, the pre-opening though playing a 
significant role for all six stocks, plays a relatively greater role for stocks that are less active 
on the MSE.   
Table 2.5 presents a summary of orders that are partially or fully filled (henceforth filled) for 
the six stocks being considered.  Specifically, we follow the same theme as previous tables, 
in that we list the stocks from most active to least active. Along with the total number of 
orders filled for each stock, the categories presented reflect the opening and trading period 
separately.  For the three most active stocks, BOV, MLC and HSB, 26,286, 24,362 and 
28,749 orders were filled, from which approximately 22%, 28% and 22% of the total were 
executed at the opening following the pre-opening period.  However, of the 2,970, 3,180 and 
4,088 orders filled for the stocks MIA, IHI and MSI, approximately 58%, 55% and 41% of 
these orders were filled at the opening.  Essentially, the proportion of orders filled during the 
opening, relative to the trading session reflects the same conclusion as established for order 
submissions.  Hence, the least active stocks have a greater proportion of total order 
execution occurring during the opening, relative to the most active stocks. 
The proportion of orders filled, relative to the number of orders submitted during the 
preopening and trading period, is presented in the fifth and sixth columns in table 2.5.  For 
the most active stocks, the number of orders filled at the opening relative to the number of 
orders submitted during the pre-opening period ranges between 46% and 48%.  Similarly, 
for the three least active stocks, the proportion of orders filled at the opening relative to the 
number of orders submitted during the pre-opening is greater and ranges between 54% and 
65%.  However, for all six stocks the proportion of orders filled relative to the number of 
orders submitted during the trading session is within the range 101% to 106%.   
There are two probable explanations for the proportion being in excess of 100%.  First, there 
are orders from the pre-opening that go unexecuted after the opening and remain in the limit 
order book. These are eventually executed during the subsequent trading session by 
incoming limit or market orders.  Secondly, market orders are allowed during the trading 
session and, as such, one submitted market order can result in multiple orders being filled as 
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it “walks” the limit order book.  However, the size of the others is not a contributing factor. 
As will be shown in the preceding table, orders submitted during the trading session are 
approximately the same size as orders submitted during the pre-opening period.  
The last two columns in table 2.5 present the proportion of orders filled at the opening and 
during trading of those submitted during the recent pre-opening or trading period 
respectively.  Evident from the table, is that for all six stocks the majority of all orders filled 
at the opening were submitted during the pre-opening period.  This indicates that orders 
submitted in the pre-opening tend to be aggressive in their pricing and, as such, get executed 
at the opening.  For instance, for the most active stocks, between 66% and 70% of orders 
filled at the opening were submitted during the most recent pre-opening period.  
Additionally, approximately 57% to 62% of the orders filled for the least active stocks were 
submitted during the preceding pre-opening period.  However, during the trading session, 
between 69% and 72% of orders filled for the three most active stocks were submitted 
during that trading session and approximately between 60% and 67% of orders filled for the 
three least active stocks were also submitted during that trading session.  Hence, the result 
indicates that relative to the most active stocks, the least active stocks incoming orders are 
more likely to result in a queued limit order being executed. 
2.7.2   Order Submission and Trading Volumes 
The submission and trading volume during the pre-opening and trading session are 
summarised and presented in table 2.6.  Of the total volume submitted to the order book for 
the three most active stocks, between 34% and 41% of total bid volume and between 36% 
and 43% of ask volume were submitted during the pre-opening period.  For the three least 
active stocks, between 41% and 79% of total bid volume and between 45% and 79% of ask 
volume were submitted during the pre-opening.  Apparent here is that relative to the trading 
period, a smaller proportion of total submission volume occurs during the pre-opening for 
more active stocks when compared to the least active of the six stocks in this analysis. 
Hence, the less active stocks have proportionally more of their volume submitted during the 
pre-opening period relative to the trading period.  This reinforces the earlier conclusion 
regarding the importance of the pre-opening to the least active stocks.   
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2.6 
Summary of Submission and Trading Volume during the Preopening, Opening and Trading Periods 
 
Total Volume Submitted 
Volume 
Submitted Pre-
opening 
Volume 
Submitted 
Trading 
Total Trading 
Volume 
Opening 
Trading 
Volume 
Trading 
Volume 
Trading 
 Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask 
BOV    21,295,839     23,406,630  34.06% 38.95% 65.94% 61.05%      17,007,185  17.48% 82.52% 
MLC    40,144,384     41,226,996  40.95% 42.78% 59.05% 57.22%      29,278,204  19.64% 80.36% 
HSB    22,620,033     23,406,578  36.35% 36.15% 63.65% 63.85%      18,451,778  18.15% 81.85% 
MIA      7,108,581       7,264,080  40.51% 44.96% 59.49% 55.04%         6,085,761  27.38% 72.62% 
IHI    16,085,021     17,016,853  72.46% 79.30% 27.54% 20.70%      10,641,499  57.84% 42.16% 
MSI      2,814,496       2,906,947  66.65% 69.77% 33.35% 30.23%         2,150,857  41.88% 58.12% 
Note: This table reports for the entire sample the total bid and ask volumes submitted to the order book, the percentage of these volumes submitted during the 
preopening and the trading periods, the total trading volume and the percentage of the volume traded at the opening and during the trading period.  
4
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Table 2.7 presents a summary of the average and standard deviation of order submission 
volume and trading volume during the pre-opening and trading periods for the six stocks.                
For order submissions, the summary of volume is categorised into bid and ask separately.  
Evident from the table is that the average size of bid and ask orders submitted during the pre-
opening are not considerably larger or smaller in general compared to orders submitted 
during the trading period.  For instance, the average size of bid order submitted during the 
trading session for the three most active stocks ranges between 0.61 and 1.1 times larger than 
the size of bid orders submitted during the pre-opening period.  For the three least active 
stocks, the size of bid orders submitted during trading ranges between 1.02 to 1.19 times 
larger than orders submitted during trading.  Similarly, the average size of ask orders 
submitted during trading are between 0.98 and 1.07 times, for the most active stocks, and 
between 1.15 to 1.38 times, for the least active, larger than ask orders submitted during the 
pre-opening period.  However, in general the average size of ask order tends to increase 
during trading relative to the pre-opening, when compared to the average size of bid orders 
in both periods.    
The average size of orders executed at the opening relative to the trading session is 
proportionally similar to the relative size of orders submitted during the pre-opening and 
during trading respectively.  Essentially, for the three most active stocks, the average size of 
orders executed during trading relative to the average size of orders executed during the 
opening, ranges between 0.97 to 2.26 times larger.  For the three least active stocks, the 
relative size of average trading volume during trading relative to the opening, ranges 
between 1.11 and 1.23 times larger.  With the exception of MLC, where the average trade 
during the trading period relative to the opening is more than double.  The average trade size 
at the opening for the other stocks is relatively of similar size to the trading period. 
Another point to note from table 2.7 is the size of the standard deviation relative to the size 
of the average in all cases.  For bid and ask submission volume and trading volume during 
the pre-opening and the trading period, respectively, the size of standard deviation is larger 
than the averages in all cases.  This indicates excess dispersion, which suggests that there are 
  
 
Table 2.7 
Summary of Orders Submission and Trade Volume during Pre-opening, Opening and Trading Period 
  BOV MLC HSB MIA IHI MSI 
Bid Submission Volume during Pre-opening. 
Avg.      1,279       2,125       1,520       2,477       5,304       1,563  
Std.      1,823       2,437       2,199       2,908       6,479       2,713  
Bid Submission Volume during Trading. 
Avg.      1,408       1,302       1,463       2,521       6,318       1,657  
Std.      1,721       1,779       1,730       2,494       7,340       2,987  
Bid Submission Volume during Trading Relative to 
Pre-opening Period. 
        1.10         0.61         0.96         1.02         1.19         1.06  
Ask Submission Volume during Pre-opening. 
Avg.      1,463       2,468       1,830       2,098       4,224       1,021  
Std.      1,933       2,370       2,016       1,801       4,635       1,460  
Ask Submission Volume during Trading. 
Avg.      1,560       2,419       1,847       2,408       4,928       1,412  
Std.      1,442       2,270       1,927       2,193       4,831       2,984  
Ask Submission Volume during Trading Relative to 
Pre-opening Period. 
        1.07         0.98         1.01         1.15         1.17         1.38  
Trade Volume at Opening. 
Avg.         755       1,302          938       1,317       2,746          795  
Std.      1,261       1,779       1,540       1,496       3,520       2,149  
Trade Volume during Trading. 
Avg.         794       2,939          911       1,468       3,373          885  
Std.      1,039       2,807          927       1,735       4,265       2,002  
Trading Volume during Trading Relative to Opening 
period. 
        1.05         2.26         0.97         1.11         1.23         1.11  
Note: This table presents the average (Avg.) and standard deviation (Std.) for the volume of bid and ask orders submitted during the pre-opening and trading 
periods and the volume of orders fully or partially filled at the opening and during trading. 
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Table 2.8 
Summary of the Number of Orders Submitted and Trade during the Pre-opening, Opening and Trading Period 
  BOV MLC HSB MIA IHI MSI 
No. of Bid Orders Submitted during Pre-opening 
Avg.       6        5       6       2       2       2  
Std.       8        8     14       1     11       3  
No. of Bid Orders Submitted during Trading 
Avg.     10        6     13       3       2       2  
Std.     14     12     26       3       2       2  
No. of Bid Order Submitted during Trading Relative to 
Pre-opening.  
       1.67        1.20        2.17        1.50        1.00        1.00  
No. of Ask Orders Submitted during Pre-opening 
Avg.       6        4       4       2       4       3  
Std.       5        7       4       2     18       3  
No. of Ask Orders Submitted during Trading 
Avg.       8        7       9       3       2       2  
Std.       9        7     10       3       2       2  
No. of Bid Order Submitted during Trading Relative to 
Pre-opening. 
       1.33        1.75        2.25        1.50        0.50        0.67  
No. of Trades at Opening 
Avg.       3        3       3       2       2       2  
Std.       9        9     17       2       2       2  
No. of Trades during Trading 
Avg.     15        3     16       5       3       3  
Std.     29        4     47       7       4       4  
No. of Trades during Trading Relative to Opening.  5.00 1.00 5.33 2.50 1.50 1.50 
Note: This table presents the average (Avg.) and standard deviation (Std.) of the number of bid and ask orders submitted and orders that were fully or partially 
filled at the opening or during the trading session. 
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periods when there are relatively larger volumes being submitted and traded, and other 
periods when the volume of both are relative low. 
2.7.3  Daily Average Number of Order Submissions and Trades 
A summary of the average number of orders submitted and executed during the pre-opening, 
opening and trading period is provided in table 2.8.  In general there are more orders 
submitted during the trading period compared to the pre-opening period and more order 
executed during the trading session relative to the opening.  More specifically, for the three 
most active stocks, an average of five or six bid orders were submitted during the pre-
opening period, while on average ten or thirteen orders were submitted during the trading 
period.  For the three least active, an average of two bid orders were submitted during the 
pre-opening, while between two to four orders were submitted during the trading period.  
Similarly, for the three most active stocks, between four and six ask orders were submitted 
during the pre-opening compared to between seven and eight during the trading session.  In 
addition, for the three least active stocks, between two to four ask orders were submitted 
during the pre-opening while between two and three orders were submitted during the 
trading session.  This suggests that, for the least active stocks, most of the ask orders were 
submitted during the pre-opening period relative to bid order submissions. 
On average, the number of trades occurring during the trading session is greater than the 
number of trades executed during the opening.  For the three most active stocks, an average 
of three trades occur at the opening compared to, on average, three, fifteen and sixteen trades 
executing during the trading period.  For the three least active stocks a similar trend is 
observed.  On average, two orders are executed at the opening compared to between three 
and five during the trading period.  With respect to the standard deviation, in almost all cases 
the standard deviation is greater than the average, indicating that there are periods of very 
high and very low activity at the opening and during the trading session. 
  
  
 
Table 2.9 
Summary of Order Submission and Fill by Broker 
Broker 
Orders Submitted 
Preopening 
Orders Filled at Open 
Orders Submitted 
Trading 
Orders Filled During 
Trading 
 Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell 
BR1 4.88% 9.62% 4.66% 5.90% 3.93% 4.68% 3.96% 5.00% 
BR2 5.23% 8.10% 8.38% 11.88% 5.21% 10.23% 5.19% 10.84% 
BR3 5.65% 5.95% 7.11% 6.50% 2.66% 2.72% 4.72% 3.45% 
BR4 1.69% 1.82% 1.66% 1.42% 0.71% 0.85% 0.90% 0.94% 
BR5 5.10% 6.98% 3.50% 5.41% 3.53% 3.27% 3.95% 3.47% 
BR6 3.00% 3.27% 2.31% 2.32% 2.08% 1.95% 2.28% 2.23% 
BR7 11.83% 9.44% 17.65% 15.06% 21.28% 19.96% 19.38% 17.65% 
BR8 6.95% 5.83% 5.83% 4.14% 4.96% 5.13% 4.96% 4.61% 
BR9 2.09% 1.87% 2.24% 2.00% 2.39% 3.14% 2.47% 2.82% 
BR10 0.86% 0.65% 0.98% 0.71% 0.54% 0.50% 0.44% 0.26% 
BR11 23.21% 22.58% 23.35% 22.89% 25.93% 22.11% 23.28% 22.34% 
BR12 25.89% 19.12% 17.59% 13.81% 21.10% 14.69% 22.24% 14.12% 
BR13 2.28% 2.39% 3.28% 3.25% 3.55% 3.51% 4.16% 5.00% 
BR14 0.26% 0.47% 0.28% 0.71% 0.14% 0.51% 0.18% 0.52% 
BR15 1.04% 1.81% 1.09% 2.77% 1.85% 6.38% 1.73% 5.93% 
BR16 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
BR17 0.05% 0.09% 0.07% 1.24% 0.14% 0.37% 0.15% 0.82% 
Note: This table reports the percentage of order submitted and filled by brokers.  Specifically, the percentage of orders submitted during the preopening and 
trading periods and the percentage of the total orders filled at the opening and during the trading period by all participating brokers.  Each category is further 
separated into the bid and ask sides.  The names of the brokers are replaced with a separate identifier so as not to reveal the brokers‟ activity. 
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Table 2.10 
Summary of Order Submission and Fill by Type of Investor 
Type of Investor 
Orders Submitted 
Preopening 
Orders Filled at 
Open 
Orders Submitted 
Trading 
Orders Filled 
During Trading 
 Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell 
Resident Individual 83.52% 80.33% 78.19% 75.06% 75.76% 63.04% 75.56% 62.75% 
Resident Credit Institutions 0.74% 1.14% 1.42% 2.27% 1.75% 4.62% 1.82% 5.08% 
Non Fin. Private Entity 2.24% 2.89% 3.10% 4.73% 3.89% 5.78% 3.96% 5.78% 
Resident Insurance Company 1.96% 0.95% 3.39% 1.75% 4.39% 4.43% 4.20% 3.89% 
Resident Collective Investment Scheme 9.80% 12.43% 10.29% 12.32% 10.40% 16.83% 10.27% 16.49% 
Other 1.75% 2.25% 3.61% 3.87% 3.80% 5.29% 4.18% 6.01% 
Note: This table reports the percentage of orders submitted during the preopening and trading periods and the percentage of the total orders filled at the opening 
and during the trading period by major investor types.  Each category is further separated into the bid and ask sides. 
4
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2.7.4   Submission and Trading Activity by Broker and Investor Type 
Table 2.9 summarizes the proportion of orders submitted and executed by brokers during the 
pre-opening, opening and trading sessions.  The names of the brokers are replaced so as not 
to reveal their trading activities.  Of the seventeen brokers listed in the table, there are four, 
BR2, BR7, BR11 and BR12 that play a dominant role in the submission and execution of 
orders during the pre-opening and trading session.
6
  For instance, during the pre-opening, 
approximately 66% and 59% of bid and ask submission and 74% to 67% during the trading 
period, were submitted by these brokers.  In addition, approximately 67% and 64% of bid 
and ask orders filled at the opening and approximately 70% and 65% of bid and ask orders 
filled during trading are by these four brokers.  
Following a similar format, table 2.10 summarises order submission and execution based on 
the major categories of investor type on whose behalf brokers trade.  Evident from the table 
is that the overwhelming majority of all orders submitted and executed are on behalf of 
residential individual or collective investment schemes.  Specifically, approximately 84% 
and 76% of bid orders and 80% and 76% of ask orders submitted during the pre-opening and   
trading periods, respectively, were attributable to these investors.  In addition, approximately 
88% and 87% of bid orders and 86% and 79% of ask orders executed at the opening and 
during trading, respectively, were on behalf of residential investors and collective 
investments schemes.  Hence, the overwhelming majority of trading on the MSE is 
attributable to local investors. 
2.8   Conclusions 
In this chapter, I present a summary of the development of the MSE since its inception, an 
outline of the trading procedure implemented to facilitate the trading process and a summary 
of the empirical data for the six most active stocks utilised in this thesis.  Regarding the 
trading procedures, the types of orders allowed for use on the exchange are Market and Limit 
orders.  In addition, orders are allowed to include special terms that can specify an expiry 
                                                 
6
 The number of brokers listed in table 2.9 is greater than the number presented in table 2.2.  This results from 
the number of brokers reducing over time.  In addition, other brokers listed are the Central Bank and other 
market regulators.   
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date after which the order is automatically cancelled, or other criteria that governs the way in 
which the volume associated with an order is displayed or executed.  The execution priority 
of orders submitted to the order book and the effect of alterations to the order terms on the 
time and price priority of the order, are also outlined.  Since this thesis focuses mainly on the 
pre-opening period, this chapter outlines the rules governing the pre-opening period and the 
Opening Algorithm responsible for the execution and allocation of securities at the opening 
of the exchange. 
The preliminary analysis of the empirical data reveals that the pre-opening period plays an 
important role for the six most active stocks investigated.  The pre-opening period accounts 
for between 38% and 70% of all orders submitted for these stocks.  However, the pre-
opening plays a relatively greater role for the least active of the six stocks considered, as 
proportionally more orders are submitted during the pre-opening period when compared to 
the trading period.  A similar conclusion arises when the number of orders filled at the 
opening, relative to the trading period, is compared.  Essentially, between 22% and 58% of 
orders filled for the six stocks were at the opening.  As the stocks become less active, the 
relative proportion of orders filled at the opening increases.  In essence, this further 
highlights the importance of the pre-opening period for stocks traded on the MSE and more 
so for the less active stocks.  In addition, when the analysis focuses on the submitted and 
trading volumes, the conclusions remain the same. 
An examination of the broker order submission and execution activity during the pre-
opening and trading periods reveals that there are four dominate brokers.  Of the total 
number of order submissions, approximately 63% and 70% were submitted by these brokers 
during the pre-opening and trading periods respectively.  In addition, approximately 66% 
and 73% of orders filled at the opening and during trading respectively, are by each of these 
four brokers.  The local individual investors classified as Residential Investors, account for 
the majority of orders submitted and executed on the MSE.  Approximately 82% and 69% of 
orders submitted during the pre-opening and trading periods and approximately 77% and 
69% of orders executed at the opening and during the trading period are attributable to these 
investors. 
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In summary, the analysis of the empirical data reveals that the pre-opening period plays an 
important role in the MSE relative to the trading period, due to the level of activity that 
occurs during that period.  However, the pre-opening period is characterised by a lack of 
trade execution and this makes even less clear the reasons why traders would participate 
during this period.  It is this question that forms the foundation of investigation undertaken 
in this thesis.           
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Chapter 3 
The Market Pre-opening Period: A Review of Theoretical 
and Empirical Literature 
3.1   Introduction 
The price discovery process in markets that facilitate the trading of securities between 
investors is one of the most studied areas of finance and is arguably the quintessence of 
market microstructure theory.  The field of market microstructure places great emphasis on 
determining the factors that influence price discovery at the transaction level and makes 
theoretical predictions about the effect of these factors on the price of securities.  In 
particular, the significance of studying the price discovery process in a securities market 
facilitates a greater understanding of the mechanism for achieving price efficiency and 
provides plausible reasons why prices deviate from efficiency.   
When prices are efficient, all the available market information is reflected in the level of 
prices and any deviation will be due to frictions in updating prices whenever additional 
information becomes available.  Thus the price discovery process can be described as the 
mechanism by which prices become efficient through the continuous incorporation of new 
information into security prices.  Therefore, the characteristics of the price discovery process 
will significantly impact the convergence of asset prices to their fundamental values and the 
consequent volatility in prices caused by the adjustment process.   
Significant deviations from efficient prices can result in periods of unusually high volatility 
and in some cases market regulators are forced to halt the trading process in order to resume 
some degree of serenity to the market.  However, halts in the trading process are sometimes 
involuntary and unavoidable such as the overnight, holiday or weekend closing of the 
markets.  During these halts, the continuous updating of security prices to reflect the state of 
information in the market is absent and as such, there is a “pause” in the price discovery 
process.  As a result, closing prices may become inefficient if additional information is 
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received by investors during the period of the trading halt.  Hence the difference in valuation 
of the assets‟ fundamental value by all investors tends to result in significant price volatility 
at the resumption of continuous trading.   
One of the first attempts to highlight and provide evidence of this phenomenon is Wood, 
McInish and Ord (1985).  In their analysis, they examine the distribution of minute-by-
minute return of an equally-weighted index of stocks listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE).  The authors find that, at the beginning of trade, the return and the 
standard deviation of return is significantly higher compared to other periods during the 
trading day.  One plausible explanation for this phenomenon is proposed by Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987), who argue that the difference in the mechanism used to open and close 
the market, and hence determine the opening and closing prices, is responsible for the 
observed difference in volatility.  In contrast, Stoll and Whaley (1990) claim that, in the case 
of the NYSE, the higher volatility observed at the opening is attributable to the presence of 
more private information being revealed during the opening.  The authors also claim that due 
to the monopoly power of the specialist at the NYSE, the opening prices are set higher than 
in the case of competitive market-making, thereby resulting in larger open-to-open returns.   
Amihud and Mendelson (1991) argue that the observed opening volatility is attributable to 
the halt in the trading process before the opening.  In essence, during the overnight or 
weekend closing period, the efficiency of prices is affected by the absence of trading and 
therefore prices are not being continuously adjusted to reflect the state of information that 
investors possess.  As a result, when investors begin to trade at the opening of the market, 
their varying valuation of the assets is reflected in significant price volatility. 
In light of these observations, there are mechanisms in place at most exchanges to reduce the 
effect of uncertainties facing investors regarding the fundamental value of the asset after a 
halt in the trading process.  In most cases, the mechanism employed is similar to a call 
auction process that precedes the official opening of the market and is referred to as the 
market pre-opening period.  During the pre-opening period, unexecuted orders from the 
previous trading day, overnight orders (in some cases) and new orders during this period are 
submitted and pooled, in the absence of trading, for a specified period before the market 
opens.  At the end of the pre-opening period, the pooled orders are matched and a single 
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opening price is determined for each stock.
7
  In addition, during the pre-opening period 
traders have the opportunity to modify and/or cancel existing orders so as to reflect the most 
current state of information without (in most cases) any cost or obligation, once it is done 
before the order is executed at the open.   
Arguably, it is this iterative process (or at least the ability) of updating and submitting new 
orders based on the state of information, that forms the foundation for price discovery during 
the pre-opening period.  This results from investors having the ability to gain as much 
information about the value of an asset and act on the information within a reasonable time 
frame before trades are executed.  However, the market pre-opening period does not have a 
unique design; it varies from exchange to exchange and is influenced by the mechanisms 
that exist to facilitate continuous trading during the regular trading period.  As such, 
different factors will not just affect the design of the pre-opening, but also the resulting price 
discovery process, which essentially is the main objective of the pre-opening period in the 
first place.  For instance, some exchanges mandate market makers to provide liquidity for 
stocks they have been assigned, while other exchanges operate an automated limit order 
book without the intervention of designated market makers, or a combination of both.   
Additionally, the exchange may have stipulations regarding the dissemination of quote 
information, in that the limit order book is not displayed to traders during the pre-opening.  
In other cases, the best bid and ask quotes are displayed or, in the case of total transparency, 
the entire limit order book is displayed to all market participants during the pre-opening 
period.  Another institutional feature to consider is the length of time that the pre-opening 
period lasts and if the end of the pre-opening period is fixed or randomised after a specified 
period of time.  In essence, the institutional features of the market will have an effect on the 
price discovery process throughout the pre-opening period. 
At the end of the pre-opening period, the opening price (in some cases) is determined by an 
algorithm that is designed by the exchange and based upon their individual circumstances.  
However, in most cases the opening price will be set to maximise the liquidity at the opening 
                                                 
7
 In some cases there is no set matching procedure to determine a single opening price.  However, what is done 
in these cases is that the executable bid and ask orders are matched and non-matching pairs are left in the order 
book. 
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with price continuity being a major consideration.  To get a better understanding of the 
dynamics of the price discovery process during the pre-opening period, this chapter reviews 
some of the most influential contributions to the theoretical and empirical literature of the 
market pre-opening period.   
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 provides an in-depth 
review of the theoretical literature, highlighting the institutional structure of the models, their 
main assumptions and the results that these models predict concerning the price discovery 
process.  Section 3.3 is a review of the empirical literature that seeks to provide support for 
the theoretical predictions and, importantly, highlights the influence of the markets‟ 
institutional structure on the price discovery process.  Section 3.4 provides a conclusion. 
3.2   Review of Theoretical Literature 
3.2.1   Competitive Market Makers, Informed and Noise Traders  
One of the first attempts to model the tâtonnement process during the pre-opening period 
was carried out by Vives (1995), and is an extension of the Kyle (1985) general equilibrium 
model.
8
  Vives (1995) proposes a dynamic financial market model in which there are only 
two assets; a risky asset with a liquidation value v , where ) ,( ~ vvNv   and a riskless asset 
assumed to have a unitary return.  Furthermore, two types of agents are assumed to trade 
these assets; „informed‟ and „noise‟ (uninformed) traders. 
The informed traders are motivated to trade based on a private signal that they receive 
regarding the value of the asset; whereas the noise traders will trade for liquidity reasons 
such as portfolio rebalancing purposes.  Risk neutral market makers facilitate the trading 
process for both assets and set prices, assumed to be efficiently and competitively 
determined based on Bertrand competition among all market makers.  The tâtonnement 
process is an infinite horizon call auction, where at stage n  there is a positive probability of 
n  
that trade will occur, the opening price of the risky asset is determined and the market 
opens to regular trading.  However, there is a probability of  n1  that trading will not 
                                                 
8
 In a Walrasian auction a tâtonnement is a process whereby proposed trade-offs between negotiated items goes 
back and forth until an equilibrium price is achieved. 
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occur in period n , and the pre-opening tâtonnement continues.  It is assumed that the 
probability that the market opens at any stage is independent of the previous periods, 
therefore the probability that the tâtonnement lasts until period n  will be )1(1 t
n
t   .  
Additionally, the probability n  is an increasing function in n  and as a result, 
0)1(lim 1  

t
n
t
n
 , as such, 1lim 

t
t
 .9   
At the beginning of the pre-opening period n  is relatively small and hence the probability 
that the market opens at some later period ( n ) will be reasonably high.  However, as the 
tâtonnement covers several rounds and n  becomes large (close to the end of the pre-
opening), then n  will be relatively large and the probability that the market opens over a 
longer period is closer to zero.
10
 
At the beginning of period n  of the tâtonnement, the informed trader i , without knowing 
that trade will occur during the period, submits a market order for ix  units of the risky asset 
at a predetermined price of p, from which a profit of ii xpv )(   is realisable if trade takes 
place during the period.  The informed traders are assumed to be risk averse and display 
Constant Absolute Risk Averse (CARA) behaviour with utility function of the form 
)exp()( iU  i , where i is the positive coefficient of constant absolute risk aversion.  
The order submitted to the market makers by the informed trader i  during stage n  of the 
tâtonnement is conditional upon the noisy signal is  regarding the fundamental value of the 
asset v ,
 
where ii vs   
is normally distributed and has mean s and variance 
2
 .  The 
information set of the informed trader i  at stage n  of the tâtonnement is  1 , ni ps , where 
),.......,,( 121
1

  n
n pppp  is the sequence of previous price quotes by the market maker up to, 
but excluding, period n .   
                                                 
9
 This set up is similar to a pre-opening period that is characterised by a random opening after a specific time. 
10
 This may seem unrealistic since in most cases the market has a set time at which it opens.  Vives (1995) 
explains that the probability of the market opening at an early stage in the preopening is akin to a 
communication breakdown and traders are unable to modify their orders and their current orders are executed 
during the opening call.  This event will indeed have a small probability of occurring during the early stages of 
the preopening. 
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The total order submitted by the informed traders in period n  is given as 


1
0
1),(~ dip sXx ninin , where ) ,(
1n
ini psX  is the order strategy (quantity to buy or sell) of 
trader i  in stage n .  Therefore, the strategy of the informed traders will be dependent upon 
the private signal that they receive and the sequence of previous prices they observe. If trade 
is realised in period n , then the pre-opening period ends and regular trading activities begin, 
otherwise the tâtonnement continues.  However, with no trade in period n , the informed 
traders would have an updated information set based on public information they had 
received through the subsequent sequence of prices  np  compared to 1np .   
From evaluating the updated price series, the informed traders assesses their trading strategy 
and modify, cancel or submit new orders that are conditional on the level of prices relative to 
the signal that they receive.  As such, the prices that the market makers quote at the end (or 
beginning) of each stage serves as a mechanism to extract information from the informed 
traders regarding the fundamental value of the asset.  This forms the underlying basis for 
price discovery during the preopening period. 
The noise traders are assumed to be price sensitive and submits an aggregate order to 
purchase the risky asset of nnn pu  , where n  measures the sensitivity of the total order of 
the noise traders to prices and nu  is a normally distributed random variable with mean zero 
and variance 2
u  .  The total orders that the market maker observes during stage n  of the 
tâtonnement is the aggregate orders submitted by the informed and noise traders, which is 
nnnnnn puxpL 
~)( .  The author argues that the information that is important to the 
market makers about the unknown value of the risky asset v  will be the intercept of the total 
order )( nn pL .  Therefore, nnn ux 
~
 
is defined as the order flow and the market maker 
will set the price conditional on the order flows, such that )|())(|( nnnn vEpLvEp  . 
In the first period of the tâtonnement process, the market makers quotes a price of 1p  from 
which both types of traders submit their market orders to the market makers, such that the 
total order is 111111
~)( puxpL  .  If trade is realised then the process ends there and the 
value v  of the asset is realised.  However, if trade does not occur, then in the second period 
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the traders (informed and noise) will either modify their previous order or cancel and submit 
new orders.  In this case, the strategy of the informed trader i  in period 2 takes the form 
) ,( 12 psX ii and the noise traders submit in aggregate a market order of 222 pu  .  
Subsequently, this process continues recursively until the preopening period ends, the market 
opens and trading occurs. 
In the general case, market makers will quote efficient prices, based on the aggregate 
information that they receive, by observing the order flow n , where 
n
n   ,..., , 21  is 
the sequence of previous order flow over the n  periods of the tâtonnement, up to and 
including period n .  Therefore, the competitive market makers will set price np  in period n  
conditional on the noisy information contained in the previous order flow 
),...,,( 121
1

  n
n   and the current period order flow nnn ux 
~ , such that 
)|( nn Ep  .   
The information that the market makers observe in the order flow is a noisy signal for the 
value of the asset, due to the anonymity of orders placed by informed agents and those of 
noise traders.  In essence, the market makers will only observe random orders during any 
stage of the preopening period.  However, by observing the evolution of the order flow, the 
market makers are well positioned to be able to extract valuable information from the 
informed traders about the value of the asset if the tâtonnement process continues over a 
sufficient amount of rounds. 
The main hypotheses being investigated are; (1) how many rounds of the tâtonnement are 
necessary to provide an accurate estimation of the liquidation value of the risky asset and (2) 
how does the parameter of the risk aversion  , the noise in the private signal 2
e  and the 
noise in the order flow affect the speed at which prices reveal private and public information.   
The results show that, in equilibrium, the informed trader i  has a desire to buy or sell the 
risky asset according to the difference between the private signal is  
and the value of the 
risky asset v .  The price of the risky asset that is set by the competitive market makers, 
follow a martingale process, such that 11)|(   nnn pppE .  This follows from the assumption 
that the prices and the value of the asset follow a normal distribution and, due to competitive 
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market making, )|( 1 nn pvEp  is a sufficient statistic in estimating the unknown value of 
the asset v  when the series  1np  is known.  As a result, the price that is set in period 1n  
will be conditional upon the price in the previous stage of the tâtonnement, such that 
11)|(   nn ppvE . 
The response of informed traders to the private signal, which is reflected in their order 
strategy ) ,( 1nini psX , depends negatively on their degree of risk aversion  , the noise in 
the private signal 2
e , and the conditional variance of the prices )|( 1nn ppVar .  Another 
fundamental result is that the sensitivity of orders from noise traders to price ( n ) does not 
affect the trading strategy that the informed traders employ to exploit their private signal is .  
However, an increase in market depth results in the informed traders responding more to the 
private information, since the price impact of their orders will be relatively less.
11
 
Additionally, as the number of rounds n  in the tâtonnement increase, prices become more 
informative regarding the public and private information that is revealed by the traders.  The 
explanation here is that the informed traders will buy once their private signal is above the 
current price and sell if it is below.  Consequently, the prices that the market makers quote 
converges to the unknown fundamental value v  at the rate of n1 , due to informed trading.  
Furthermore, the precision of the quoted prices in relation to the fundamental value of the 
asset decreases in the level of risk aversion  , the noise in the private signal 2
e  and the 
variance of aggregate order from noise traders 2
u . 
The competitive market makers increases the liquidity of market (depth) as the number of 
rounds in the tatonnement increases and the market prices that they quote become less 
sensitive to the level of the order flow.  The volatility of price quotes increase as more 
information is being incorporated into current prices and, consequently, the market order of 
the informed traders tend to zero due to the erosion of their informational advantage.  
Essentially, the efficiency of this information aggregating process reveals that only a few 
rounds during the tâtonnement will provide a quoted price that is close to the fundamental 
                                                 
11
 The depth of the market here is defined as the maximum number of share that the market makers are willing 
to buy or sell at a specific price. 
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value of the risky asset v .  Hence, providing an indicative price np  at each stage during the 
preopening period is vital for enabling the opening price to converge to the unknown value 
of the asset after a halt in the trading process. 
The model presented above proves to be a fair representation of the tâtonnement process 
during the preopening period.  One of the most interesting results is the speed at which 
information is incorporated into prices and, for that reason, the tâtonnement over a 
sufficiently long period will reveal the full unknown fundamental value of the risky asset.  
This process, however, erodes the value of the private information (signal) that the informed 
traders receive and at the end of the preopening period, they would not have benefited from 
receiving the information.  However, with the speed of information revelation, a reasonable 
question in this case is why would the informed trader submit orders during the period when 
the probability of the market opening is low?   
Another consideration regarding the model presented in Vives (1995), is that, given the 
speed of information erosion during the preopening, would the informed traders devise 
strategies to conceal as much of the information as possible when the probability that the 
market opens is low and employ a profitable strategy when the probability that the market 
opens is high?   
3.2.2   Manipulation during the Pre-opening 
3.2.2.1   Strategic Manipulation by an Informed Trader 
To analyse the effects of incorporating strategic behaviour by an informed trader in the 
preopening period, Medrano and Vives (2001) extend the model of Vives (1995).  The 
authors incorporate an informed trader that acts strategically on the private information in 
the presence of competitive informed traders and noise traders.  In this set up, there is a 
continuum of informed traders of total mass, standardised on the interval  1 ,0 .  Of these 
informed traders  1 , where 10   , represent the mass of the risk averse competitive 
informed traders as described in Vives (1995) and the remaining   represent a single risk-
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neutral strategic informed trader.
12
  The informed trader acts by taking into consideration the 
effect that the market orders have on the informational content of prices and, as such, will 
devise strategies to counter this effect.  These three categories of traders submit market 
orders to risk-neutral market makers that are assumed to be competitive and set prices 
efficiently. 
The tâtonnement is assumed to take place over a finite horizon of N period compared to the 
infinite horizon case discussed in Vives (1995).  The value of N is unknown to all traders.  
At state n  of the tâtonnement, where Nn 0 , there is a positive probability of n  that 
trade occurs and the value of the asset v  is realised and the market opens for trading.    The 
probability that the tâtonnement continues (no trade) and traders cancel, revise or submit 
new trades is  n1 .  It is further assumed that the sequence of probability  n  will be 
non-decreasing and a significant difference to the case of Vives (1995) is that 1N .  In 
other words, trade must occur at stage N of the tâtonnement. 
Similarly, there is one risky asset with a liquidation value v , where ) ,(~ 2vvNv  , and a 
riskless asset is assumed to have a unitary return.  The strategic informed trader, in this case, 
observes the liquidation value of the risky asset v , and the information set is given by 
 1 , npv , where ),...,,( 1211   nn pppp is the series of past prices in the tâtonnement.  In 
addition, ) ,( 1nn pvY  denotes the market order submitted by the strategic informed trader in 
period n .  The competitive informed trader i , on the other hand, receives a private signal 
ii vs   regarding the value of the asset, where ) ,(~
2
vNsi .  As previously defined, the 
information set of the competitive informed trader i  will be  1 , ni ps .   
If we define y  as the size of the aggregate market order submitted by the informed traders 
(competitive and strategic) during the trade execution stage of the tâtonnement, then the 
market order y  submitted by the strategic informed trader at a price p , will yield a profit 
of yp  )(  .  The competitive informed trader i’s profit from ix  units of the asset at a 
                                                 
12
 Another explanation is to assume that a fixed proportion of the informed traders will act strategically on the 
information (signal) that they receive and the remaining will behave in the competitive manner as described in 
Vives (1995). 
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price of p  is ii xpv )(  .
13
  The competitive informed traders are assumed to display 
constant absolute risk-averse (CARA) behaviour, the strategy of the competitive informed 
traders is identical to the case presented in Vives (1995) and, similarly, the noise traders 
submit an aggregate order of nu  units.  The risk-neutral competitive market makers observe 
a noisy order flow due to the presence of the noise traders and the anonymity of the trade 
flows.  Similar to Vives (1995), the price in period n  is the expected value of the asset v  
given all the information that the market makers have observed up to and including period n. 
The results of the dynamic model presented above are achieved by simulating the model 
over the N stages of the tâtonnement, from which several conclusions are established.  The 
main conclusions with regard to the behaviour of the strategic informed trader during the 
preopening period are as follows:  The strategic informed trader has an incentive to 
manipulate the market at the beginning of the tâtonnement in order to exploit the private 
information received.  Similar to the results of Vives (1995), the rate at which prices 
converge to the value of the asset is reasonably fast due to the competitive behaviour of the 
informed traders.
14
   
In order to keep prices uninformative, the strategic informed trader has to submit market 
orders that are contrary to the orders submitted by the competitive informed traders.  Thus, 
the strategic informed trader always manipulates the market during the period when the 
probability that the tâtonnement ending (market opens) n  is low.  In other words, the 
strategic informed trader submits market orders that are contrary to the private information 
that is received so as to compensate for the information revealed by the competitive 
informed traders. 
Inevitably, the strategic informed trader has to reverse the “contrary” orders and submit 
market orders that are in line with the direction of the private information.  When the 
                                                 
13
 The authors do not explicitly make the connection between the aggregate order of the competitive informed 
traders and that of the strategic informed trader.  Essentially, y will be the total units demanded by the informed 
agents (competitive and strategic), thus if the strategic trader demands y  units then the competitive traders 
will submit in aggregate  y1 which should be equal to 
1

dixi .  However, this is not explicitly stated. 
14
 Recall that the value of the asset v is equal to the average signal of the competitive informed traders in the 
model of Medrano and Vives (2001). 
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probability that the tâtonnement ends n  is high, the strategic informed trader reverses the 
queued orders.  As a consequence, the results indicate that the trade intensity associated with 
the strategic informed trader increases with the probability that the market opens.  The 
authors further posit that a random opening time (due to the unknown value of N) does not 
eliminate market manipulation, but reduces it due to the potential cost facing the competitive 
informed trader if the manipulative trades are executed at the end of the tâtonnement. 
Several results of Medrano and Vives (2001) contradict those of Vives (1995), in which no 
strategic informed trader is assumed.  Firstly, the presence of a strategic informed trader 
places a limit on the amount of information that is revealed during the tâtonnement.  For 
instance, in Vives (1995), the value of the asset is revealed over several rounds of the 
tâtonnement and at the point when trades are executed, the market price and the fundamental 
value of the asset are equivalent.  However, Medrano and Vives (2001) show that the 
manipulative behaviour of the strategic trader results in non-convergence between the 
fundamental value of the asset and the market price at the opening, irrespective of the 
number of rounds in the tâtonnement.  Secondly, Vives (1995) shows that the rate of 
increase in precision between the fundamental value of the asset and the prices quoted by the 
market maker is non linear and equal to n1 , which in the limit equals zero.  When a 
strategic informed trader is incorporated, the rate of price precision is linear in the number of 
stages in the tâtonnement )(n  and does not converge to zero. 
3.2.2.2   Strategic Behaviour and a Fixed Opening 
During the preopening period, traders submit orders without any obligation and therefore 
have the option to revise or cancel previous orders without incurring any cost.  As such, 
these orders are non-binding and can be withdrawn by the traders just before trading is 
executed.  As shown in both Vives (1995) and Medrano and Vives (2001), this process of 
submitting non-binding orders extracts valuable information about the fundamental value of 
the asset.  With this in mind, why would informed traders participate in this tâtonnement 
process which (for the most part) will not be in their favour?  
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Brusco, Manzano and Tapia (2003) theorise that the informed traders have an incentive to 
participate in the preopening period, along with the noise traders, to increase the level of 
noise that the market makers observe.  They further argue that the order flow during the 
preopening provides the market makers with a signal for the amount of noise in the 
tâtonnement, and a perspective on the level of noise when setting opening prices.  In other 
words, if the market maker observes a large order during the preopening (submitted by the 
informed trader), the market maker is more inclined to attribute the large flow to noise and, 
as such, the impact on the subsequent opening price that they set is miniscule. 
From this argument, Brusco et al. (2003) posit that the order flow during the preopening 
constitutes two components; the level of noise trading and the fundamental value of the 
asset.  In other words, an increase in the purchase order flow does not automatically translate 
into higher prices being quoted by the market maker and vice versa.  Consequently, the 
relationship between the order flow and the value of the asset is non-monotonic during the 
preopening period due to the weight the market makers place on orders being attributable to 
noise.  This is in stark contrast to the models of both Vives (1995) and Medrano and Vives 
(2001), in which the information reveal through the order flow is non-linear and linear, 
respectively.   
This non-monotonic relationship arises from the assumption that the market maker observes 
two components from the order flow; the extent of noise trading and information about the 
value of the asset.  Since the market maker is conscious of the non-binding characteristic of 
preopening orders and the possibility that orders submitted during the pre-opening can be 
cancelled before they are actually executed, the market maker places more emphasis on the 
order flow originating from noise traders when setting prices for the assets.  As a 
consequence, the price impact of the order flow is relatively low. 
The theoretical representation developed to support this claim is a two period model.  The 
first period is the pre-opening, where the traders place market orders to a single market 
maker who discloses the theoretical opening price and the net amount of orders on a 
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continuous basis.
15
  The second period is the opening period, which is the order execution 
stage of the pre-opening tâtonnement process.  Two types of agents trade during both the 
pre-opening and the opening period; an informed speculative trader, analogous to the 
strategic informed trader of Medrano and Vives (2001), who observes the value of the risky 
asset v  before the pre-opening period, and noise traders who trade based on portfolio 
rebalancing (liquidity) purposes.  The informed speculator submits a market order of Tx   
during the pre-opening period and a market order of Fx  during the opening period.  The 
market order Fx  can be viewed as the combination of cancelling the previous order Tx  and 
submitting another order, or simply as a modification of the previous order Tx . 
Each noise trader submits a market order of -1 for a sell or 1 for a buy during the pre-
opening and at the opening.  The total market order of the noise traders during the pre-
opening is denoted as Tu
~ , whereas Fu
~
 denotes the total market order submitted during the 
opening period.  It is assumed that the noise traders do not cancel or modify their pre-
opening orders.  The total order flow observed by the market maker in the pre-opening is 
TTT uxz
~  and, equivalently, the total order flow at the opening period will be 
FTFF uuxz
~~  .  The price that is set by the market maker will be the expected value of 
the asset, conditional on the order flow in both periods, such that  FF z ,|
~)z ,( TT zvEzp  . 
By deriving the rational expectation equilibrium in both periods, Brusco et al. (2003) show 
that the informed trader manipulates the market during the pre-opening period by placing 
orders that are in excess of that justified by the private information received.  Thus, if the 
signal implies a high value for the asset relative to the price, the informed trader places a 
relatively large buy order that is viewed by the market maker as noise and is not reflected in 
the prices quoted.  In effect, the theoretical prices that are quoted during the pre-opening will 
not have a monotonic relationship with the order flow.  As a consequence, the opening price 
at the end of the pre-opening does not have a monotonic relationship with the fundamental 
value of the asset.   
                                                 
15
 The theoretical price is the price that clears the market based on the cumulated order that the market maker 
receives. 
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This finding is contrary to that of Medrano and Vives (2001), in which they show that the 
strategic informed trader posts “contrary” orders during the beginning of the tâtonnement to 
compensate for information revealed by the competitive informed traders.  However, when 
the probability of the market opening is high, the strategic informed traders revise the 
contrary orders so as to reflect their information.  This implies a monotonic relationship 
between the order flow and prices.   
Brusco et al. (2003) further argued that this non-monotonic relationship would not hold in 
the regular trading period.  They argued that during the open period, orders are executed on a 
continuous basis and an informed trader could only exploit private information by 
employing a monotonic strategy.  For instance, the informed trader would trade in small 
quantities until the entire information has been revealed.  In essence, the relationship 
between the order flow and the quoted prices during the pre-opening period should be 
different from the relationship between the order flow and quoted prices during regular 
trading hours.   
3.2.2.3   Strategic Behaviour and Initial Public Offers 
The models of Medrano and Vives (2001) and Brusco et al. (2003) are a more realistic 
representation of the tâtonnement process in the presence of strategic informed traders 
participating during the pre-opening period.  However, Kuk, Liu and Pham (2009) examine 
manipulation during the pre-opening for newly listed stocks on a stock exchange.  The 
authors contend that traders during the pre-opening may employ a “submit-cancel” strategy 
to influence the opening price of stocks that are being listed on an exchange for the first 
time.   
Contrarily, informed traders during the pre-opening do not possess private signals about the 
fundamental value of the stock from which to profit, as seen in Vives (1995), Medrano and 
Vives (2001) and Brusco et al. (2003).  The assumption here is that the submission of 
aggressive limit orders by the strategic trader induces other traders, who rely on information 
from the order flow, to submit additional aggressive orders that perpetuate the initial impact 
on opening prices.  This is possible, based on the assumption that the order book is 
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anonymous and traders are unable to distinguish a strategic trader from other traders.  In 
order to create a false signal, the authors assume that the strategic trader submits executable 
limit orders that would generate a trade at the opening if the order is not cancelled or 
revised.
16
  However, close to the opening, strategic traders cancel the order or revise the 
order price in a way that makes it unexecutable.  Hence, employing such a strategy implies 
that the strategic trader executes an order post-opening so as to profit from the relatively 
higher/lower opening price.   
To model this behaviour, the authors employ a two stage Bayesian Nash Equilibrium game 
played by an informed trader, a strategic manipulator and an uninformed trader who learns 
from the order book.
17
  In the first stage, a limit order arrives with a probability of  , where 
there is a probability of 2/  that the order is submitted by the strategic buyer or seller.  
Similar to Medrano and Vives (2001), the intention of the strategic trader is to submit a buy 
(sell) order that conveys a false signal to the market that the stock is underpriced 
(overpriced).  By doing so, the strategic trader disguises their self as an informed trader with 
the intent to lead other traders to submitt similar aggressive orders.   
In the second stage, the uninformed learner, without knowing who is submitting the order in 
the first stage, determines if the stock value is high or low, based on the submitted limit 
order.  In addition, based on the aggressiveness of the order submitted in period one, the 
uninformed learner forms a belief about the identity of the trader who submitted the order, 
and then submits a limit order.  However, the strategic trader cancels the order so close to the 
opening that it is not possible for the other traders to withdraw their orders before the orders 
get executed. 
Solving this two stage game reveals that the probability of observing manipulative “submit-
cancel” activity by the strategic trader increases with the level of information asymmetry and 
the number of potential uninformed learners (one of whom will participate during stage two 
of the game).  In addition, the impact of the strategic trader‟s order on opening prices also 
increases with the level of information asymmetry and the number of available potential 
                                                 
16
 Executable orders are orders submitted with a price that crosses the contra-side limit order in the order book.  
For instance, a sell order is contra-side to a buy-order with the same price. 
17
 There are N uninformed learners from which only one will participate in the second stage of the game. 
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uninformed learners.  In essence, the capability of the strategic trader to influence prices and 
manipulate the market depends on the level of information asymmetry between the 
manipulator and other traders and the ability of uninformed traders to learn from false 
signals placed in the order book.     
3.2.3   The Case of a Strategic Specialist 
The models reviewed thus far have not made any explicit behavioural assumptions about the 
market maker that facilitates the pre-opening tâtonnement process.  An institutional structure 
that is used by some stock exchanges is to mandate a market maker, known as the specialist, 
to provide liquidity and price-continuity for stocks that are traded on the exchange.  In 
addition, the exchange imposes various restrictions on the behaviour of the specialist 
regarding the process of trading in shares assigned to them.  To fulfil this mandate, the 
specialist has to maintain an inventory of stocks from which they provide traders with a firm 
bid to buy and an offer to sell the underlying stock at specific prices.   Within the context of 
the pre-opening, traders submit orders to the specialist and, at the end of the preopening, the 
specialist determines the opening price, taking into consideration all the constraints faced.  In 
essence, the specialist, being the sole facilitator through which trades are executed, is faced 
with various costs and benefits in carrying out their obligations.   
The specialist is in an advantageous position due to the ability to view all orders submitted 
by traders.  As a consequence, being the sole facilitator of trading during the pre-opening can 
result in significant profits for the specialist when setting opening prices.  However, there is 
a potential cost facing the specialist for maintaining an inventory of stocks, since there may 
be cases where they have to buy stocks to replenish their inventory at unfavourable prices.  
Additionally, the specialist may not be able to act on information like other market 
participants, since at all times they have to be willing to buy or sell the stock irrespective of 
the state of information in the market. 
In order to examine the effects (importance) of a strategic specialist in the price discovery 
process during the pre-opening, Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000) construct a theoretical 
model of a pre-opening tâtonnement that incorporates a specialist with explicit consideration 
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for their obligation to maintain an inventory and adhere to various exchange obligations.  
They contend that the specialist‟s role in overseeing the evolution of the order book during 
the pre-opening conveys valuable information to the specialist.  Additionally, due to the 
obligations faced, if the specialist trades “strategically” on the information, the resulting 
opening price is more efficient than one determined by a non-specialist dealer market. 
The model is a two period game, where in the first stage traders submit price-contingent 
orders to the specialist for execution at the opening.  In the second stage, the specialist views 
the orders submitted during the pre-opening period and determines an opening price 
considering the accommodation of any excess demand from the inventory.  In both periods, 
a single risky asset with unknown value v , mean   and precision   (inverse of the 
variance) is traded between the traders and the specialist.  Similar to the model of Medrano 
and Vives (2001), both informed and noise traders participate in the pre-opening.  The 
informed traders are assumed to obtain private information signal s  about the unknown 
value of the asset that is drawn from a random distribution with mean v  and a precision  .  
The information set of the informed trader i , where Ni ,...,1 , is denoted as i , from 
which they will form their expectations about the value of the asset.   
The informed traders are assumed to be price-takers and exhibit Constant Absolute Risk 
Aversion (CARA) with utility function of the form )exp()( iii WWu  , where 
iiiii pqceqvW  )(  is the trader‟s terminal wealth, 0i  is the coefficient of risk 
aversion, iq  is the quantity of stock trader i  orders, ie  is the trader‟s initial share 
endowment, ic  is his initial cash position and p is the opening price.  Madhavan and 
Panchapagesan (2000) show that maximising the informed trader‟s utility is equivalent to 
maximising the certainty equivalent 22 )()21()( iiiiiii eqpqceqv   .   
Since the traders are price-takers, their choice variable will be the quantity ordered during 
the pre-opening. Thus, maximising the certainty equivalent shown above yields 
pbapq iii )( , which is the price-contingent demand function of the informed trader i , 
where 
iioi eva  )()(
2  and )(1 2iib  .   Therefore, the greater the difference 
between the risk-weighted expected value, based on the information set and the value of the 
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share endowment, the higher the demand of the informed trader i .  The uninformed noise 
traders, also assumed to have CARA utility functions, trade for liquidity-based reasons such 
as life-cycle consumption needs.  The noise trader j , where Kj ,...,1 , submits a market 
order of 
jx  during the pre-opening, to be executed at the opening. 
3.2.3.1   Opening Price without Specialist Intervention 
In the situation where there is no market maker present, traders submit their orders 
electronically to an automated call auction system that establishes the opening price.  In this 
case, the opening price is equal to the price *p  that sets the aggregate excess demand to 
zero.  The aggregate excess demand is the sum of the orders submitted by the traders, which 
is  
K
j j
N
i i
N
i i
K
j j
N
i i
xebpvxqpQ )()( 0 .  Since the price 
*p  is the market 
clearing price that set the aggregate excess demand to zero, then *p  is the solution to 
0)( 0  
K
j j
N
i i
N
i i
xebpv .  Therefore,      0
1
0
* vbexvp
N
i i
N
i i
K
j j
.  
Thus, the opening price is equal to the value of the asset plus a zero mean noise   that 
captures the effects of informed traders hedging their endowment risk and noise (liquidity) 
trading. 
3.2.3.2   Opening price with Specialist Intervention 
When the specialist is incorporated into the pre-opening to determine the opening price, the 
opening price is not necessarily equal to the price that would otherwise be determined in the 
case of an automated market clearing system.  At the opening, the specialist selects an 
opening price 0p  that clears the market and absorb any excess demand from their inventory.  
Thus the opening price reflects the additional amount of stock that the specialist purchases or 
sells during the pre-opening period.  In addition, it is assumed that the exchange regulators 
impose a price continuity restriction on the opening price that is set by the specialist.  
Therefore, the specialist is expected to set a fair opening price that is close to the previous 
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closing price and is assumed to face a cost for failing to maintain price continuity of 
2
0 )(
cpp  , where 0  is a constant and cp  is the previous closing price. 
If the aggregate trade of the specialist at the opening is denoted as z , then the specialist‟s 
terminal wealth at the beginning of the trading period is 
)()( 00
c
sss ppzpcezvW   , where sc , represents a risk-less asset, se  
is the 
specialist‟s share inventory prior to the opening and zp0  
is the cost to the specialist for the 
amount of stock purchased/sold at the opening.  In essence, the terminal wealth of the 
specialist is the value of the opening inventory and share obtained/sold, the cash position less 
(plus) the cost (income) from obtaining (selling) z  shares and the cost of price discontinuity.  
The specialist is assumed to maximise a CARA utility function of the form sW
s eWU
)( , 
where 0  is the coefficient of risk aversion. 
The market clearing price that is set by the specialist at the opening is the price 0p  that sets 
the aggregate excess demand plus the specialist trade to zero.  In other words, the opening 
price set by the specialist solves 0)()( 000   zxebpvzpQ
K
j j
N
i i
N
i i
, which 
is the sum of the orders of the traders and the amount traded by the specialist at the opening.  
Therefore, zpp  *0 , where  
1

N
i i
b  and *p  is the price determined in the 
automated call auction system discussed above.  Essentially, the presence of the specialist 
does not affect the demand of the traders since their demand is only contingent on prices.  
However, the opening price set by the specialist is equal to the price set in an automated call 
auction system plus additional noise induced by the specialist trade at the opening.    
Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000) examine the informational efficiency of both prices by 
comparing the variance of the deviation of both prices from the fundamental value of the 
asset, which they defined as the pricing error.  The unconditional variance of the pricing 
error in the automated call auction process is    varvar 0* vp  and the unconditional 
variance of the pricing error at the opening, with specialist intervention, is 
        ,cov2varvarvar 200 zzvp  .   It is evident that the variance of the pricing 
error in the case of specialist intervention is the sum of the weighted variance of the pricing 
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error without specialist intervention, the variance of the specialist trade and the covariance 
between the specialist trade and noise induced by noise trading.  The difference here is
        ,cov2varvarvar 20*00 zzvpvp  . 
The authors contend that the specialist trade has positive unconditional variance arising from 
inventory hedging and the exchange obligation for price continuity.  In addition, they claim 
that the last two terms in the equation above can be negative or positive, which results in 
more or less efficient prices, respectively.  For instance, if the specialist is risk-neutral and 
the cost of maintaining price continuity is low, then the specialist trade partially offsets the 
noise that arises from the noise trading such that   0,cov z .  However, if the inventory 
and price-continuity have potentially high costs for the specialist and the information is poor, 
then   0,cov z  and, as such, the specilaist chooses less efficient prices at the end of the 
pre-opening compared to an automated system. 
3.3   Review of Empirical Literature 
3.3.1   Noise vs. Learning during the Pre-opening  
The theoretical models of Medrano and Vives (2001), Brusco et al. (2003) and Madhavan 
and Panchapagesan (2000) all conclude that the opening price at the end of the pre-opening 
is noisy around the fundamental value of the asset.  Both Brusco et al. (2003) and Medrano 
and Vives (2001) argue that the manipulative behaviour of the strategic informed trader 
leads to less efficient prices, as they intentionally induce additional noise into the order flow 
that the market makers observes.   Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000) show that in the 
case of no intervention by a market maker, the price that is determined by the automated call 
auction system is noisy around the fundamental value of the asset due to noise trading.   
Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000) also show that with the intervention of a designated 
market maker, the efficiency of prices can be more or less, compared to the automated call 
auction system, depending on the relationship between their trades and the trades of the 
noise traders.  However, an alternative to these predictions is presented in Vives (1995), 
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where the noise component is less influential and the order flow represents a strong signal 
regarding the value of the asset.   
An empirical assessment of these theoretical predictions is carried out by Biais, Hillion and 
Spatt (1999), who argue that due to the non-binding characteristic of trades during the pre-
opening, orders “might fail to be serious and informative” (p. 1220).  Hence, it may be the 
case that the pre-opening prices and order flow do not contain information about the 
fundamental value of the asset.  Based on this argument, they posit what they term as the 
“noise hypothesis”, where the pre-opening order flow reflects only noise trading which may 
be due in part to manipulation.  Alternatively, the traders can behave as the competitive 
informed traders of Vives (1995) that place market orders based on the private signal that 
they received without any manipulative behaviour.  This they termed as the “learning 
hypothesis”, where the order flow reflects the fundamental value of the asset and prices 
reflect learning (from the information of indicative prices) about the asset‟s value. 
In functional form, the prices ( tp ) under the noise hypothesis are the expected value of the 
asset, conditional on the information before the beginning of the pre-opening tâtonnement 
plus some error.  Essentially, tt IvEp  )|( 0  where v  is the fundamental value of the 
asset, 0I  is the information set at the beginning of the pre-opening period and t  is an 
exogenous white noise error term that is independent of the value of the asset and the 
information set.  Under the learning hypothesis, the prices are determined by the expected 
value of the asset, conditional on the public information observed from the continuous 
updating of theoretical (market clearing) prices by the automated call auction system during 
the pre-opening (as in Vives, 1995).
18
  Therefore, )|( tt IvEp  , where tI  is the information 
received by the traders through observing the evolution of theoretical prices over the pre-
opening tâtonnement. 
                                                 
18
 There is a slight difference here compared to the assumptions of Vives (1995), which arises from the Vives 
model incorporating a market maker, thus making the traders price takers.  In this set-up, the traders submit 
quotes (demand functions) to a centralised system that matches the buys with the sell orders.  This set-up is also 
observed in the empirical analysis of Brusco et al. (2003).  However, this does not pose a problem, as Vives 
(1995) and Medrano and Vives (2001) both conclude that under such a situation (submitting demand functions) 
the results are similar in nature. 
 72 
 
To test these hypotheses, Biais et al. (1999) carry out an empirical analysis of limit orders 
from the pre-opening and the opening order book of the order-driven Paris Bourse.  The 
Paris Bourse is a computerised continuous auction market with no specified market makers 
to provide liquidity for stocks.  Investors place computerised limit orders through brokers, 
and trading occurs only when limit orders to sell are the same as limit orders to buy the 
asset.
19
  The pre-opening period of the Paris Bourse is from 8:30 am to 10:00 am and the 
trading day lasts until 5:00pm.  During the pre-opening, the indicative market-clearing 
(theoretical) price of the current limit orders is displayed electronically along with the 
associated volume and whenever investors place, modify or cancel orders, the market 
clearing price and volume are updated instantaneously.   
The authors assume that due to the effects of traders learning under the learning hypothesis 
and the observed increase in order flow as the pre-opening tâtonnement approaches the end, 
that the distribution of theoretical prices that are displayed throughout the tâtonnement will 
be non-stationary.  To circumvent this problem, they estimate an unbiasedness regression for 
each minute during the pre-opening period and at the end of the trading day, in effect 
analysing the price distribution at each point in time.   
The regression used to test the learning hypothesis is given as 
  tttt ZIvEPIvEv  )|()|( 00  , where if tt    1 , the learning hypothesis is 
confirmed.  In other words, if the difference between the fundamental value of the asset and 
its expectation, given the information before the pre-opening, is explained by the difference 
between the observed theoretical prices and the expected value of the asset, given the 
information set before the opening, then the changes in theoretical prices will incorporate 
learning.  However, if tt    0 , then the theoretical prices do not incorporate public 
information (learning) and therefore the noise hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
The results of the regression outlined above reveal that between 8:30 am and 9:50 am the 
noise hypothesis is not rejected.  This is in line with the arguments put forward by Medrano 
and Vives (2001) and Biais et al. (1999), in which they state that informed agents (acting 
strategically) distort the information that the market maker extracts from the order flow by 
                                                 
19
 See Bias, Hamilton and Spatt (1995) for a comprehensive description of the Paris Bourse. 
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placing manipulative orders.  Another explanation is that the informed agent may wait until 
the last few stages of the tâtonnement to try to realise the potential value of their information 
and not place orders during the early stages of the pre-opening.
20
   
Towards the end of the tâtonnement process of the pre-opening, specifically, from 9:50 am 
to 10:00 am, the results indicate learning as prices converge to their fundamental value, 
become more efficient and reflect the state of information during the period.  This, they 
explain, can be attributed to the fact that when the end of the pre-opening period is close, the 
informed traders (strategic and competitive) have to submit serious orders as they face the 
risk and potential cost of a manipulative order being executed during the opening.  
In a similar study, Aggarwal and Conroy (2000) examine learning and price discovery of 
IPOs on the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) 
stock exchange.  In their study the authors examine the learning process by which the price 
from the offers changes to the price of the first trade.  For an IPO there is no price history 
from which investors can infer the opening price, which potentially can impact the price 
discovery process negatively and result in noisy opening prices.  At the NASDAQ, IPOs 
participate in the pre-opening period only during the last five minutes before the market 
officially opens, compared to 90 minutes for non-IPO stocks.  During these five minutes, the 
lead underwriter and all market makers submit orders and revise or cancel existing orders 
before the market opening and the IPO are traded for the first time.  Hence, compared to 
other stocks, investors have a smaller time-frame within which to learn about the 
fundamental value of the IPO stock in the absence of price history, trade execution and 
binding orders to buy and sell. 
The empirical analysis focuses on all the IPOs that took place on the NASDAQ over the 
period May 1997 to October 1997, which amounts to a sample of 188 observations.  Using a 
similar method to Biais et al. (1999), the authors test whether the quotes of market makers 
for IPO stocks during the pre-opening are “pure noise” or reflect “learning”.  The results 
reveal that there is significant learning and price discovery reflected in the quotes of the 
market makers.  In addition, they find that the lead underwriter, without changing quotes 
                                                 
20
 This argument is not supported by the results of Brusco et al. (2003), as they found that the informed trader 
will always have an incentive to increase the amount of noise the market maker observes. 
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often, observes and learns from the quoting behaviour of the other market makers.  Another 
interesting finding is that the first quote entered by the lead underwriter during the five 
minute period is very informative and explains a larger proportion of initial returns for IPOs.  
Hence, this signifies the importance of the pre-opening period in achieving price discovery, 
even in the absence of previous trading information specific to IPO stocks.     
3.3.2   Manipulation and Initial Public Offers 
The theoretical model of Kuk, Liu and Pham (2009) shows that, both the probability of 
observing manipulative “submit-cancel” activity by the strategic trader and the impact of the 
strategic trader‟s order on opening prices, increase with the level of information asymmetry 
and the number of potential uninformed learners.  To test these predictions, the authors carry 
out an empirical study of order submission activities during the pre-opening period for a 
sample of 540 initial public offer (IPO) stocks on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
between 1995 and 2005.  The analysis focuses on IPO stocks particularly, due to the high 
level of asymmetric information surrounding the initial listing of a stock on the exchange.  
The authors claim that information asymmetry in IPO stocks arises from the lack of price 
history and the tendency for issuers to under-price IPOs so as to attract sufficient investors, 
thereby creating significant uncertainty about the fundamental value of the stock. 
The ASX is an order driven market, similar to the Paris Bourse, with the pre-opening period 
occurring between 8:00 am and 10:00 am.  However, for stocks that are initially being listed, 
the exchange will assign a specific time during the pre-opening when these stocks will be 
available to investors.  To identify strategic order placement by traders, Kuk et al. (2009) 
develop an algorithm that assesses the intention of an order submitted for an IPO stock 
during the pre-opening.  Hence, if a trader submits an executable limit order and then, closer 
to the opening, alters the order in a way that significantly reduces the execution probability 
then this order is identified as strategic.  In other words, the strategic trader is assumed to 
submit an executable order in the desired direction of manipulation in an attempt to be 
mistaken for an informed trader, thereby providing a false signal to the other traders.  As the 
pre-opening progresses and the opening price changes, the strategic trader continuously 
alters the manipulative order to maintain the credibility of the false signal.  Close to the 
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opening, the strategic trader either cancels the order or revises its price in such a way that the 
order is no longer executable during the opening matching process. 
The authors find that of the total order submissions in the sample of IPO stocks, 45.6% of 
these orders are identified as being strategic.  However, a repeat of the algorithm reveals a 
dramatic reduction of strategic order submissions to approximately 8.3% after twenty trading 
days following each IPO.  Hence, this indicates that the strategic traders take advantage of 
the high asymmetric information and price uncertainty associated with IPO stocks during the 
pre-opening in an effort to influence the behaviour of less informed traders.   
In addition, the results reveal that the price impact of the strategic orders is greater than that 
of non-strategic orders, especially when the strategic orders are submitted early.  
Interestingly, the analysis reveals that the withdrawal or alteration of the strategic order (to 
avoid execution at the opening) does not result in an equivalent reversal in the indicative 
opening price, compared to the initial impact.  The evidence also indicates that the inflated 
(deflated) prices, due to the submission of strategic orders, revert after the opening of the 
market, further signifying manipulative behaviour. 
3.3.3   The Pre-opening Period without an Opening Price 
The analyses discussed so far have focused on markets characterised by one or more market 
makers, and the opening price is determined by pooling the market (limit) orders and 
choosing the price that clears the market.  In Vives (1995) and Medrano and Vives (2002) 
the market makers are assumed to be competitive, while in Madhavan and Panchapagesan 
(2000) and Brusco et al. (2003) their analysis assumes a single market maker that determines 
the opening prices.  Essentially, all the above studies assume that at some point the pre-
opening tâtonnement eventually ends and an opening price is determined by the market 
maker(s), whether by a random (after a point in time) or fixed opening.  With this in mind, is 
it possible for a pre-opening period, without an opening price being determined at the end, to 
be able to provide price discovery?  A stock market with such a characteristic is the 
NASDAQ Stock Exchange. 
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The NASDAQ Stock Exchange is a multiple dealer electronic securities market with 
competitive market makers who are mandated by the exchange regulators to provide 
liquidity for stocks traded on the exchange.  In other words, in the capacity of a market 
maker, they are obligated to make firm bid and ask quotes once the market is open.  Both 
market makers and dealers are required to display their bid and ask quotes on the Electronic 
Communication Network (ECN), which is viewed by all the market makers at the 
NASDAQ.  Additionally, the dealers are able to view the “Reported Inside Quote”, which is 
the lowest ask and the highest bid quotes submitted by the market makers for each stock.   
Another point to note is that for a highly traded stock there is more than one market maker 
obligated to post firm bid and ask quotes for that stock.  Consequently, market makers for a 
stock sometimes post quotes that result in what is described as „locked‟ or „crossed‟ inside 
quotes.  A locked inside quote occurs when a market maker posts a bid (ask) that is equal to 
the lowest ask (highest bid) posted by another market maker.  Similarly, a crossed inside 
quote occurs when the posted bid (ask) is greater (lower) than the lowest ask (highest bid) 
quote in the order book.  In an orderly functioning market, the best ask should be higher than 
the best bid, and the NASDAQ rules prohibit market makers from intentionally entering 
quotes that result in a lock or a cross during regular trading hours.  However, due to the non-
binding characteristic of pre-opening orders, locked or crossed quotes are allowed and as 
such are normally observed.  The NASDAQ pre-opening period begins at 8:00 am and trade 
execution starts at 9:30 am and ends at 4:30 pm. 
Against this background, Cao, Ghysels and Hatheway (2000) examine the use of NASDAQ 
market makers‟ quotes as signals for price discovery in the absence of a formal procedure for 
matching quotes at the end of the pre-opening period.  They argue that the more informed 
market makers utilise locked and/or crossed quotes during the pre-opening period to signal 
their estimate for the stock to the other less informed market makers.  They further posit that 
if pre-opening quotes contain information about the value of the asset, and locks and crosses 
are signals instead of noise, then they (locks/crosses) should explain changes in the 
equilibrium (close-to-close) prices.   To measure the contribution of pre-opening prices to 
changes in the close-to-close stock prices, the pre-opening and trading period are partitioned 
into pre-cross/lock, lock, cross, post-cross/lock and trading sub-periods.   
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For each sub-period, the Weighted Average Price Contribution (WPC) is calculated so as to 
determine the contribution of each period to the close-to-close price change.  The WPC 
measures the fraction of price change over the period under consideration, relative to the 
change in the close-to-close price.  Hence, a WPC of one would indicate a one to one 
relationship between the price change of a specific period and the close-to-close price 
change.  If i  denotes the sub-period of interest (say lock), then the WPC for period i  is as 
follows: 
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where tP  denotes the absolute value of the close-to-close price change from day 1t  to 
day t , 
tiP ,  is the total price change for period i  on day t , and T denotes the terminal time 
or market closing time.  To measure each period‟s contribution proportional to the 
contribution of the trading period, and taking into consideration that the periods are not of 
the same duration, they compute the Relative Time Weighted Price Contribution (RTWPC) 
for each sub-period.  The RTWPC for period i  is calculated as the WPC for period i  
relative to the duration of the period (in time), expressed as a proportion of the WPC for the 
trading period relative to its duration.  Thus, a ratio of one would indicate that the WPC in 
period i  relative to period i ‟s duration is the same as the WPC for the trading day relative 
to its duration.  It follows that: 
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The results of the RTWC reveal that, per unit of time, the price contribution of the pre-
opening period is only “slightly” higher than the price contribution, per unit of time, of the 
trading period.  This is evident, as the RTWC for the pre-opening period relative to the 
trading period adjusted for time, is equal to 1.1.  Therefore, amidst the non-binding 
characteristic of pre-opening quotes and the lack of a formal matching procedure at the end 
of the pre-opening period to determine the opening price, there is still significant price 
discovery during the NASDAQ pre-opening period.   
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The results also reveal that the proportion of price discovery during the period of locked 
inside quotes, per unit of time, is 3 times higher compared to the trading period.  In addition, 
the proportion of price discovery during periods of crossed inside quotes, per unit of time, is 
9.7 times greater compared to the trading period relative to the length of the trading day.  
Hence, locked and especially cross inside quotes contain significant information about the 
fundamental (equilibrium) value of the stock during the NASDAQ pre-opening period, due 
to its use by brokers to signal the value of the security to other less informed brokers.
21
    
However, Davis (2003) studies the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) pre-opening period and 
finds that neither the investors nor the market makers use locked or crossed quotes to signal 
the direction of prices.  The author suggests that, in the case of private investors, locking or 
crossing quotes occurs naturally because of the lack of trade execution during the pre-
opening.  Specific to the market markers, the author attributes the lack of signalling through 
locks or crosses to the restrictions imposed on market makers during the pre-opening.  At the 
TSE market makers are not allowed to set opening prices, and non-client related orders two 
minutes before the opening are penalised with a lower execution priority.  Thus, the 
institutional details of an exchange seem to profoundly impact the signalling effect of 
locking or crossing quotes during the pre-opening.      
In another study of the NASDAQ, Ciccotello and Hatheway (2000) employ unbiasedness 
regressions similar to Biais et al. (1999) to examine if prices during the pre-opening are 
unbiased and efficient.  The authors examine dealer pre-opening quotes for 52 stocks over a 
one year period.  The results indicate that the pre-opening period generates prices that are 
informationally unbiased.  However, the results also reveal that the prices actually become 
biased during the last minute before the opening.  In addition, the extent of the bias increases 
for stocks with relatively lower trading volume.  This they attribute to the lack of indicative 
prices that are common to automated call auction systems.  Using the weighted price 
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 Shkilko, Van Ness and Van Ness (2008) study locked and crossed inside spread that occurs during the 
NASDAQ and NYSE trading day.  From a sample of the one hundred most actively traded stocks on both the 
NYSE and NASDAQ, this study finds that during the trading period the NASDAQ stocks lock or cross 
approximately 10% of the time and this occurs only 3.5% of the time for the NYSE stocks.  However, they find 
that these zero or negative spreads are resolved between 4.5 to 25 seconds after they occur.  While it is 
apparently the reason for locked or crossed spread during the pre-opening, the reasons are less clear during the 
trading period with active execution of orders.  The authors contend that there are cases when the rapid update 
of quotes during active trading leads to stale quotes being locked or crossed by other incoming quotes.  
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contribution method (WPC), the authors show that despite a total of 50 market makers 
participating during the pre-opening, more than half the pre-opening price discovery is 
attributable to between six or seven market makers.  Thus, this indicates that there is 
significant price leadership among a few market makers during the NASDAQ pre-opening. 
3.3.4   Pre-opening Price Discovery and Overnight Trading 
Another interesting feature of the NASDAQ stock exchange is the ability of dealers to trade 
stocks over a twenty four hour period on the Electronic Communication Network.  This is 
necessary due to the fact that some stocks listed on the NASDAQ are also listed on several 
other stock exchanges around the world.  Therefore, in order to facilitate a continuous 
market for internationally listed stocks, the exchange provides the dealers with the 
opportunity to trade stock over the entire day.  An interesting question in this case is, how 
does trading over a twenty-four hour period affect the price discovery during the pre-opening 
period, since there are less halts in the trading process compared to other markets.  Barclay 
and Hendershott (2003), who analyse the NASDAQ Stock Exchange, examine this and other 
questions.   In their article, they examine how the trading process affects the revelation and 
timing of information, in which period informed traders prefer to trade, how the trading 
process affects the relative amount of information incorporated into the stock price and how 
trading affects the informational efficiency of stock prices. 
The authors categorise the NASDAQ trading day into four periods; the pre-opening period 
(8:00am to 9:30am), the regular trading period (9:30am to 4:00pm), the post close period 
(4:00pm to 6:30pm) and the overnight period (6:30pm to 8:00am).  It is important to note 
that market makers are required by the NASDAQ to quote firm and binding bids and ask 
quotes during the regular trading period.  However, providing quotes in the other periods is 
optional and may not be binding. 
To ascertain in which period informed or noise traders participate the most, Barclay and 
Hendershott (2003) estimate the Probability of Informed Trader (PIN) methodology 
introduced by Easley, Kiefer and O‟Hara (1996) for each categorised time period.  The 
Probability of Informed Trader is calculated as 1)2(  PIN , where   is the 
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probability that the informed trader receives a private signal about the value of the asset,   
is the order arrival rate of the informed trader, conditional on the information, and   is the 
order arrival rate of the noise traders.   
The results from the PIN calculation for the pre-opening, opening and post-close periods 
reveal that the probability of an informed trader is greatest during the pre-opening, compared 
to the other two periods.  In addition, the probability of an informed trader is lowest during 
the trading period and is approximately half the probability of an informed trader during the 
pre-opening period.  In essence, most of the informed traders try to exploit their 
informational advantage during the pre-opening period, resulting in more efficient prices.  
Therefore, this signifies the importance of the pre-opening period in the NASDAQ exchange 
in providing price discovery for securities. 
To measure the relative impact of private and public information disseminated during 
trading on the price discovery process for each of these sub-periods, the authors utilise the 
Hasbrouck (1991b) VAR methodology.  Based on this analysis, they find that 35% of price 
discovery in both the pre-opening period and trading day is attributable to private 
information, and 24% of the information discovered in the post close was private.  Thus 
most of the private information is disseminated throughout the trading day (including the 
pre-opening) and only a small amount of informed trading actually takes place during the 
overnight period.  
Barclay and Hendershott (2003) went further in measuring the amount of new information 
incorporated into stock prices within any of the specific periods.  The methodology used 
here is the calculation of the WPC for each period, similar to the calculations in Cao et al. 
(2000).  The periods examined in this analysis are the pre-opening, post-close, the overnight 
and the opening periods.
22
  The results reveal that 74% of the close-to-open price 
contribution occurs at the pre-opening, 15% at the post close and 9% occurs at the opening 
of trade.  In essence, the results here provide strong evidence that the pre-opening period is 
important in the price discovery process for stocks traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange. 
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 The opening period is defined by the authors as the last trade before 9:30 am to the first trade after 9:30 am. 
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3.3.5   Trading vs. Non-Trading during the Pre-opening 
The Cao et al. (2000) and Barclay and Hendershott (2003) analyses of the NASDAQ pre-
opening period are carried out during a period where there is virtually no trading on off-
exchange ECNs during the pre-opening period.  The off-exchange ECNs are open limit order 
books where traders can submit orders and trade anonymously with each other, thereby 
bypassing the broker-driven NASDAQ exchange.  In addition, due the lack of broker support 
and the anonymity of trades, traders can execute orders any time on these networks even 
during the official pre-opening period of the NASDAQ exchange.  However, due to the 
growth in these ECNs over time, this resulted in an increase in off-exchange trading 
occurring in parallel to the NASDAQ pre-opening period where no trading occurs until the 
open at 9:30 am.  Hence, trading on these off-exchange networks during the pre-opening can 
potentially provide market makers with price information from which they can position their 
inventory and profit from this information at the opening of the NASDAQ. 
To study the impact of growth in ECNs and the increased trading volume that is concurrent 
with the absence of trading during the NASDAQ pre-opening, Barclay and Hendershott 
(2008) evaluate the evolution of market makers‟ quotes during the pre-opening for two 
regimes; the non-trading regime during the early 1990‟s and the trading regime during the 
late 1990‟s.  The authors study all after-hour trades for all stocks listed on the NASDAQ 
over the period January 1993 to June 1999.  The objective of the study is to determine if 
trading during the pre-opening period provides market makers with the ability to establish 
prices that are more efficient, compared to the non-trading regime.  In addition, they assess if 
trading during the pre-opening increases the information content of prices at the opening, 
due to the movement of informed traders from the trading day to the pre-opening period. 
The authors assess the impact of trading on the efficiency of opening prices for the entire 
sample by utilising unbiasedness regressions, similar to the Biais et al. (1999) analysis.  The 
results reveal that increases in pre-opening trading volume over time lead to more efficient 
opening prices.  In other words, trading on the off-exchange ECNs during the pre-opening 
improves the efficiency of prices quoted by market makers, thereby resulting in more 
efficient opening prices.  To assess if information trading migrated from the trading day to 
the pre-opening period, the authors divide the 24 hour trading day into four periods; the pre-
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opening, the opening trade, the trading day and the post-close. The price discovery 
attributable to these periods is estimated by the WPC method. 
The results of the WPC computation for the four periods reveal that over the sample period, 
price discovery shifted from the opening trade of the day to during the pre-opening period.  
However, the price discovery during the trading day remained constant, which indicates that 
information trading did not migrate to the pre-opening period, despite the increase in trading 
volume on off-exchange ECNs over time.  In addition, for some stocks the information that 
is reflected in the opening price remained unchanged over the entire period.  Essentially, the 
increasing level of trading on the off-exchange networks concurrent with the NASDAQ pre-
opening period improved the information available to the market makers and therefore 
resulting in less noisy prices at the opening.  Additionally, the results reveal that non-trading 
mechanisms are capable of incorporating public information into prices and reveal private 
information, thereby leading to price discovery. 
3.3.6   Price Discovery in Dealer Market vs. Automated Call Auction  
Ellul, Shin and Tonks (2005) study the factors that influence the choice investors make to 
submit orders to the automated call auction system, as opposed to the dealership market 
operated at the London Stock Exchange (LSE) during the pre-opening period.  At the LSE, 
the main order-driven system that executes orders without any market maker intervention 
operates simultaneously alongside a parallel off-exchange quote-driven dealer system that 
relies on market makers to provide liquidity to investors.  During the pre-opening period, the 
order-driven system determines opening prices based on a call auction similar to that of the 
Paris Bourse, while the dealer system depends on market makers similar to the NASDAQ 
exchange.  The pre-opening period at the LSE is relatively short, beginning at 7:50 am and 
ending at 8:00 am when the trading day begins.  The empirical analysis focused on the FTSE 
100 stocks traded on both the quote-drive and order-driven systems over the period June 
1998 to December 2000.  
The authors measure the contribution of both types of system to price discovery during the 
pre-opening by employing the WPC method.  In addition, the pre-opening is separated into 
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two periods, the first from 7:50 am to 7:55 am and the second from 7:56 am to 8:00:30 am 
when the opening call algorithm clears the market.
23
  The results of the WPC computation 
indicate that there is no price discovery during the first period of the pre-opening in either 
the order-driven or the dealer driven markets.  The authors claim that the absence of price 
discovery during this five minute period between 7:50 am and 7:55 am is attributable to the 
small number of orders placed during this period.  However, in both markets there is 
significant price discovery present during the second period (7:56 am to 8:00:30 am) when 
serious orders that are intended for execution at the opening are being submitted by 
investors.  In addition, the WPC for the order-driven (call auction) market is larger in 
comparison to the dealer market.  Hence, this indicates that most of the price discovery 
during the pre-opening takes place in the market without market maker intervention, similar 
to an implication of the theoretical model of Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000). 
The authors employ an endogenous switching model to determine the factors that influence 
traders‟ decisions to trade on either the order-driven or the dealer-driven markets.  In this 
model the traders are assumed to choose between different venues based on the trading costs 
they will incur.  The results indicate that the order imbalance, adverse selection cost, price 
uncertainty and order size increases the trading cost in the order-driven market relative to the 
dealer-driven market.  Conversely, large trading volume reduces the cost faced by investors 
trading in the order-driven market.  In the dealer-driven market, the results show that 
investors face a high fixed cost relative to the order-driven market.  Hence, these results 
suggest that the order-driven market provides a lower trading cost only when there is a high 
level of trading volume.  Additionally, when there is an increase in informed trading, 
investors migrate to the dealership market due to uncertainty about prices. 
3.4   Conclusions 
This chapter provides a survey of the most influential contributions to the market 
microstructure literature that covers the market pre-opening period.  First, a comprehensive 
evaluation of the theoretical contributions to the pre-opening literature is presented, which 
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 The 30 seconds is incorporated into the second period since, at the extreme, all orders executed at the 
opening take at most 30 seconds.  
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highlights the major assumptions and predictions of models developed so as to provide a 
framework for analysing the tâtonnement process of the pre-opening period.   Second, a 
review of the empirical literature is provided, which outlines the major assumptions, 
methodology and results of these analyses.  Throughout the literature there is a consistent 
conclusion that there is significant price discovery present during the pre-opening period, as 
the opening prices tend to reflect its fundamental values.  In addition, it can be concluded 
that a well-designed pre-opening period provides the market with a suitable mechanism to 
achieve price stability after a halt in the trading process. 
Suffice to say, the institutional structures of the market and its design have a significant 
effect on the price discovery process during the pre-opening period.  For instance, if the 
exchange regulator designates a specialist to be the sole entity authorised to trade securities 
among all investors, then the convergence of asset prices to their fundamental value during 
the pre-opening significantly depends on the behaviour of the specialist and the information 
that can be inferred from market participants.  On the other hand, in the case of a fully 
automated auction system, only the behaviour of investors affects the convergence of prices 
to their fundamental value.   
However, the literature that focuses on the market pre-opening period has not seen 
significant development compared to that of other areas of market microstructure. Further 
empirical analysis is necessary to ratify the theoretical predictions proposed in the theoretical 
literature.  As such, this area provides researchers with a rich area for further research in 
determining factors that influence trader behaviour during the pre-opening period and how 
these factors contribute to the price discovery process.  Hence, this thesis aims to provide a 
greater understanding of the factors that influence the behaviour of traders and by extension 
the resulting price discovery. 
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Chapter 4 
Determining the Intensity of Buy and Sell Limit Order 
Submissions in the Market Pre-opening Period 
4.1   Introduction 
This chapter analyses the process of limit order book formulation during the market pre-
opening period of a nascent stock market, the Malta Stock Exchange (MSE).  Specifically, 
we investigate if publicly available information concerning the current state of the order 
book impacts the intensity of order submissions, and whether there are discernable 
differences between trader behaviour on the buy and sell side of the market.  Asymmetric 
information and costly market participation have both been demonstrated to impede the price 
discovery and liquidity formation process in asset markets (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; 
Grossman and Miller, 1988).  Analysing the market pre-opening period can alleviate the 
influence of these two factors, as traders can revise or cancel submitted orders without 
penalty, and unexpected changes in trade prices or inventory positions by definition play no 
role in influencing the order submission process due to the absence of trading.  
During pre-opening, traders place limit orders for a specific volume of shares to be bought or 
sold at a specified price.  Essentially, they are confronted with a trade-off at market opening 
between maximising the probability of trade execution and attempting to secure the most 
favourable trade price, given the prevailing state of the limit order book.  In providing 
liquidity, traders must decide whether to aggressively seek to trade the asset, taking into 
consideration the state of the order book, or employ a more patient strategy, hoping to 
optimise on the execution price of the asset at the risk of not trading at market opening. 
The process of constructing the order book in the pre-opening potentially represents a 
valuable source of information about the characteristics of the market in general, traders‟ 
valuation for an asset and the level of liquidity demanded and supplied at different prices.
24
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 See Parlour and Seppi (2007) for a comprehensive survey of literature on limit order markets.  
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The fact that orders submitted during this period are non-binding and can be subsequently 
cancelled or revised at no cost, makes inference somewhat more challenging.  However, by 
observing each other‟s actions, traders can identify signals and trends in the order 
submission process which facilitate learning in relation to both equilibrium price discovery 
(Biais Hillion and Spatt, 1999) and information concerning latent market liquidity (Dia and 
Pouget, 2006).   
The central focus of this chapter is to determine whether traders appear to utilise information 
inferred from the characteristics of pre-opening limit order submissions, and the consequent 
changes in the limit order book, in formulating their own order submission strategies.  In 
particular, do inferences derived from traders‟ observations of the evolving state of the order 
book impact the intensity of their own order submission during the market pre-opening 
period?  We further explore which specific information from the order book is most 
significant in determining the driving factor behind the intensity of order submission of limit 
orders by traders.  Additionally, we seek to determine if the different sides of the market are 
asymmetrically impacted by the information that can be observed during the pre-opening 
period. 
We make two key contributions to the literature.  First, previous work on market pre-
opening (such as Vives, 1995; Medrano and Vives, 2001; Madhavan and Panchapagesan, 
2000; Barclay and Hendershot, 2003; and Biais Hillion and Spatt, 1999) focuses on the 
period‟s role in price discovery and how differences in the regulations and architecture of an 
exchange impact on this function.  To our knowledge, we are the first to empirically analyse 
the process determining the intensity of order submissions during the market pre-opening 
period as incipient liquidity is provided to the limit order book.  In addition, the theoretical 
literature on the market pre-opening proposes that information asymmetry may drive order 
placement activity during this period.  In our analysis, we formulate and test hypotheses that 
incorporate such considerations to determine if there is sufficient evidence to support the 
theoretical predictions.  
Second, by focusing solely on explaining the intensity of limit orders during the pre-opening 
period our approach contrasts with previous duration studies (Engle and Lunde, 2003; 
Bauwens and Giot, 2000; and Hall and Hautsch, 2007) which analyse the intensity of order 
 87 
 
submissions during the regular, continuous trading period. The latter studies necessarily 
incorporate factors such as the arrival of market orders and trade execution intensity to 
explain limit order submissions.  Since we analyse the pre-opening period, we focus entirely 
on the temporal construction of liquidity in the order book and how changes to the prevailing 
state of the order book affect order submission strategy.  
To analyse the pre-opening order submission processes, we model the buy and sell duration 
processes separately, utilising the Log-ACD model proposed by Bauwens and Giot (2000).  
A key advantage of this approach is that it allows the incorporation of additional factors into 
the conditional expectation equation of the ACD model without the necessity of imposing 
positivity constraints on the model coefficients.  In addition, the error structure is assumed to 
follow a Weibull distribution, which allows for some degree of flexibility in the hazard 
function.  To determine the impact of limit order book activity and incoming orders, we 
incorporate explanatory variables into the conditional expected duration equation that reflect 
the impact of: (i) the posting of limit orders, (ii) the current spread, (iii) mid-quote returns 
and (iv) revisions or cancellation of orders previously submitted to the order book.  In order 
to present a clearer interpretation for the arguments being proposed, we formulate the 
arguments around order submission intensities as opposed to durations.  The intensity is 
defined as the reciprocal of expected duration and represents the instantaneous arrival rate of 
order submissions. 
To pre-empt the results, we find that the intensity of buy order submissions is more 
responsive to information contained in incoming order and changes to the state of the order 
book in comparison to order submission intensity on the sell side.  In fact, we find that the 
greater the price of an incoming buy (sell) order relative to the price at the top of the buy 
(sell) order book, then the greater the increase in the intensity of buy (sell) order 
submissions.  This increase in the intensity of buy (sell) order submissions is particularly 
significant whenever the price associated with an incoming buy (sell) order is greater than or 
equal to the best sell (buy) price, thus resulting in the spread being locked or crossed.  These 
results are consistent with the finding in the continuous trading period studied by Hall and 
Hautsch (2007).   
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Periods of low buy order submission intensity follow the placement of incoming sell orders 
at or below the best buy price, a finding potentially attributable to a negative signalling 
effect occurring when the price of sell orders trend lower, especially those resulting in a 
locked or crossed spread.  However, this negative signalling effect results in an increase in 
the intensity of sell order submissions.  Similarly, when the price of an incoming buy order 
locks or crosses the best sell price, this increases the intensity of buy order submission and 
reduces the intensity of sell order submissions.  Essentially, these findings corroborate Cao 
et al. (2000), who conclude that a locked or crossed inside spread improves the price 
discovery process by providing strong information signals regarding the fundamental value 
of the asset.  
Changes to the limit order book, such as cancellations and revision of previously submitted 
limit orders have a mixed impact on the intensity of order submissions.  For instance, we 
find that the cancellation of a buy or sell order reduces the intensity of both buy and sell 
order submissions.  In addition, a higher volume associated with a cancelled sell order 
reduces the intensity of buy order submissions.  We discuss these findings in the context of 
the signals they provide concerning the probability of order execution, as well as the 
possibility of price manipulation by informed traders acting strategically to improve the 
prices at which their orders are executed.  Revisions to buy and sell prices induce an 
asymmetric response from market participants.  For instance, revisions of buy prices towards 
the top of the order book increases the intensity of sell order submissions, which is indicative 
of sell side traders taking advantage of more favourable buy prices.  However, there is no 
impact on the buy side when prices of buy orders are revised towards the top of the order 
book.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  In section 4.2 we outline the 
economic intuition and derive testable hypotheses based on the existing literature.  Section 
4.3 describes the econometric methodology while section 4.4 provides details of the data and 
explanatory variables.  Section 4.5 reports and discusses the empirical results and section 4.6 
briefly concludes.     
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4.2   Economic Intuition and Testable Hypotheses  
4.2.1   Submission Clustering 
The market pre-opening acts as a period of information aggregation and a platform to signal 
liquidity needs subsequent to a halt in trading following an overnight or weekend closure of 
the exchange.  During this period, traders receiving private information relevant to the 
fundamental value of the asset and/or developing incipient need for liquidity, can devise 
trading strategies to preannounce their information and/or liquidity needs to other market 
participant, facilitating market coordination to enhance gains from trade (Brusco et al. 2003).  
These communication strategies will attempt to maximise the probability of trade execution 
while attempting to secure the most favourable trade price at market opening, given the 
prevailing state of the limit order book.  Dia and Pouget (2006) also maintain that 
communicating trading needs during pre-opening rather than at market opening mitigates the 
impact of trading imperfections such as costly market participation and adverse selection 
risk, thereby enhancing both market liquidity and welfare.  Moreover, although there is no 
execution of trades and all traders have the option to cancel or revise orders without any cost 
or obligations, Biais et al. (1999) demonstrate that pricing efficiency increases during pre-
opening and the evolution of process is consistent with learning during the period.   
Several previous papers study aspects of the underlying information communication and 
coordination game which occurs during pre-opening.  In Vives (1995), competitive informed 
traders and noise traders submit limit orders to buy or sell an asset during the pre-opening 
period without knowing whether their trades will be executed at the opening of trading.  
However, as the pre-opening progresses towards the end, informed traders reveal a 
significant portion of their private information through limit order submissions that 
continuously improves the information set and learning capacity of other traders.  As a 
result, the relatively rapid erosion of the informational advantages conveyed by the private 
information set dramatically reduces the incentive for informed traders to post further quotes 
towards the end of the pre-opening period. 
Vives (1995) predicts that the intensity of both the buy and sell order submissions increases 
during the early stages of the pre-opening, but following the process of continuous revelation 
of information about the fundamental value of the asset by informed traders, the intensity of 
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both order type diminishes towards the end of the period.  However, this assumption is not 
supported by the empirical study of the pre-opening by Biais et al. (1999), who reveal that 
while there is little evidence of learning during the early stages of the pre-opening, they 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the evolution of pre-opening prices towards the end of this 
period reflects learning.  This is consistent with many order submission strategies.  For 
example, informed traders may decide not to submit orders during the early stages of the 
pre-opening and only submit their information based orders close to the end of the pre-
opening period.  Utilising such a strategy eliminates both the revelation of information and 
learning by other market participants during the early stages of the pre-opening period.  
However, towards the end of the pre-opening period when informed traders begin to submit 
their information based orders, the learning process resumes and the intensity of the order 
submissions increases. 
However, informed traders might also act strategically and intentionally induce distortions 
into the learning process of the uninformed traders, diminishing their ability to form 
expectations about the fundamental value of the asset from the order flow.  Medrano and 
Vives (2001) show that when manipulative behaviour is incorporated into the information 
aggregation process, the strategic informed trader posts contrary orders during the early 
stages of the pre-opening intending to offset the information revealed when other 
competitive informed traders submit orders.  However, towards the end of the pre-opening 
period, the strategic informed trader reverses the contrary orders and places orders consistent 
with their information set.  As a consequence, contrary to the predictions of Vives (1995), 
Medrano and Vives (2001) posit that manipulative behaviour by an informed trader causes 
the intensity of order submission to increase towards the end of the pre-opening period. 
The predictions presented above are conflicting with regards to which stage of the pre-
opening that is characterised by an increase in the order submission intensity.  However, 
they make one similar conclusion that there is tendency for clustering of order submission 
during the pre-opening period due to informed trading.  Further, if the private information 
set of the trader implies a higher fundamental value than the price implied by the market, 
then the intensity of order submissions will be more focused on the buy side of the market 
and vice versa.  However, if private information arrives randomly to the market then both 
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sides should display similar degrees of clustering.  Therefore, in such a situation the intensity 
of orders on both side of the market will be examined separately.  The testable implication is 
as follows: 
Hypothesis 1:  Order Submissions Clustering 
(a) The pre-opening period exhibits clustering in the buy and 
sell order submission intensity. 
(b) The intensity of order submissions increases towards the 
end of the pre-opening. 
4.2.2   Limit Order Prices 
Submitting limit orders during the trading period reveals the willingness of a trader to 
purchase or sell a number of units at a specific price, with both the price and volume that 
constitute the limit order contain, in principle, significant private information about the 
trader‟s valuation of the asset.  However, in the pre-opening period, the delay between the 
submission of orders and the initiation of trading means the trader‟s valuation becomes 
public information before any potential benefits can be realised.  With each limit order 
submission, market participants can revise their expectations about the fundamental value of 
the asset and devise strategies to profit from their updated information set.  For instance, in 
the case where the limit order is placed by an informed trader, the uninformed trader without 
knowing the type of order (informed or liquidity motivated) that is submitted, assesses the 
aggressiveness of the order based on its characteristics.  As a result, if the uninformed trader 
infers that the order is information based then their order strategy will reflect the updated 
information set.  Hence, we predict that the intensity of order submissions will be affected by 
the information that can be inferred from the posted of limit orders. 
Though the prices associated with limit orders contain significant information about traders‟ 
valuation of the asset, this information is not revealed in isolation.  In effect, the information 
that is inferred from the price of an incoming limit order lies in its relation to the price of the 
best buy/sell order currently in the limit order book.  To determine the relationship between 
the price associated with an incoming limit order and the buy/sell order intensity, we follow 
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applicable arguments from Hall and Hautsch (2007).  In their analysis, the intensity of the 
buy and sell arrival process in the limit order book of the Australian Stock Market is 
estimated using an Autoregressive Conditional Intensity (ACI) model.  They argue that when 
a trader submits a limit buy order with a price that is higher than the current best buy, this 
reveals that the trader is more aggressive to get their order executed and places a higher 
valuation on the asset.   
Hall and Hautsch (2007) further argue that a trader who sets the buy limit price above the 
prevailing best buy price indicates that they are only faced with a low adverse selection risk 
and displays an upper tail expectation that is higher than the best buy price.  Effectively, this 
constitutes a positive signal to the market and as a result the net buying pressure is expected 
to increase.
25
  Similarly, when the price of an incoming sell limit order is set above the best 
sell, this conveys a positive signal in that the trader‟s upper tail expectation is higher than the 
prevailing best sell price.  Accordingly, the net buying pressure is expected to increase.  In 
addition, the converse of these relationships also holds true, in that, the price of an incoming 
limit buy (sell) order that is set below the current best buy (sell) represents a negative 
signalling effect and as a result, the net buy pressure is expected to decrease. 
However, within the context of the pre-opening period we further argue that due to the 
absence of trade execution, the magnitude of the difference between the price of the 
incoming buy (sell) and the best buy (sell) price has a more relevant impact on the intensity 
of the order submissions.  For instance, if there is manipulation by an informed trader during 
the pre-opening period such as in Medrano and Vives (2001), then the manipulative trader 
will implement negative signalling strategies to offset any positive signal revealed by other 
informed traders.  In essence, if the information is consistent with a higher fundamental asset 
value, the strategic trader would impose a negative signal by placing sell limit orders.  Thus, 
for the effect to be strong or credible the price of the limit sell orders must be close to or 
lower than the price of the best sell.  The converse of this argument also holds true.   
Medrano and Vives (2001) show that towards the end of the pre-opening period the strategic 
trader is compelled to place orders that are in line with the private information to enable the 
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 Hall and Hautsch (2007) define the net buy pressure as the ratio of the estimated buy and sell intensities. 
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strategy to yield a positive payoff.  Therefore, towards the end of the pre-opening period the 
strategic trader will submit buy orders, and in order to increase the probability that their 
orders are executed at the opening, the price of the limit order must be close to or greater 
than the best buy price.  The more aggressive the strategic trader is the higher the price of the 
submitted buy limit order.  
Alternative, in terms of the Vives (1995) framework which does not incorporate 
manipulative behaviour by an informed trader, the impact of the price of an incoming limit 
order and the intensity of the order submissions will be the same as expressed above, though 
the arguments are different.  Essentially, Vives shows that the order flow conveys significant 
information about the traders‟ valuation of the asset from which other traders can infer and 
learn about the fundamental value of the asset throughout the pre-opening period.  Therefore, 
an informed trader will increase the probability that their order is executed at opening by 
submitting limit buy (sell) orders with prices that are close to or greater (less) than the best 
buy (sell) price.  This “jump-the-queue” behaviour is present during the trading period, as 
Ellul et al. (2007) show for the NYSE, when the depth on the own side increases.  
We propose that uninformed traders that notice this trend will adjust their order strategies in 
a similar fashion and as such the intensity of the buy or sell order submission increases.  
Consequently, this process continues recursively until prices converge to their fundamental 
value, at which the intensity of orders by informed agents reduces dramatically due to the 
erosion of their private information.   
The implication is that the more aggressive a trader is in getting their buy order executed at 
the opening, the larger the difference between the incoming buy order price and the best buy 
price.  Accordingly, if a trader is aggressively seeking to get their sell order executed at the 
opening, then the difference between the best sell order and the incoming sell price will be 
large.
26
  The larger the difference on the buy (sell) side, the greater the positive (negative) 
signal that arises due to the order submission and vice versa.  Alternatively, the same 
arguments are applicable if a strategic trader intentionally induces a negative signal to offset 
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 The differences discussed here are negative whenever the price of an incoming buy (sell) order is below the 
best bid (ask) price and tend towards zero as the order price gets closer to the top of the order book.  In 
addition, the difference is set to zero if the price of the incoming buy (sell) order is equal to or greater than the 
best bid (ask) price.  This is explained in more detail in section 4.4.2 of this chapter.   
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the information that is revealed by other informed traders.  Thus in both cases, a positive 
signal increases (decreases) the intensity of buy (sell) order submissions and decreases 
(increase) the intensity of sell (buy) order submissions.  Similarly, a negative signal 
increases (decreases) the intensity of sell (buy) order submissions and decreases (increases) 
the intensity of buy (sell) order submissions.  From these arguments we propose four testable 
hypotheses:
27
 
Hypothesis 2:  Impact of Limit Order Prices 
(a) The intensity of buy order submissions increases with the 
difference between the price of an incoming buy order and 
the best buy price. 
(b) The intensity of sell order submissions decreases with the 
difference between the price of an incoming buy order and 
the best buy price. 
(c) The intensity of sell order submissions increase with the 
difference between the the best sell price and the price of 
an incoming sell order.   
(d) The intensity of buy order submissions decreases with the 
difference between the the best sell price and the price of 
an incoming sell order.  
4.2.3   Locked or Crossed Inside Spread  
During the regular trading period, a trade is executed whenever the price associated with an 
incoming buy (sell) order is equal to or greater (less) than the prevailing best sell (buy) price 
in the limit order book.  Essentially, this makes it impossible for the price of the best buy to 
be equal to or greater than the price of the best sell in the limit order book.  However, during 
the pre-opening period there is no execution of trades taking place.  As a consequence, the 
price of an incoming buy (sell) can be set at or above (below) the best sell (buy) which 
                                                 
27
 Recall that intensity is earlier defined as the inverse of the conditional expected duration.  Since the 
estimation relies on duration, therefore, if an explanatory variable is negatively related to the conditional 
expected duration then it will be positively related submission intensity.  In this case, when the buy (sell) order 
is close to the top of the order book (smaller negative number) then it is expected to have a negative 
relationship with the conditional expected duration and a positive relationship with submission intensity.    
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results in a locked or crossed inside spread.  A locked inside spread refers to the situation 
where the prices of the best buy and sell are equal.  Accordingly, a crossed inside spread 
refers to the situation where the best buy is greater than the best sell in the limit order book.  
Cao et al. (2000) examine the impact of locked and crossed inside spread on the price 
discovery process of the NASDAQ market pre-opening period. They find that when the 
market is locked or crossed, significant information is being revealed about the fundamental 
value of the asset. 
Therefore, we argue that a trader who locks or crosses the inside spread by submitting a buy 
limit order that is equal to or greater than the best sell, sends a positive signal by revealing 
that their valuation for the asset is either equal to or greater than the prevailing best sell 
price.  Additionally, by employing such an aggressive strategy to increase the probability 
that their order is executed at the opening, this also increases the probability that the trader 
possesses private information about the fundamental value of the asset.  Consequently, this 
should positively impact the intensity of the buy order submissions and negatively impact 
sell order submissions, since the information is on the buy side of the market.  However, 
based on the same arguments, if the market is locked or crossed by an incoming sell order, 
then this sends a negative signal regarding the fundamental value of the asset.  Thus, the 
intensity of the buy submissions is expected to be negatively impacted and the intensity of 
the sell order submissions positively impacted.  The testable hypotheses in this situation are 
as follows: 
Hypothesis 3:  Locked or Crossed Inside Spread 
(a) The intensity of buy order submissions is positively 
impacted when the inside spread is locked or crossed by 
an incoming buy order. 
(b) The intensity of sell order submissions is negatively 
impacted when the inside spread is locked or crossed by 
an incoming buy order. 
(c) The intensity of sell order submissions is positively 
impacted when the inside spread is locked or crossed by 
an incoming sell order.   
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(d) The intensity of buy order submissions is negatively 
impacted when the inside spread is locked or crossed by 
an incoming sell order. 
4.2.4   Incoming Limit Order Volume 
Extant theoretical models argue that the volume that is associated with a submitted limit 
order is associated with informed trading, as a relatively higher volume is an indication of a 
trader‟s aggressiveness to profit from private information (Easley and O‟Hara, 1997a).  This 
suggests order flow volume during the pre-opening period will be vital in the information 
aggregation process, as market participants may infer valuable information about the 
fundamental value of the asset.  In both Vives (1995) and Medrano and Vives (2001), order 
flow during the pre-opening represents an important variable in the determination of the 
prices set during the period.  In other words, the price at each point during the pre-opening is 
conditional upon the order flow that emanates from the traders.  They maintain that an 
increase in order flow signifies the arrival of private information and prices are impacted 
accordingly.  In essence, order flow is a major conveyor of information regarding the 
fundamental value of the asset, from which uninformed traders can make inferences.  
There are a few points we should note.  First, in Vives (1995), order flow during the pre-
opening period first increases and then diminishes towards the end of the period, as more 
and more information about the fundamental value of the asset is revealed by informed 
traders.  In the limit, prices equal their fundamental value and informed traders have no 
incentive to place additional orders since their information advantage has been eroded.  
Second, Medrano and Vives (2001) in their analysis of strategic manipulation contend that 
due to the behaviour of the strategic informed trader, order flow during the pre-opening 
period will be „U‟ shaped.  This occurs due to the submission of manipulative orders during 
the early stages of the pre-opening and then the resubmission of revised orders towards the 
end of the pre-opening period.  They further predict that the intensity of order submission 
increases towards the end of the pre-opening period.   
In both cases (Vives, 1995 and Medrano and Vives, 2001) an increase in order flow volume 
will be positively related to the intensity of order submissions during the pre-opening period.  
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Essentially, the impact operates through two channels.  First, if volume is a purveyor of 
private information during the pre-opening (Biais et al. 1995), then the volume associated 
with an incoming buy (sell) limit order will be positively related to the intensity of buy (sell) 
order submissions and inversely related to the intensity of the sell (buy) order submissions.  
In essence, a high order volume on the buy side is indicative of private information that is 
reflective of a higher fundamental value compared with the present prices.  This leads to a 
tendency for the intensity of the buy order submissions to increase.  However, since there is 
no trading during the pre-opening period, other traders in the market observe this trend, and 
learn from the order flow.  Hence, under the assumption of learning, a high order flow on the 
buy side of the market act to reduce the intensity of orders on the sell side of the market, and 
vice versa.  Therefore, the testable hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 4:  Impact of Limit Order Volume 
(a) The intensity of buy order submissions increases with 
the volume of an incoming buy order. 
(b) The intensity of sell order submissions decreases with 
the volume of an incoming buy order. 
(c) The intensity of buy order submissions decreases with 
the volume of an incoming sell order. 
(d) The intensity of sell order submissions increases with 
the volume of an incoming sell order. 
4.2.5   Order Revisions and Cancellations 
On the MSE, limit orders that are submitted during the pre-opening are non-binding and 
traders have the option to cancel or revise their order without cost or obligation anytime 
before the order is filled at the opening.  An order revision corresponds to any modification a 
trader makes to a previous order that does not alter the type of order (buy or sell).  For 
instance, if a trader changes the price or volume of a previously submitted order, then this 
constitutes a revision.  However, if a trader contemplates modifying the type of order from 
say a buy to a sell, then the order has to be cancelled and the desired type of order re-
submitted.  The exact reason for a cancellation is generally unknown since there are a variety 
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of reasons that can motivate the cancellation of an order.  For instance, if a strategic trader 
possesses private information about the fundamental value of the asset in the framework of 
Medrano and Vives (2001), the strategic trader submits limit orders during the early stages 
of the pre-opening that are contrary to what is implied by their private information.  If the 
strategic informed trader is to profit from the private information, these manipulative orders 
need to be cancelled and an order reflective of the private information is submitted.  In this 
case, the cancellation of a previous order will be associated with an informed event, and as 
such should have a significant impact on the intensity of the buy/sell submissions. 
Alternatively, if the information aggregation process commences towards the end of the pre-
opening period as in Biais et al. (1995), then this provides additional reasons for 
cancellations and revisions.  Essentially, their analysis finds that towards the end of the pre-
opening period quotes become more informative and reflect learning among traders.  
Therefore, later in the pre-opening uninformed traders are able to form better estimates of 
the fundamental value of the asset, and as such likely modify their previous orders to reflect 
their updated information set.  Thus, if the price of their initial order was an under or over 
estimate of the true fundamental value, then they will revise their orders to accommodate 
their updated estimate.  Additionally, if based on the information that is being revealed by 
the informed traders, uninformed traders realise that they are on the wrong side of the 
market, then any previous orders will be cancelled and new orders submitted.  Under these 
assumptions, cancellation and/or revision of a previously submitted order is information 
driven, and will significantly impact the intensity of the order submissions. 
The main implications are as follows.  First, the cancellation of a previous buy (sell) order is 
expected to negatively impact the buy (sell) order intensity and positively impact the sell 
(buy) order intensity.  The argument here is that if the cancellation arrives in light of 
learning, a cancelled order implies that the direction of the trader‟s order placement strategy 
has changed.  The trader has inferred that the information flow is concentrated on the 
opposite side of the market, and they no longer have an interest in executing their current 
order.  Further, we expect that the impact should be more significant the higher the volume 
associated with the cancelled limit order.    
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Second, the impact of a revised order is likely to be dependent on the direction of the change 
in relation to the best buy/sell order.  If the limit buy price is revised upwards, closer to the 
best buy, then this represents a positive signal that the trader associates an improved 
valuation with the asset.  This may be as a result of learning, and as such should have a 
positive relation to the intensity of the buy order submissions.  The converse of this 
argument should also hold true in the case of the sell order submissions.  Therefore, we posit 
that: on the one hand, a revision of a buy order price in the direction of the best buy 
increases the intensity of buy order submissions and reduces the intensity of sell order 
submissions.  On the other hand, if there is a revision to a previous sell order price in the 
direction of the best sell then this carries a negative signal and as such should increase sell 
order intensity and reduce buy order intensity.  In addition, the magnitude of these 
relationships should also be increasing in the volume of the order being revised.  Overall, the 
testable hypotheses can be summarised as follows: 
Hypothesis 5:  Impact of Limit Order Cancellations 
(a) The cancellation of a buy order and the associated volume 
negatively impacts the intensity of buy order submissions and 
positively impacts the intensity of sell order submissions.  
(b) The cancellation of a sell order and the associated volume 
negatively impacts the intensity of sell order submissions and 
positively impacts the intensity of buy order submissions.   
Hypothesis 6:  Impact of Limit Order Revisions 
(a) The revision of a buy order price closer to the best buy price 
and the associated volume increases the intensity of buy order 
submissions and reduces the intensity of sell order 
submissions. 
 
(b) The revision of a sell order price closer to the best sell price 
and the associated volume increases the intensity sell order 
submissions and reduce the intensity of buy order submission. 
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4.2.6   Bid-Ask Spread and Mid-Quote Return 
In a limit order market the inside spread is computed by finding the difference between the 
prices of the best buy and best sell orders in the order book.  This measure is closely 
associated with the level of liquidity in the limit order book, with a wide spread indicative of 
low market liquidity and a narrow spread indicates a relatively high level of liquidity in the 
market.  In the context of the pre-opening period, in which there is no active execution of 
trades, the best buy (sell) represents the highest (lowest) valuation that a buyer (seller) has 
placed on the asset under consideration.  Therefore, we can argue that if the highest value to 
buy is close to the lowest value that a trader is willing to sell, then this should signify a 
greater level of incipient liquidity in the market.
28
  As a consequence, we expect the intensity 
of both the buy and sell order submission to also be positively impacted by a narrow spread.  
In essence, with greater level of incipient liquidity available in the market, the intensity of 
the order submissions of both types can be expected to increase. 
Another source of inference available to traders during the pre-opening is the past behaviour 
of order prices during the period.  Under the assumption of learning, traders observe the 
evolution of expected opening prices as a basis upon which to form their own expectation of 
the fundamental value of the asset.  The fact that the pre-opening period is preceded by an 
overnight, weekend or holiday halt in the trading process enhances the possibility that it has 
resulted in variations in traders‟ expectations about the full information value of the asset.  
As a consequence, any revision in expectations that manifest itself during the order 
submission process should provide significant information about the direction of the asset‟s 
fundamental value when such revisions are observed by uninformed traders.   
Further, if market participants learn from differences in valuation that are realised over time 
leading to more informed inferences about the fundamental value of the asset, they will 
become more inclined to submit orders.  Consequently, we expect the intensity of both buy 
and sell order submissions to increase.  To measure the impact of variation in expectations 
about the fundamental value on the intensity of the buy and sell order submissions, we use 
the mid-quote return as a proxy.  In essence, if there is a high level of variation in valuation 
                                                 
28
 A similar argument is articulated by Hall and Hautsch (2007) in the context of active trading.  They argue 
that the inside spread directly affects the intensity of the trade process on both sides of the market.  However, 
they do not present a case for the response to the quote processes. 
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about the fundamental value of the asset subsequent to the overnight or weekend halt in the 
trading process, then this should be reflected in the mid-quote returns.  Therefore, we expect 
that in light of such learning, a high absolute mid-quote return should have a positive impact 
on both the buy and sell order submission intensity.  Therefore, the testable hypotheses in 
this case are as follows: 
Hypothesis 7:  The Impact of Buy-Sell Spread and Mid-quote Returns 
(a) The intensity of both the buy and sell order submissions 
should increase when there is an decrease in the inside 
spread. 
(b) The intensity of both the buy and sell order submissions 
should be positively impacted when there is an increase in 
the mid-quote return. 
4.3   Econometric Methodology 
4.3.1   The ACD Model 
To model the intensity of buy and the sell order submissions we utilise the Log ACD model 
formation proposed by Bauwens and Giot (2001).  This is an extension of the ACD model 
first introduced by Engle and Russell (1998).  To present a clear case for the use of the Log 
ACD model we first discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the basic ACD framework.  In 
the model proposed by Engle and Russell (1998), the series  11,...,, ttt ii   represents the clock 
time that orders are submitted and the duration of each order relative to the occurrence of the 
previous order is defined as 1 iii ttx .  Engle and Russell (1998) further define i  as the 
conditional expectation of the i
th
 duration, such that ),...,|( 11 xxxE iii  .  In addition, 
they propose that the i
th
 duration is the product of the conditional duration at period i  and 
an independently and identically distributed ( iid ) variable i , such that iiix  , where 
iid~  with density function ),(  if , where   is a parameter vector.  By construction, the 
error structure for the ACD model is defined as iii x   , where 1)( iE  . 
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In order to derive the framework for modelling the conditional duration i , Engle and 
Russell (1998) assume that the durations are conditionally exponentially distributed, and as 
such the hazard function is constant and equal to one.  Specifically, the hazard function 
)(0 t  is the ratio of the probability density function )(0 tP  to the survival function )(0 tS , 
such that )()()( 000 tStPt  .
29
  They further propose that the conditional intensity of the 
ACD model can be expressed as    11)(1)()(0)(1 ),...,),(|(

 tNtNtNtN tttttNt  , where 
)(tN  is a counting function, )(tNt  and )(tN  are the time and conditional duration when the 
counting function is evaluated, respectively.
30
  Therefore, if the hazard function )(0   is 
assumed to be equal to one, imposing the assumption of exponentially distributed durations, 
implies the conditional intensity becomes 1 1)(1)( ),...,|(

 tNtN xxt  .  As a result, Engle and 
Russell (1998) propose the following parameterization for the conditional duration process 
which is referred to as the Exponential ACD (EACD) model: 
EACD(m,q):     
q
j jij
m
j jiji
x
11
      (1) 
However, Dufour and  Engle (2000) argue that the standard ACD specification in equation 
(1) has several disadvantages.  For instance, the linear parameterization structure for the 
conditional duration i  combined with the non-negative attribute of durations in general, 
necessitates the imposition of positivity constraints when estimating model coefficients 
),,(  .  Without this constraint it would be possible for the model to predict negative 
durations.  This problem is further amplified if additional explanatory variables which are 
negatively related to the duration process are included in the ACD structure. 
An attempt to circumvent this problem is proposed by Bauwens and Giot (2000) in their 
Log-ACD model.  Estimating the log of conditional duration (log i ) rather than conditional 
duration ( i ), eliminates the need to place positivity restrictions on the coefficients.  In 
addition, by estimating the log of the conditional duration the autocorrelation exhibits 
                                                 
29
 If )(0 TF is the cumulative probability distribution corresponding to the probability density )(0 tP , then the 
survival function )(1)( 00 tFtS  . 
30
 See Engle and Russell (1998) for a complete outline and explanation of these arguments and their proofs. 
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hyperbolic decay, thereby capturing a greater degree of persistence in the duration series.  
Bauwens and Giot (2000) propose the following structure for the parameterization of the 
Log-ACD model, which they referred to as the Log2ACD model.
31
 
LogACD(m,q):        
q
j jij
m
j jiji 11
lnexp     (2) 
4.3.2   Error Distribution 
Another important point in the estimation process is that iidi ~ , with probability density 
function ),(  if , where   is a coefficient vector which determines the shape of the 
distribution.  However, due to the non-negative nature of duration data series in general, 
),(  if  should have a non-negative support which restricts the distributions that can be 
considered.  In the basic model, Engle and Russell (1998) propose the use of the exponential 
distribution for the density function.  Essentially, assuming exponentially distributed error 
terms imposes a flat hazard curve on the conditional duration structure - an assumption 
tested and rejected in the empirical analysis of Engle and Russell (1998).  They argue that 
greater flexibility is needed in the hazard function, and estimate the standard ACD model 
assuming a Weibull distribution resulting in the Weibull ACD (WACD) model.   
To incorporate a more flexible hazard function in the ACD structure, different distributions 
have been proposed.  For instance, Dufour and Engle (2000) implement the Generalised 
Gamma distribution, Grammig and Maurer (2000) propose the use of the Burr distributed 
error structure and Hautsch (2002) employs the Generalised F distribution for the ACD 
specifications.  The Exponential and Weibull distributions are special cases of the Burr, 
Generalised Gamma and Generalised F distributions.  However, due to the relative 
complexity of these distributions, not all moments may exist without placing restrictions on 
the distribution parameters during the estimation process.  This complicates the estimation 
process of the models under consideration.   
                                                 
31
 Bauwens and Giot (2000) also propose an alternative parameterization Log1-ACD which is not considered 
here.  However, we estimate both models and find that while the results are qualitatively the same, the 
estimated errors of the Log1-ACD model tend to be significantly more serially correlated.   
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Consequently, due to the number of parameters to be estimated in this analysis, we utilize a 
Weibull distributed error structure (equation (3)) so as to minimise the number of estimated 
parameters and reduce the complexity of the estimation process.
32
  Additionally, by 
incorporating additional explanatory variables into the conditional expectation equation, we 
expect that a greater amount of the persistence will be captured by the model, which makes 
utilising a more flexible distribution unnecessary. 
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where   is a non-negative parameters related to the slope of the distribution and )(  is the 
gamma function. 
4.3.3   Estimation and Inference 
Since ix  represents the pooled process of the buy and sell order durations, let 
a
it  and 
b
it  be 
the clock time associated with the submission time of a sell and buy order, respectively.  
Therefore, the duration of a specific order to the next order of the same type is ki
k
i
k
i ttx 1 , 
where sbk , .  The conditional expected duration of type k  is defined as 
k
i , such that 
k
i
k
i
k
i x    and 1)( 
k
iE  .  For tractability, we incorporate only one lag of the error and 
conditional expectation in the model, and refer to the formation as LogACD(1,1).  
Additionally, given we wish to explain the fundamental drivers of the order submission 
processes, we enter additional factors into the conditional expectation equation.  Let kiZ 1  be 
a column vector of explanatory variables that are known at time 1it , with the corresponding 
parameter (row) vector of coefficients 
k .  Then, the model for estimation is as follows: 
   kikkikkikkki Z 111 lnexp         (4) 
                                                 
32
 We experiment with the Generalized Gamma and Burr distribution but did not achieve convergence in the 
estimation process. 
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We estimate the augmented LogACD(1,1) model presented in equation (4) using maximum 
likelihood method by implementing the Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman (1974) (BHHH) 
algorithm.  The log-likelihood function is: 
   
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4.4   Data and Explanatory Variables 
4.4.1   Data 
The data used in this analysis is extracted from the Maltese Stock Exchange historical data 
base over the period January 4, 2000 to June 28, 2007.  The Maltese Stock Exchange is an 
electronic continuous limit order market with active execution of trades beginning at 10:00 
am and ending at 12:30 pm.  Prior to the initiation of trading, the pre-opening period begins 
at 8:30 am and ends at 10:00 am when the clearing algorithm that determines the equilibrium 
prices is executed.
33
  The sample studied in this analysis comprises events from the three 
most active stocks during the market pre-opening period.  These are HSBC Bank Malta plc 
(HSB), Bank of Valletta plc (BOV) and the Maltacom plc (MLC).  Table 4.1 provides 
summary statistics for order submissions, revisions and cancellations.  Figure 4.1 plots the 
duration between both buy and sell order submissions for the three stocks used in this study.   
The total number of events occurring in the samples is 22, 921 for BOV, 27,397 for MLC 
and 16,884 for HSB.  The events comprise the submission, revision and cancelation of limit 
orders, which account respectively for approximately 60%, 28% and 12% of the total events 
in the case of BOV.  For MLC, approximately 56%, 30% and 14% of the total events 
represents limit order submissions, revision and cancellation of orders, respectively.  The 
proportions for HSB are 65% for limit order submissions, 9% for cancelled orders and 26% 
of the events represents order revisions. Other events, such as exchange actions, that occur in 
the data are omitted since they constitute a very small percentage of the total events and lack 
any economic interpretation. 
                                                 
33
 As of 23 October 2006, the pre-opening period changed to 9:30 am to 10:45 am with the continuous open 
from 10:45am to 12:30pm.  This has been accounted for in our estimation. 
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Table 4.1 
Summary Statistics for Limit Order Submission, Revisions and Cancellations 
Panel A. BOV MLC HSB 
 Limit Order Arrivals    
 Total orders submitted 13,793 15,219 10,958 
 Number of buy 7,005 8,579 6,789 
 Number of sell 6,788 6,640 4,169 
 Cancelled Limit Orders    
 Total orders cancelled 2,782 3,853 1,554 
 Number of cancelled buy 1,213 1,980 818 
 Number of cancelled sell 1,569 1,873 736 
 Revised Limit Orders (Price)    
 Total revised orders 6,346 8,325 4,332 
 Number of revised buy 2,899 4,665 2,401 
 Number of revised sell 3,447 3,660 1,931 
 
Total Number of Events 22,921 27,397 16,844 
Panel B.  
 
Time between order arrival (Seconds) 
 Mean  262.84 270.58 258.26 
 Standard Deviation 478.04 484.05 488.68 
 Min 0 0 0 
 Max 4,576 4,695 4,225 
 LB(36) Statistic 9,644.05 12,109.83 14,133.26 
 
Time between buy order arrival (Seconds) 
 Mean 296.38 229.18 296.02 
 Standard Deviation 555.15 467.44 542.59 
 Min 1 1 1 
 Max 4,927 5,060 4,943 
 LB(36) Statistic 4,660.56 5,935.31 7,998.55 
 
Time between sell order arrival (Seconds) 
 Mean 359.73 400.72 489.24 
 Standard Deviation 575.22 615.37 690.66 
 Min 1 1 1 
 Max 4,969 4,955 4,984 
 LB(30) Statistic 1,812.53 2,517.24 1,184.46 
Note: This table reports a summary of the data for the three stocks used in this study.  Panel A 
reports the number of limit order submitted, revised and cancelled for all three stocks from 
January 4, 2000 to June 28, 2007.  Panel B reports duration statistics for the pooled, buy and sell 
submissions processes, including the mean, standard deviation, minimum (Min), maximum 
(Max) and the Ljung-Box test statistic at 36 lags (LB(36)). 
  
  
 
Figure 4.1 
Buy and Sell Order Submission Duration 
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From the summary statistics in panel B of table 4.1, it is evident that there is a high degree of 
persistence in both the buy and sell duration series for all three stocks since the Ljung-Box 
statistic is highly significant even at 36 lags.  The HSB buy duration series seems to be the 
most persistent and the sell durations of HSB appear to be the least persistent based on the 
Ljung-Box statistic.  In fact, the buy duration series tend to be significantly more persistent 
than the sell duration series for all stocks, which is indicative of a buyer‟s market or the 
effect of short sale constraints.  
To test the hypotheses discussed in section 4.2, we construct our explanatory variables by 
recreating the limit order book at each point in time for the entire sample.  Table 4.2 
provides an outline of the variables and their definitions.  In addition, due to the lack of order 
execution during the pre-opening period, it is possible that the best buy is equal to or greater 
than the best sell which results in a zero or negative spread.  Based on market regulations, 
orders that cross the inside spread will be reflected in the order book at the market clearing 
price.  Hence, we adjust the variables such that whenever the spread is crossed or locked, the 
best buy or sell price is set equal to the expected opening price.
34
   
4.4.2   Explanatory Variables 
In section 4.2.1, we argue that for reasons related to information revelation and learning, the 
intensity of buy and sell order submissions increases towards the end of the pre-opening 
period.  To test this hypothesis, we measure the time to opening (in minutes) at each order 
submission and incorporate it in the model, defining imto  as the number of minutes to open 
whenever a buy or sell order is submitted to the order book.
 35
  Section 4.2.2 argues that the 
difference between the price associated with an incoming buy order and the best buy 
positively (negatively) impacts the intensity of the buy (sell) submissions.  Similarly, we 
argue that the difference between the price of the best sell order and the price associated with 
                                                 
34
 The expected opening prices are not included in the data set provided to us by the exchange.  However, we 
applied the exact rules used to determine the opening price for a stock to the order book data and computed the 
expected opening prices.  To ensure our implementation is correct, the computed opening price is cross 
checked with the actual execution prices at the opening.  
35
 Hypothesis 1a, which speaks to the presence of clustering during the market pre-opening period, is tested by 
examining the coefficient  k  associated with the lagged conditional expected duration.   
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an incoming sell impacts the intensity of buy and sell order submissions negatively and 
positively, respectively.  To capture these impacts, the variables ilbb  
and ilba  
are 
incorporated, to measure the difference between the log price of best buy and the log price of 
the incoming buy order and the difference between the log price of an incoming sell order 
and the log price of the best sell in period i , respectively.
36,37
   
In section 4.2.3, the discussions highlight the impact of a locked or crossed inside spread on 
the intensity of the buy (sell) order process.  To test these hypotheses, we construct two 
variables.  First, to determine the impact of an incoming buy order that lock or crosses the 
inside spread, we define the dummy variable iblc , which takes the value of one when the 
price of an incoming buy is greater than or equal to the best sell price.  Second, to measure 
the impact of an incoming sell order that locks or crosses the inside spread, we define the 
variable ialc , which is assigned a value of one when the price of an incoming sell order is 
less than or equal to the best buy price. 
Hypothesis 4a in section 4.2.4 proposes that the intensity of the buy order submissions 
increases with the volume associated with an incoming buy order, while hypothesis 4b 
proposes the opposite impact on the sell submission, as the volume associated with an 
incoming buy order negatively impacts the intensity of sell order submissions.  In addition, 
hypothesis 4c and 4d proposes that the volume associated with an incoming sell order 
positively impact the intensity of the sell order submissions and negatively impact the 
intensity of the buy order submissions.  To test these hypotheses, the log volume of the 
incoming buy order  ilbv  and the log volume of the incoming sell order  ilav  are 
incorporated into the model.   
                                                 
36
 The order of the variables are reversed in this case since we want to examine the effect of the price associated 
with an order getting close to the best buy/sell.  In other words the value of these variables should be closer to 
zero the closer the order is to the best buy/sell in the limit order book.  
37
 The objective of the variables lbb and lba is to measure the aggressiveness of the price associated with an 
incoming order.  When the price of an order is equal to or exceeds its corresponding best order, the variables 
will be either zero or positive, respectively.  However, if the order exceeds (crosses) the best opposite order, 
then the value of the variable will be computed as if the order price is equal to the opening price.  This is done 
because the variable is intended to reflect the visible order book and orders that cross the spread are reflected at 
the opening price during the pre-opening period.    
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To measure the impact of cancellations of orders and their associated volume on the order 
submission intensity as proposed in section 4.2.5, we define several variables.  First, the 
dummy variables idcb  and idca  are constructed, which assign a value of one if a buy or sell 
order is cancelled, respectively.  In addition, the impact of the volume associated with the 
cancelled order is measured using the variables ilcbv  and ilcav , which are the log volumes 
associated with the cancelled buy and sell order, respectively. 
In hypotheses 6a and 6b, we propose that revision of a buy (sell) order closer to the best buy 
(sell) positively impacts the intensity of the buy (sell) order submission and negatively 
impacts the intensity of sell (buy) order submissions.  This impact is measured by 
incorporating into the model, the log ratio of the revised price in relation to the previous 
price (for a revised buy order) and the log ratio of the previous price to the revised price (for 
a revised sell order), which are denoted as ilrb  and ilra  respectively.  In essence, if the 
revised buy order is closer to the best buy then the log ratio is large since the revised price is 
higher.  This argument also holds true in the case of a revised sell order, however, the order 
of the variables is reversed.
38
  In addition, we measure the impact of the volume associated 
with a revised buy or sell order by incorporating the variables irbv  and irav , which are the 
log volume associated with the revised buy and sell orders respectively. 
The final set of variables being considered in this analysis are intended to measure the 
impact of the bid-ask spread and the mid-quote returns on the intensity of the order 
submissions, which are outlined in hypotheses 7a and 7b.  If we denote ibblog  and ibalog  
as the log best buy and log best sell price in period i , then the spread is 
iii babbspr loglog  , which is the difference between the log best sell and the log best buy 
prices.  Additionally, the mid-quote return )( imqr  is measure by the absolute value of the log 
ratio of the mid-quote in period i  to period 1i , such that   |log| 1 iii mqmqmqr , where 
  2iii bbbamq  , imq  is the mid-quote during period i  and iba and ibb  are the best buy 
and sell prices in period i respectively.    
                                                 
38
 The best sell is the minimum price at which an agent is willing to sell the asset.  As a result, any revision of a 
sell towards the best sell is a decrease in the price.  Thus, the log ratio of the previous sell price to the revised 
price is positive.    
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Table 4.2  
Summary Description of Explanatory Variables 
Variable  Description of Variable 
i  
 Conditional expected duration. 
imto  
 Time until the market open in minutes. 
ilbb  
 The log price of the best buy minus the log price of an incoming buy order. 
ilba  
 The log price of an incoming sell order minus the log price of the best sell. 
ilbv  
 Log volume associated with an incoming buy order. 
ilav  
 Log volume associated with an incoming sell order. 
iblc  
 Dummy variable that indicates when the incoming buy price is greater than or equal to 
the best sell price. 
ialc  
 Dummy variable that indicates when the incoming sell price is less than or equal to the 
best buy price. 
idcb  
 Dummy variable indicating a cancelled buy order. 
idca  
 Dummy variable indicating a cancelled sell order. 
ilcbv  
 Log volume associated with a cancelled buy order. 
ilcav  
 Log volume associated with a cancelled sell order. 
ilrb  
 Log ratio of the revised buy price to the previous buy price. 
ilra  
 Log ratio of the previous sell price to the revised sell price. 
irbv  
 Log volume associated with a revised buy order. 
irav  
 Log volume associated with a revised sell order. 
imqr  
 The mid-quote return captured by the absolute change in the mid-quote. 
ispr  
 The difference between the log prices of the best sell and the best buy. 
Note: This table provides a summary of the explanatory variables that are utilised in this study.  The variables 
are calculated by reconstructing the pre-opening limit order book at every event for the entire sample under 
study. 
 
Important to note, is that in the situation where multiple events occur during the i
th
 interval, 
then we cummulate the volume related variables and find the avearge of the remaining 
variables.  Table 4.2 provides a summary description of the explanatory variables discussed 
in this section.  Table 4.3 provides a statistically summary of the explanatory variable.  
  
 
Table 4.3  
Statistical Summary of Explanatory Variables  
  Mean   Std. Dev.   Skewness   Kurtosis 
 BOV MLC HSB  BOV MLC HSB  BOV MLC HSB  BOV MLC HSB 
imto  
20.662 23.994 19.546  18.004 20.115 17.745  1.085 0.802 1.043  1.051 0.14 0.710 
ilbb  -0.010 -0.015 -0.010  0.091 0.049 0.043  -2.259 2.835 -8.283  998.854 352.917 140.659 
ilba  -0.016 -0.029 -0.023  0.050 0.124 0.067  -7.572 -15.783 -1.835  97.845 387.578 15.340 
iblc  0.240 0.231 0.355  0.427 0.422 0.478  1.219 1.273 0.608  2.485 2.621 1.369 
ialc  0.028 0.038 0.019  0.164 0.191 0.136  5.745 4.839 7.060  34.008 24.413 50.845 
ilbv  6.287 6.941 6.202  1.195 1.139 1.216  -0.130 0.102 -0.014  3.728 3.372 2.915 
ilav  6.674 7.360 7.075  1.201 1.199 1.330  -0.094 0.581 -0.332  3.114 5.551 2.948 
idcb  0.052 0.075 0.045  0.222 0.264 0.207  4.026 3.220 4.410  17.210 11.372 20.451 
idca  0.048 0.052 0.025  0.213 0.222 0.157  4.244 4.039 6.039  19.015 17.310 37.464 
ilcbv  6.377 7.113 6.357  1.267 1.183 1.228  -0.096 0.055 -0.297  3.974 3.215 2.983 
ilcav  6.896 7.399 6.917  1.085 1.099 1.189  -0.056 -0.443 -0.416  3.388 5.736 3.899 
ilrb  2.250 2.953 3.315  4.278 5.337 16.415  5.745 7.341 13.677  51.546 87.828 195.557 
ilra  2.661 2.824 2.731  5.551 6.105 9.799  5.470 8.707 10.721  41.499 109.505 136.002 
irbv  6.228 6.932 6.074  1.113 1.039 1.129  0.037 0.005 0.143  3.012 3.182 2.919 
irav  6.650 7.120 7.065  1.187 1.028 1.365  -0.318 -0.142 -0.315  2.653 3.671 2.962 
imqr  1.015 1.400 0.921  1.475 1.613 1.356  5.667 1.725 2.764  67.452 6.837 12.895 
ispr  0.122 0.159 0.096  0.992 0.997 0.701  18.577 10.751 11.912  503.548 138.181 169.325 
Note: This table presents a statistical summary of the variables used in the empirical analysis.  For the three stocks utilised in this study, we present the mean, 
standard deviation (Std. Dev.), Skewness and Kurtosis for all the explanatory variables employed in this empirical analysis.  
The variables blc, alc, dcb and dca are dummy variables.  
1
1
2
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4.5   Empirical Results 
The results are generated by estimating two separate models for each of the three stocks, one 
each for the duration series of the buy and sell submission process.  All the regressors are 
assumed to be weakly exogenous to the conditional expected duration, and enter the model 
lagged one period.  Table 4.4 and 4.5 reports the parameters estimates and model 
diagnostics, respectively.  Table 4.6 provides a summary of the proposed hypotheses and the 
results based on the empirical analysis.  In addition, since our arguments are in terms of 
intensity as opposed to durations, we also discuss the results of the model in terms of 
intensities, which is the reciprocal of the conditional expected duration.  A variable that 
reduces duration will be interpreted to increase the intensity of order submissions. 
4.5.1   Order Submission Clustering  
In hypotheses 1a we argue that by breaking the pooled order submission process into its buy 
and sell components and modelling each duration series separately, the resulting processes 
will remain highly persistent due to the presence of informed trading.  In addition, we posit 
that both processes would display similar levels of persistence.  Based on our findings 
presented in table 4.4, we can confirm hypothesis 1a as the persistence which infers 
clustering, measured by the coefficient of the autoregressive conditional duration variable, 
ranges between 0.987 to 0.964 for the buy submission series and between 0.875 to 0.982 for 
the sell submission series.  Thus, there is a tendency for periods of high intensity to be 
followed by periods of high intensity, and periods of low intensity to be followed by periods 
of low intensity during the pre-opening period.  However, on average the buy side is more 
persistent as compared to the sell side.  These findings provide some support to the learning 
hypothesis proposed in Biais et al. (1999), and the presence of informed trading as proposed 
in Vives (1995) and Medrano and Vives (2001). 
However, contrary to the findings of Biais et al. (1995) and Medrano and Vives (2001), the 
results reveal that the intensity of buy order submissions decreases as the pre-opening period 
progresses towards the end.  This is evident as the coefficient of the variable imto , which 
measure the time to market open, is significant and negative for two of the three stocks  
  
 
Table 4.4  
Empirical Results for Duration Models 
 Buy Side  Sell Side 
 
BOV  MLC  HSB  BOV  MLC  HSB 
Coef. t-Stat.  Coef. t-Stat.  Coef. t-Stat.  Coef. t-Stat.  Coef. t-Stat.  Coef. t-Stat. 
  -0.0570 -3.898  0.1354 6.29  0.0328 3.02  0.0628 3.33  0.2446 6.88  0.6250 9.68 
ji  0.0602 30.193  0.0808 34.96  0.0518 29.37  0.0500 19.73  0.0813 21.34  0.1005 13.83 
ji  0.9816 888.771  0.9645 612.09  0.9871 1050.99  0.9824 675.56  0.9483 322.82  0.8747 106.02 
imto  -0.0002 -2.232  -0.0004 -5.98  0.0000 -0.14  0.0001 1.29  -0.0001 -1.58  -0.0003 -1.34 
ilbb  -0.2508 -4.700  -0.3081 -5.04  -0.4025 -5.79  -0.0472 -1.48  -0.0584 -1.50  0.1596 1.21 
ilba  0.1232 4.455  -0.0117 -0.64  0.0296 2.53  -0.0977 -2.15  -0.0947 -1.89  -0.8622 -8.21 
iblc  -0.0638 -17.501  -0.0805 -16.00  -0.0381 -12.42  0.0340 2.29  0.0350 2.01  0.0810 3.02 
ialc  0.0706 4.815  0.1452 9.75  0.1856 11.90  -0.0362 -7.75  -0.1048 -16.43  -0.1721 -10.07 
ilbv  0.0148 8.733  0.0022 1.08  0.0048 3.21  0.0047 4.33  0.0044 2.42  -0.0036 -1.17 
ilav  0.0008 0.936  -0.0063 -6.43  -0.0031 -4.97  -0.0021 -0.95  0.0023 0.76  0.0135 2.30 
idcb  0.0703 6.148  0.1599 14.56  0.1652 13.61  0.1042 6.10  0.0632 3.63  0.2466 5.64 
idca  0.0398 3.072  0.0879 6.13  0.1061 6.64  0.1345 8.98  0.1336 7.52  0.2740 6.90 
ilcbv  0.0007 0.946  0.0014 1.32  -0.0025 -3.85  -0.0009 -1.25  -0.0028 -1.80  -0.0014 -0.52 
ilcav  0.0025 3.048  0.0005 0.45  0.0023 3.99  -0.0029 -3.42  -0.0002 -0.10  -0.0003 -0.11 
ilrb  -0.0001 -0.771  -0.0015 -5.22  0.0001 0.24  -0.0004 -2.75  0.0002 0.68  -0.0045 -4.33 
ilra  0.0005 3.944  0.0002 1.14  0.0001 1.99  -0.0007 -3.45  0.0000 -0.02  -0.0030 -3.50 
irbv  0.0019 2.159  -0.0082 -5.88  0.0009 1.19  0.0019 2.31  -0.0019 -1.19  0.0122 4.28 
irav  -0.0032 -4.638  0.0057 5.16  -0.0047 -9.77  -0.0031 -3.27  -0.0048 -2.45  -0.0110 -3.44 
imqr  0.0091 2.809  0.1809 15.51  0.0086 1.30  0.0041 4.10  0.1483 10.85  0.3346 10.13 
ispr  -0.0058 -8.375  0.0017 1.84  -0.0017 -4.02  0.0001 0.24  0.0006 0.49  -0.0020 -0.81 
Note: This table reports the coefficient estimates and their associated t-statistics from the estimation of the Log-ACD (1,1) model, outlined in equation 4 .
  
The 
estimates are based on tick-by-tick data of the three most liquid stock of the Malta Stock Exchange from January 4, 2000 to June 28, 2007. The coefficients 
highlighted in bold are significant at the 5% level of significance or less.  See table 4.6 for a summary of these results and proposed hypotheses. 
 1
1
4
 
 115 
 
analysed.  In essence, the finding is in line with Vives (1995), who concludes that in the 
absence of manipulation, traders will reveal a significant portion of their private information 
towards the end of the pre-opening period, and consequently have no incentive to submit 
additional orders therefore reducing the intensity of order submissions.  However, the 
intensity of sell order submission is not impacted by the time to opening of the market.     
4.5.2   Impact of Limit Order Prices 
We contend in section 4.2.2 that the price associated with an incoming limit order contains 
significant information that impacts the intensity of order submissions.  The empirical results 
in table 4.4 confirm hypothesis 2a, which states that the intensity of buy order submissions 
increases when there is a positive signal resulting from the price associated with an incoming 
buy order in relation to the prevailing best buy price.  However, we find no evidence that the 
intensity of sell order submissions is negatively impacted as proposed in hypothesis 2b.  
Specifically, the coefficient associated with the variable ilbb  is negative and significant on 
the buy side for all three stocks and insignificant for the stocks on the sell side.   
The results confirm both hypotheses 2d and 2c which posit that the difference between the 
best sell price and the price of an incoming sell order, measured by the variable ilba , impacts 
the intensity of buy and sell submissions negatively and positively, respectively.  We find 
that the variable ilba  is positive and significant for two stocks on the buy side and negative 
and significant for two stocks on the sell side.  Essentially, sell orders that are submitted 
towards the top of the order book conveys a negative signal which induces additional sell 
orders and dissuades the submission of buy orders. 
Overall, the results reveal that traders that place the price of an incoming buy order high 
relative to the best buy sends a positive signal about the fundamental value of the asset to the 
market by revealing that they are aggressively trying to increase the probability that their 
orders are executed at the opening.  In effect, this positive signal increases the intensity of 
buy order submission.  However, traders on the sell side are not induced by this increase buy 
order submissions as no additional liquidity is provided by posting subsequent sell orders.  
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Moreover, when a trader submits a sell order with a price that is low relative to the best sell 
price, this is viewed by the market as a negative signal about the fundamental value of the 
asset.  As a consequence, traders on the buy side reduce the intensity with which they submit 
additional buy orders.  However, when traders on the sell side view this signal information, 
they increase the submission of sell orders.  Essentially, this finding provides some evidence 
that activity during the pre-opening period is characteristic of information based trading as in 
the cases of Vives (1995) and corroborates the findings of Hall and Hautsch (2007).  
4.5.3   Impact of Locked or Crossed Inside Spread 
We find strong evidence in support of hypotheses 3a and 3b, which predict that when the 
price of an incoming buy order is set at or greater than the best sell price, which locks or 
crosses the inside spread, there is a positive impact on the intensity of buy order submissions 
and a negative impact on sell order submissions.  The results show that the coefficient 
associated with the variable iblc  has a negative and significant coefficient for all three stocks 
on the buy side and positive and significant for the three stocks on the sell side.  In addition, 
the results also confirm hypotheses 3c and 3d, that propose that an incoming sell order that 
results in a locking or crossing of the inside spread, measured by ialc , impacts the intensity 
of the buy order submissions negatively and positively impacts the intensity of sell order 
submissions. 
In essence, whenever a trader sets the price of an incoming buy order greater than the price 
of the prevailing best sell, this sends a strong positive signal to the market that the trader is 
aggressively trying to increase the probability that their order is executed at the opening.  It 
also increases the probability that the trader is informed.  As a result, the positive signal 
induces buy side traders to submit additional buy orders.  Traders on the sell side of the 
market observe this positive signal, and reduce the intensity of their sell order submissions.  
Analogously, if the inside spread is locked or crossed by an incoming sell order, then this 
sends a strong negative signal about the fundamental value of the asset.  Consequently, the 
intensity of buy order submissions reduces and the intensity of sell order submission 
increases.  Overall, a locking or crossing of the inside spread is a strong indication of price 
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discovery and traders respond accordingly during the pre-opening period.  Our results are 
consistent with the finding of Cao et al. (2000) which highlights that a locked or crossed 
inside spread is consistent with information revelation about the fundamental value of the 
asset, and under the assumption of learning, other traders act on this information.   
4.5.4   Impact of Limit Order Volume 
The results reveal that high volume associated with incoming buy orders has a negative 
impact on the intensity of both buy and sell order submissions.  Essentially, this finding 
confirms hypothesis 4b and is contrary to the prediction of hypothesis 4a.  Specifically, the 
coefficient associated with the variable ilbv , which measures the log buy volume, is positive 
and significant on the buy side for two stocks and positive and significant for two stocks on 
the sell side.  We find similar conflicting results with regards to hypothesis 4c, where the 
coefficient associated with the variable ilav  is negative and significant for two stocks on the 
buy side of the order book.  This suggests that larger volume associated with a sell order 
submission increases the intensity of buy order submissions.  In addition, we find no 
evidence to support hypothesis 4d, which states that the volume of an incoming sell order 
will positive impact the intensity of sell order submissions.   
In summary, the overall findings indicate that buy volume does not convey significant 
information about the fundamental value of the asset, since high buy volume is normally 
submitted in a period of low order submission intensity on both sides of the order book.  
Conversely, whenever large sell volume is submitted to the market, this does not induce sell 
side traders to submit additional sell orders.  However, it increases the intensity of buy order 
submissions which suggest that buy side traders take advantage of sell side liquidity 
whenever it becomes available.  Therefore, order flow volume during the pre-opening period 
does not appear to be motivated by information based trading or provide any form of 
signalling about the fundamental value of the asset, as argue in Vives (1995), Medrano and 
Vives (2001) and Brusco, et al  (2003).  Instead, it may play a liquidity signalling role as 
trader on both sell sides of the market solicit order submissions from the opposite side by 
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signal their liquidity needs, but only the buy side respond by increasing the intensity of their 
order submissions.     
4.5.5   Impact of Order Cancellations 
In hypothesis 5a and 5b we argue that the cancellation of orders queued in the limit order 
book and the associated volume are information driven and indicate that learning is 
occurring.  The evidence suggests that a cancelled order, whether buy or sell, has a negative 
impact on the intensity of both buy and sell order submissions.  This is evident as the 
coefficients associated with the variables idcb  and idca , which indicate a cancelled buy or 
sell order respectively, are positive and significant on both sides of the order book for the 
three stocks studied.  In addition, the results indicate a negative relationship between the 
volume associated with a cancelled sell order and the intensity of the buy order submission.  
These results provide partial support for hypothesis 5a, which predicts that the intensity of 
the buy order submissions is impacted negatively by the cancellation of a buy order, and are 
contrary to the prediction of a negative impact on the intensity of sell order submissions.  In 
addition, the negative relationship between the cancellation of a sell order and the intensity 
of both the buy and sell submissions, also partially supports hypothesis 5b, which predicts 
that the intensity of sell order submissions reduces when sell orders are being cancelled from 
the order book. 
In summary, we find mixed support for the predictions in hypotheses 5a and 5b.  Essentially, 
we find that when liquidity is removed from the order book by cancellations on either side, 
there is a general reduction in the intensity of order submissions on both sides of the order 
book.  This further supports the claim that order flow volume plays a liquidity signalling role 
at the MSE.  In addition, when traders realise that the probability of their orders being 
executed at the opening is low they tend to cancel these orders.  Consequently, when there is 
a reduction in the supply of liquidity, traders on the buy side reduce the intensity of buy 
order submissions.  Similarly, when there is a reduction in liquidity due to cancellation of 
buy orders, traders on the sell side will reduce the intensity of sell order submissions.  This 
suggests that cancellation of orders are liquidity motivated as opposed to information driven, 
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since cancellations of orders on one side of the order book do not seem to be motivated by 
information being observed on the opposite side of the order book, as proposed in our set of 
hypotheses.   
4.5.6   Impact of Limit Order Revisions 
Hypotheses 6a and 6b propose that the revisions of buy (sell) prices closer to the best buy 
(sell) price will have a positive impact on the intensity of buy (sell) order submissions and 
negatively impact the intensity of the sell (buy) order submissions.  We find only weak 
evidence in partial support of the proposal of hypothesis 6a on the buy side.  However, 
contrary to our predictions, there is a positive relationship between the revision of buy prices 
closer to the best buy price and the intensity of sell order submissions (measured by the 
variable ilrb ).  Specifically, a buy order price that is revised closer to the best buy increases 
the intensity of sell order submissions.  In addition, we find evidence that the volume 
associated with a forward revised buy order ( irbv ) negatively impacts the intensity of sell 
order submissions.  Therefore, larger buy orders that are revised forward, send a positive 
signal and consequently reduce the intensity of sell submissions.   
The results provide support for hypothesis 6b that predicts that forward price revision of sell 
orders will increase the intensity of sell order submissions and reduce the intensity of buy 
order submissions.  The estimated coefficient of the variable ilra  is positive and significant 
on the buy side and negative and significant on the sell side for two of the three stocks.  In 
addition, the volume associated with a revised sell order )( irav  is predicted to negatively 
impact the intensity of buy order submissions and positively impact sell order submissions.  
Contrary to our predictions, we find that the volume associated with a sell order that is 
revised closer to the best sell, positively impacts the intensity of buy order submissions for 
two of the three stocks in our study.  In support of hypothesis 6b, we find that a larger 
volume associated with a revised sell order positively impacts the intensity of sell order 
submissions.  
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Overall, the results reveal that sell orders that are revised closer to the top of the order book 
are indicative of price discovery as traders increase the intensity of their sell order 
submissions subsequently.  In addition, sell side traders also compete for liquidity provided 
from the buy side, by increasing the intensity of their submissions as prices become more 
favourable when buy orders are revised towards the top of the book.  Similarly, large volume 
associated with a revised sell order induces traders to place additional buy orders since the 
sell side traders are providing liquidity at a better price.  This finding is consistent with the 
effects of incoming sell volume on the intensity of buy order submissions and supports the 
conclusion of liquidity signalling by traders in the pre-opening.  Therefore, as with the case 
of order cancellations, the revision of orders closer to the best buy/sell does not seem to be 
driven by information, but by availability of liquidity. 
4.5.7   Impact of Mid-Quote Return and Inside Spread 
The arguments proposed in hypotheses 7a and 7b predict that the intensity of both buy and 
sell order submissions is negatively impacted by a large inside spread and low mid-quote 
return.  The results are contrary to the prediction of hypothesis 7a on the buy side of the 
market.  Essentially, the coefficient associated with the variable ispr  
is negative and 
significant for two stocks on the buy side.  Hence, this indicates that as the spread reduces, 
the intensity of buy order submissions reduces.  This result is consistent with the finding that 
the intensity of order submissions reduces as the pre-opening period progress market 
opening.  Hence, as orders are submitted within the spread (or prices revised within the 
spread) during the pre-opening period, which effectively reduces the spread and reveals 
information about the value of the asset, this leads to a reduction in the intensity of buy order 
submissions consistent with the predictions of Vives (1995). 
The results reveal that the coefficient associated with the variable imqr , which measures the 
absolute mid-quote return, is positive and significant for two and three stocks on the buy and 
sell side, respectively.  This is contrary to the predictions of hypothesis 7b.   Essentially, we 
find that an increase in the absolute mid-quote return, reflecting enhanced uncertainty about 
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the fundamental value of the stock, reduces the intensity of submissions on both sides of the 
market.     
 4.5.8   Model Diagnostics      
Panel A of table 4.5 indicates that the shape parameter associated with the Weibull 
distribution is significant across all the models estimated and is not significantly different 
from one.  This suggests that the durations are distributed exponentially.  In addition, the 
mean of the estimated errors i
~ , is not statistically different from one on either side of the 
order book, which is in line with the assumption of duration models that utilise a Weibull 
distribution.  The standard deviation of the estimated errors on both sides is greater than one 
in all cases, which suggests that there might be excess dispersion remaining in the error 
structure.  The Ljung-Box test statistic at four and sixteen lags for the estimated error and 
error squared does not show any significant autocorrelation in the error structure, except for 
one equation.  From this, we conclude that the models have captured most of the dispersion 
in the duration series in general. 
The empirical analysis utilizes a total of seventeen explanatory variables, which might raise 
the possibility that multicollinearity is present and influences the results derived from the 
models.  To quantify the impact of correlations between the explanatory variables on the 
resulting standard error, we compute the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each variable 
and report the findings in panel B of table 4.5.  The results of the VIF indicate that 
multicollinearity does not seem to pose a problem in our model as all values are less than 
two which is far below the threshold value of five used in the literature.  
4.5.9   Remarks      
It is evident from the results that the buy side of the market reacts more than the sell side to 
the information inferred from incoming limit orders and changes to the limit order book 
during the market pre-opening period.  Overall, sell order submissions are less reactive to 
changes in the limit order book and are less persistent than the buy order submission  
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Table 4.5  
Weibull Parameter and Model Diagnostic Statistics 
Panel A 
 
Buy Side 
 
Sell Side 
Parameters 
 
BOV MLC HSB 
 
BOV MLC HSB 
       

  
0.96 1.00 0.98 
 
1.02 1.03 1.04 
       N 
 
5220 6641 5902 
 
5041 4732 2800 
      LL 
 
-38619 -48758 -40580 
 
-38887 -3684 -22567 
     SIC 
 
14.83 14.71 13.79 
 
15.46 15.61 16.18 
i of Mean 
~
  
1.06 0.98 1.01 
 
0.98 0.97 0.94 
i of SD 
~
  
1.88 1.56 1.80 
 
1.49 1.49 1.35 
i of LB 
~
)4(
  
5.25 6.75 31.85 
 
4.74 3.56 4.42 
i of LB 
~
)16(
  
21.27 13.29 57.63 
 
10.91 11.48 22.65 
2~
)4( i of LB    
9.93 3.21 1.22 
 
1.69 5.70 4.22 
2~
)16( i of LB    
14.89 8.88 7.28 
 
11.11 23.36 17.51 
Panel B  
 Variables 
 Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
imto  
  1.08 1.03 1.07   1.14 1.04 1.10 
ilbb   
1.03 1.14 1.07 
 
1.04 1.07 1.12 
ilba   
1.02 1.01 1.04 
 
1.03 1.05 1.12 
iblc   
1.21 1.41 1.38 
 
1.09 1.09 1.22 
ialc   
1.03 1.05 1.02 
 
1.33 1.40 1.35 
ilbv   
1.01 1.02 1.16 
 
1.02 1.01 1.11 
ilav   
1.02 1.03 1.07 
 
1.01 1.02 1.06 
idcb   
1.02 1.02 1.02 
 
1.03 1.03 1.04 
idca   
1.02 1.03 1.05 
 
1.02 1.02 1.01 
ilcbv   
1.02 1.01 1.15 
 
1.02 1.02 1.06 
ilcav   
1.01 1.02 1.10 
 
1.02 1.01 1.04 
ilrb   
1.01 1.04 1.09 
 
1.01 1.03 1.05 
ilra   
1.03 1.02 1.02 
 
1.02 1.02 1.02 
irbv   
1.02 1.02 1.12 
 
1.02 1.02 1.11 
irav   
1.02 1.02 1.08 
 
1.02 1.03 1.05 
imqr   
1.01 1.11 1.07 
 
1.07 1.09 1.12 
ispr   
1.22 1.27 1.25 
 
1.21 1.31 1.29 
Note: Panel A of this table reports the estimated slope coefficient for the Weibull 
distribution )( and other model diagnostic measured corresponding to the 
estimated error of the models.  While Panel B reports the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) for all explanatory variables.  Coefficients highlighted in bold are significant 
at the 5% or less level of significance.  N refers to the number of observations, LL is 
the log likelihood value, BIC is the Bayesian Information Criterion, i
~
 is the 
estimated error, SD is the standard deviation and LB is the Ljung-Box test statistic. 
 
  
 
Table 4.6  
Summary of Proposed Hypotheses and Empirical Results. 
Hyp. Description of Hypothesis 
Rel.  
Var. 
Buy Side Sell Side 
Exp. 
Sign 
Est. 
Sign 
No. 
Sig. 
Exp. 
Sign 
Est. 
Sign 
No. 
Sig. 
1 Order Submission Clustering        
 a Persistence in the buy and sell order submission processes. 1i  +ve +ve 3 +ve +ve 3 
 b The intensity increases towards the end of the pre-opening. imto  +ve -ve 2 +ve -ve 0 
2 Limit Order Price        
 a & b 
The intensity of buy (sell) order submissions increases (decreases) with the 
difference between the best buy price and the price of an incoming buy order. i
lbb  -ve -ve 3 +ve +ve 0 
 c & d 
The intensity of sell (buy) order submissions increase (decreases) with the 
difference between the price of an incoming sell order and the best sell price.   i
lba  +ve +ve 2 -ve -ve 2 
3 Locking or Crossing of Inside Spread        
 a & b 
The intensity of buy (sell) order submissions increases (decreases) when the 
inside spread is locked or crossed by an incoming buy order. i
blc  -ve -ve 3 +ve +ve 3 
 c & d 
The intensity of sell (buy) order submissions increases (decreases) when the 
inside spread is locked or crossed by an incoming sell order. i
alc  +ve +ve 3 -ve -ve 3 
4 Limit Order Volume        
 a & b 
The intensity of buy (sell) order submissions increases (decreases) with the 
volume of an incoming buy order. i
lbv  -ve +ve 2 +ve +ve 2 
 c & d 
The intensity of buy (sell) order submissions decreases (increases) with the 
volume of an incoming sell order. i
lav  +ve -ve 2 -ve +ve 1 
1
2
3
 
  
 
Table 4.6  
Summary of Proposed Hypotheses and Empirical Results (cont’d) 
Hyp. Description of Hypothesis 
Rel.  
Var. 
Buy Side Sell Side 
Exp. 
Sign 
Est. 
Sign 
No. 
Sig. 
Exp. 
Sign 
Est. 
Sign 
No. 
Sig. 
5 Limit Order Cancellations        
 a 
The cancellation of a buy order and associated volume negatively (positively) 
impacts the intensity of buy (sell) order submissions. 
idcb  +ve +ve 3 -ve +ve 3 
ilcbv  +ve -ve 1 -ve -ve 0 
 b 
The cancellation of a sell order and associated volume negatively (positively) 
impacts the intensity of sell (buy) order submissions.   
idca  
-ve +ve 3 +ve +ve 3 
ilcav  
-ve +ve 2 +ve -ve 1 
6 Limit Order Revisions        
 
a 
The revision of a buy order price closer to the best buy price and its associated 
volume increases (decreases) the intensity of buy (sell) order submissions.   
ilrb  -ve -ve 1 +ve -ve 2 
 irbv  -ve +ve 1 +ve +ve 2 
 
b 
The revision of a sell order price closer to the best sell price and its associated 
volume increases (decreases) the intensity of sell (buy) order submissions. 
ilra  +ve +ve 2 -ve -ve 2 
 irav  +ve -ve 2 -ve -ve 3 
7 Buy-Sell Spread and Mid-Quote Returns        
 a 
The intensity of both the buy and sell order submissions should decrease when 
there is an increase in the inside spread. i
spr  +ve -ve 2 +ve +ve 0 
 b 
The intensity of both the buy and sell order submissions should be positively 
impacted when there is a decrease in the mid-quote return. i
mqr  -ve +ve 2 -ve +ve 3 
Note: This table presents a summary of the testable hypotheses (Hyp.) proposed in this study, the variables that are associated with each hypothesis (Rel. Var.), 
the expected sign of the coefficient to confirm the hypotheses (Exp. Sign), the average sign of the estimated coefficients (Est. Sign) and the number of 
coefficients significant at the 5% or less level and of the estimated sign (No. Sig.).  Additionally, the exp. sign and est. sign corresponds to the impact on 
duration.  Therefore, since the intensity is the reciprocal of duration the impact on intensity takes the opposite sign to that presented in the table.  
 
1
2
4
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processes.  Additionally, it is evident that order submissions decision taken by traders during 
pre-opening period within the Maltese Stock Exchange are driven to a larger extent by the 
demand for, and provision, of liquidity and appear to be impacted to a lesser extent by 
information signals in general.  For instance, we find that the intensity of buy order 
submissions are positively impacted when large volumes are associated with incoming sell 
orders, or the revision of a sell order towards the top of the order book.  In some cases on the 
buy side, we find that there may also be stock specific effects, resulting in inconsistent signs 
on the estimated coefficients between stocks.  A summary of the proposed hypotheses and 
the empirical findings in this chapter is presented in table 4.6.  
4.6   Conclusions     
This chapter examines the duration of buy and sell order submissions during the market pre-
opening period to determine whether information inferred from the limit order book by 
traders influences their decision to submit orders to buy or sell a stock.  We estimate the 
Log-ACD model of Bauwens and Giot (2001) with data from the Maltese Stock Exchange 
covering the period January 4, 2000 to June 28, 2007.  Several variables are incorporated 
into the model to capture information regarding changes to the limit order book and the 
characteristics of incoming limit orders.  Specifically, we test for evidence of clustering in 
the buy and sell duration series, the impact of limit order prices and volume, the impact of 
mid-quote returns and the inside spread, and the impact of cancellation or revisions of 
previously submitted limit orders on the intensity of order submissions. 
The empirical results reveal that the buy and sell duration series are highly persistent 
indicating the presence of clustering.  We find that the intensity of buy order submissions 
tends to respond more to the state of the order book and the effects of incoming orders as 
compared to submissions on the sell side.  Essentially, the intensity of buy order submissions 
is positively impacted the higher the price of an incoming buy order relative to the best buy, 
the higher the volume associated with an incoming or revised sell order, and whenever the 
inside spread is crossed or locked by an incoming buy order.  Factors that reduce the 
intensity of buy order submissions include low price of an incoming sell order submission, 
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large buy volume, cancellation of buy or sell orders and if the inside spread is crossed or 
locked by an incoming sell order. 
Furthermore, we find evidence that the intensity of sell order submissions is positively 
impacted the higher the price of an incoming sell order relative to the best sell, whenever the 
inside spread is locked or crossed by an incoming sell order or when the price of a buy order 
is revised closer to the top of the buy order book.  In addition, we find that the intensity of 
sell order submissions is reduced by the submission of large buy orders, when a buy or sell 
order is cancelled from the limit order book, and when the price of a buy order is revised 
towards the top of the order book. 
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Chapter 5 
Aggressiveness in Investor Order Placement Strategy in 
the Absence of Trading: Evidence from the Market 
Preopening Period 
5.1   Introduction 
This chapter analyses the aggressiveness of trader‟s order placement strategy during the 
market pre-opening period of a nascent stock market, the Malta Stock Exchange (MSE). 
Analysing price discovery and liquidity formation via construction of the limit order book in 
the absence of trade during the market pre-opening period possesses certain inherent 
advantages.  Both asymmetric information (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) and costly market 
participation (Grossman and Miller, 1988) are known to impede price discovery and 
liquidity formation in asset markets.  The market pre-opening period can alleviate the 
influence of these two factors, as traders can revise or cancel submitted orders without 
penalty, and unexpected changes in asset prices have no influence on the order submission 
process.  Indeed, Madhavan (1992), Economides and Schwartz (1995) and Domowitz and 
Madhavan (2001) conclude that the pre-opening provides an ideal solution for minimizing 
adverse selection risks arising from information asymmetry.  Admati and Pfleiderer (1991) 
and Dia and Pouget (2006) demonstrate that institutional trading arrangements such as a pre-
opening can enhance the price discovery process by improving the coordination between 
demand and supply of liquidity.
39
   
During pre-opening when placing their orders, traders are confronted with a trade-off 
between maximising the probability of trade execution, and attempting to secure the most 
favourable trade price at market opening, given the prevailing state of the limit order book. 
The MSE operates an open pre-opening limit order book where all brokers have the ability to 
publicly view all the orders that comprise the order book, including the price and disclosed 
                                                 
39
 Admati and Pfleiderer (1991) originally focus on the communication of liquidity needs via sunshine trading, 
while Dia and Pouget (2006) demonstrate how a preopening period coupled with a long-term relationship 
among market participants serves as a credible organisational arrangement for such trading. 
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volume associated with an order.
40
  Essentially, in providing liquidity, traders must decide 
whether to aggressively seek to trade the asset, taking into consideration the state of the 
order book, or employ a more patient strategy, hoping to optimise on the execution price of 
the asset at the risk of not trading at all. 
Specifically, if a trader decides to aggressively seek execution at the opening, then they have 
to decide whether to submit an order at the top or somewhere close to the top of the order 
book.  If the volume at the top of the order book is not sufficient to match their intended 
order, then an order with a price that is higher (lower) than the best existing ask (bid) will 
have to be submitted in order to maximise the probability that the entire order is executed.  
In addition, if the trader possesses private information about the fundamental value of the 
asset, then submission strategies may be formulated that optimally reveal their information 
slowly over the pre-opening in an effort to maximise their information rents, while also 
contributing to price discovery.  Alternatively, if a trader chooses to exercise patience, they 
can submit a limit order with a specific price and volume somewhere below the top of the 
order book.  The decision of the trader now becomes how close the order‟s price should be 
in relation to the top of the order book, thereby balancing the maximisation of execution 
probability against the difference between their own fundamental valuation of the asset and 
the execution price.   
Subsequent to a trader entering their order in the limit order book and awaiting execution, 
changes in pre-opening market conditions potentially impact their own valuation and/or the 
order‟s execution probability. The trader is then faced with several decisions.  First, given a 
significantly reduced probability of execution, should they cancel the order outright and 
contemplate resubmission on the opposite side of the order book. If the market eventually 
moves back in their favour they can resubmit the cancelled order.  Second, whether to revise 
either the price or the volume associated with their previously submitted limit order.  With a 
price revision the trader can move the order either towards or away from the top of the order 
book and their aggressiveness determines how much of a revision is undertaken. 
                                                 
40
 There are certain exceptions to order book disclosure in the event of a broker submitting an order with a price 
that is better than the expected opening price as determined by the Opening Algorithm. The volume associated 
with this order is classified as private information between the broker and exchange authorities although the 
expected opening price will change to reflect the presence of this order. 
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Additionally, the trader can decide to modify their order volume in the light of their 
expectation concerning the probability that the amended volume will be executed at the 
specified price. 
The main focus of this chapter is to determine the impact of existing, publicly observable 
limit order book information on the aggressiveness observed in the submission, revision or 
cancellation of orders queued in the pre-opening limit order book.  The study of order 
placement strategy reveals in greater detail the underlying process of price discovery during 
the market‟s pre-opening period with the aggressiveness of order submission essentially 
determining the speed and extent to which efficient price discovery is attained.  The 
information inferred from the limit order book that is utilised in this study incorporates both 
the order book depth and height at specified positions of the order book, as well as the inside 
spread.  In addition, we seek to explain the impact of information on a given side of the 
order book in influencing placement decisions made by traders on both the same and 
opposite side of the order book.  Thus, we measure the extent to which traders focus on both 
sides of the order book in determining the probability of order execution at the opening. 
One key contribution to the literature on market microstructure is that, to our knowledge, we 
are the first to empirically assess the aggressiveness of orders placed during the pre-opening 
period.  Compared to the previous pre-opening literature (such as Vives, 1995; Biais, Hillion 
and Spatt, 1999; Medrano and Vives, 2001; Madhavan and Panchapagesan, 2000 and 
Barclay and Hendershot, 2003), which focuses on the presence and extent of price discovery, 
this analysis examines if the current state of the order book influences the decision to place 
orders at different positions in the order book, and what information traders utilise to either 
revise their order prices (forward or backward), or cancel an existing limit order.  Hence, we 
examine the mechanism that underlies liquidity provision and the price discovery process 
during the market pre-opening period. 
To analyse order aggressiveness, we model each side of the order book separately using 
ordered probit models for submissions, forward and backward revisions, and order 
cancellations.  In essence, we rank the aggressiveness of order submissions, revisions and 
cancellations based upon the impact of the action on the execution probability of the order.  
Therefore, an action that results in a greater execution probability of new or existing limit 
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order has a higher aggressiveness ranking than an action that results in a lower probability of 
execution.  To determine the impact of order book depth, we incorporate variables that 
measure the depth at the top, one step from the top and between two and five steps from the 
top of the order book (on both sides).  Order book height takes into consideration the 
distance between orders at the top and one step below the top, and between one and five 
steps below the top of the order book (on both sides).  In addition, we incorporate the impact 
of the inside spread and the effects on order placement of a locked or crossed inside spread. 
To pre-empt our conclusions, the empirical results indicate that the aggressiveness of order 
submissions and forward price revisions do indeed react to both existing and subsequent 
changes in the execution probability, which is driven in part by the depth on either side of 
the order book.  Specifically, we find that the depth at the top of the bid order book 
positively impacts the aggressiveness of bid order submissions and forward price revisions 
since an increase in the depth on the bid side reduces the execution probability of existing 
bid orders implying, all else equal, that a greater price is necessary to increase the execution 
probability.  Moreover, an increase in the bid depth increases the execution probability of 
orders on the ask side, as there is more volume available at each respective price. This leads 
to a reduction in the aggressiveness of both ask order submissions and forward price 
revisions.  Similarly, for analogous reasons, the depth on the ask side positively (negatively) 
impacts the aggressiveness of ask (bid) order submissions and forward price revisions. These 
findings can be interpreted as support for a modified version of Parlour‟s (1998) crowding 
out hypothesis applied to the pre-opening period. We also find that backward price revisions 
are generally far less affected by order book depth, except that aggressive backward bid 
price revisions reduce when there is an increase in the ask depth below the top of the order 
book.  One interpretation of this finding is that the bid side may be more reliant on the ask 
side in terms of liquidity provision than vice-versa. 
We find that the aggressiveness of order cancellations increases on both sides of the order 
book when the depth at the top of the ask order book increases.  This indicates that the 
increase in ask side depth reduces the execution probability of ask orders, thereby resulting 
in cancellations.  The cancellation of bid orders when the ask depth increases suggest that   
some traders view large depth on the ask side as information flow concentrated on the 
 131 
 
opposite side of the order book.  This reduces their incentive to purchase the security.  In 
addition, aggressive cancellations increase on the ask side when the height between the top 
and one step from the top of the bid order book and the height between one and five steps 
below the top of the ask order book increases, reflecting a reduction in order execution 
probability.  Similarly, an increase in the height between one and five steps from the top of 
the bid order book and between the top and one step below the top of the ask order book 
increases aggressive bid cancellations.  Order submissions and forward and backward 
revisions aggression increase on the bid side when there is an increase in the height on both 
sides, however, we find mixed reactions on the ask side.  
The magnitude of the inside spread is one measure of the cost faced by traders in securing an 
increase in the probability that an order is executed at the opening.  As a consequence, an 
increase in the spread negatively impacts the aggressiveness of both order submissions and 
forward price revisions.  We also find that a narrowing spread increase the aggressiveness of 
backward revisions as traders anticipate a better price subsequent to the opening.  Our results 
also indicate that any aggressiveness observed in order cancellations is not impacted by the 
magnitude of the inside spread. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: section 5.2 defines concepts relating to 
the pre-opening order strategy and aggressiveness, whereas section 5.3 reviews the relevant 
literature and derives the testable hypotheses.  Section 5.4 outlines the econometric 
methodology utilised, while section 5.5 provides a description of the MSE, the data analysed 
in the chapter and defines the explanatory variables.  In section 5.6 we present and discuss 
the empirical results and section 5.7 briefly concludes. 
5.2   Defining Pre-opening Order Strategy and Aggressiveness 
The process of price discovery and the nature of order book liquidity formation during the 
market pre-opening period are dependent on the order submission strategy and the degree of 
aggressiveness exhibited by traders in attempting to secure order execution at the market 
opening.  Since there is no active trading during the pre-opening period, the main order 
strategies available to traders comprise limit order submissions, price or volume revisions 
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and cancellation of existing orders in the limit order book.
41
  The interaction between these 
strategies represents a significant contribution to the overall price discovery process during 
the pre-opening, as traders utilise a combination of strategies to express their information set 
and any subsequent changes to that information set.  Within each strategy, we can further 
determine the level of aggressiveness employed by the trader based on the price of the order 
in relation to the existing best buy or sell order in the limit order book. 
The existing literature on limit order submission strategies and aggressiveness (Griffiths et 
al., 2000; Ranaldo, 2004; Hall and Hautsch, 2006; Ellul et al. (2007); Cao, Hansch and 
Wang, 2008; Pascual and Veredas, 2008; and others) addresses the strategic decision 
problem faced by traders by implementing (in part, in full or slight variations thereof) the 
order aggressiveness classification schemes proposed in Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995).  In 
this classification, the degree of aggressiveness is based on the relative impact of the order 
on prices, and the probability that an order will be executed, given the associated price and 
order volume.   
Biais et al. (1995) contend that the least to the most aggressive order  categorisation is as 
follows; 1) removal of an order from the limit order book, 2) submitting a limit order that is 
below the best bid-ask, 3) submitting a limit order that is at the best bid-ask, 4) submitting a 
limit order that is within the best bid-ask, 5) submitting a market order that requires less 
volume than that available at the best bid-ask, 6) submitting a market order that requires the 
entire volume at the best bid-ask and 7) a market order that requires more volume than the 
amount currently available.  The classifications of order aggressiveness focus on the trade 
off between the submission of limit orders versus the use of market orders.  Traders are 
aware that there is a non-execution and “picking off” risk associated with limit orders, while 
choosing market orders imposes an immediacy cost.
42
 
Since there is no trading during the pre-opening period, there is no market order per se, 
which restricts direct application of the above classification scheme in this essay.  
                                                 
41
 In addition, there are various extensions of these strategies.  For instance, there can be date conditions 
associated with limit orders which affects both order submissions and revisions.  However, these events are 
exceedingly rare in orders placed during the preopening period, and as such are not discussed or modelled in 
this analysis.   
42
 See for instance, Cohen et al. (1981), Copeland, Thompson and Galai (1983) and Handa and Schwartz 
(1996). 
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Alternatively, we argue that the aggressiveness of an order submission during the pre-
opening is revealed through the actions that traders take to enhance the probability that their 
limit orders are executed at the opening.  In addition, the lack of trade execution facilitates 
the submission of orders with prices that result in a locked or crossed spread.  Hence, the 
most aggressive limit order during the pre-opening will have a price that locks or crosses the 
inside spread, defined as a situation where the price of a limit bid (ask) order is set at or 
above (below) the best ask (bid) in the order book, respectively.  The second most aggressive 
limit order is one that is placed within the inside spread, inclusive of the best bid and ask 
prices.
43
  The third most aggressive limit order is one that is placed within five steps of the 
best order on the same side of the order book.  The least aggressive limit order is one that is 
placed beyond five steps of the best order on the same side of the order book.   
In addition to the submission of limit orders, traders have the option to cancel or revise 
orders prior to opening.  In the specific institutional setting we analyse, the Malta Stock 
Exchange, this can be undertaken without any cost or obligation.  Having submitted a limit 
order, if market conditions change or additional information is observed relating to the 
fundamental value of the asset, traders have the option to either revise the price or volume 
associated with the existing limit order or effect an outright cancellation.  We follow the 
categorisation implemented by Cao et al. (2008), and term a revision to the price associated 
with an existing limit order which increases the likelihood of execution, a forward 
revision.
44,45
  Where the trader decides to trade-off execution probability for a better price by 
decreasing (increasing) the price of the buy (sell) order, we define this to be a backward 
revision.  Further, the degree of aggressiveness is dependent on the revised price in relation 
to the order‟s position in the limit order book and whether a revision increases or decreases 
the execution probability of the limit order. Essentially, the aggressiveness of order revisions 
follows the same order as that described above for order submission aggressiveness. 
 
                                                 
43
 When the spread is crossed then this category is still relevant as traders are able to place orders at the locking 
price.  This price represents the indicative opening price at which the market clears. 
44
 In the case of a sell (buy) order, a positive revision is a reduction (increase) in the price of the existing limit 
order.  Essentially, a positive revision is one that improves the likelihood of the order being executed.  The 
converse argument holds true in the case of negative revisions. 
45
 We do not analyze volume revisions due to their infrequency in the data set. 
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Table 5.1 
Description of aggressiveness within each category of order strategy 
Order Submissions 
Rank Description 
4 Limit order price is greater than the best order on the opposite side of the order book. 
3 Limit order price is between the best orders. 
2 Limit order price is within five steps of the best quote on the same side of the order book. 
1 Limit order price is below five steps from best quote on the same side of the order book. 
Forward Price Revision 
Rank Description 
4 Revised price is greater than the best order on the opposite side of the order book. 
3 Revised price is between the best orders. 
2 Revised price is within five steps of the best quote on the same side of the order book. 
1 Revised price is below five steps from best quote on the same side of the market. 
Backward Price Revision 
Rank Description 
4 Revised price is greater than the best order on the opposite side of the order book. 
3 Revised price is between the best orders. 
2 Revised price is within five steps of the best quote on the same side of the order book. 
1 Revised price is below five steps from best quote on the same side of the order book. 
Order Cancellation 
Rank Description 
4 Price of cancelled order is greater than the best order on the opposite side of order book. 
3 Price of cancelled order is between the best orders. 
2 Price of cancelled order is within five steps of the best quote on same side of order book. 
1 Price of cancelled order is below five steps from best quote on same side of the order book. 
Note: Table 5.1 presents a description of different levels of aggressiveness associated with the submission, 
forward price revisions, backward price revisions and cancellation of limit orders.  A rank of 4 is assigned to 
the most aggressive action within category and a rank of 1 is assigned to the least aggressiveness action. 
 
Orders that are at (or close to) the top of the limit order book have a higher execution 
probability compared to those further away from the top of the order book.  Hence, any 
backward revision to an order at the top of the order book is characterised as the most 
aggressive backward revision to an existing limit order.  In addition, the level of 
aggressiveness reduces as the position of the order in the book moves away from the top 
since moving down the limit order book reduces execution probability.  Thus, if an order that 
is greater than the best order on the opposite side of the order book is revised backward, then 
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this is categorised as the most aggressive backward revision.  Similarly, if an order that is 
below five steps of the best order on the same side of the book is revised backward then this 
is classified as the least aggressive backward revision. 
The aggressiveness of a cancellation is dependent on the position of the order in the book at 
the time of cancellation.  The closer the cancelled order is to the top of the limit order book, 
the more aggressive the cancellation. Thus, the cancellation of an order that is beyond the 
best quote on the opposite side of the book is the most aggressive cancellation, and a 
cancellation of an order below five steps below the best order on the same side of the book is 
characterised as the least aggressive cancellation.  See table 5.1 for a summary of the order 
aggressiveness categories and their relative rankings. 
5.3   Review of Related Literature and Testable Hypotheses 
5.3.1   Order Book Depth 
The impact of order book depth on order aggressiveness is best described by the “crowding 
out” effect proposed by Parlour (1998), where the endogenous execution probability of limit 
orders posted by traders arriving randomly to the market depends on the state of the limit 
order book.  Following a buy (sell) market order, a limit order at the subsequent best ask 
(bid) has a higher execution probability, and owing to the positive relationship between the 
execution probability of a limit order and its payoff, a subsequent trader interested in selling 
(purchasing) the asset prefers to post a sell (buy) limit order instead of a sell (buy) market 
order.  Additionally, the submission of a limit order on one side of the order book, at a 
particular price, reduces the probability that the subsequent order on the same side of the 
book will be a limit order at that price.  Submitting a limit order lengthens the queue, thereby 
reducing the execution probability of future limit orders at that particular level of the order 
book (owing to time priority rules determining the sequence of order execution), which 
increases the incentives for traders to place market orders on the side with the lengthened 
queue.  As a consequence, Parlour (1998) maintains that the submission of market orders on 
one side of the market “crowds out” the submission of market orders on the opposite side of 
 136 
 
the order book and submission of limit orders “crowds out” the submission of limit orders on 
the same side of the order book. 
Several studies such as Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995), Cao, Hansch and Wang (2008), 
Griffiths et al. (2000), Ranaldo (2004), Hall and Hautsch (2006) and Pascual and Veredas 
(2008) examine this phenomenon and find strong evidence supporting the crowding out 
effect during active trading periods.  Ellul et al. (2006) find that large depth on the buy (sell) 
increases aggressiveness in both limit and market buy (sell) order submissions.  Although 
during the pre-opening period there is no active execution of trades, the general principles 
underpinning the crowding out effect can still be applied.  Traders submit limit orders during 
the pre-opening with prices that reflect their own valuation of the asset and the probability 
that their orders are executed at the opening.  However, to increase the probability that their 
order is executed, the order has to be placed close to (at) the top of the limit order book.  
Implicitly, if there are a large number of orders at (close to) the top of the order book, a 
trader has to trade-off a more favourable price for an increased probability of the order being 
executed at the opening.  Thus, the most aggressive trader crosses the inside spread in order 
to maximise the probability of opening execution. 
For instance, if the traders observe an increased level of depth on the buy side of the order 
book, this improves the execution probability of existing limit orders on the sell side and 
provides better pricing terms to subsequent sell order submissions.  As a consequence, a 
trader submitting a buy order who is interested in maximising the probability of their order 
being executed at the opening has to place the order at the top of the bid order book.  
Additionally, since subsequent incoming sell orders have better pricing and availability of 
buyers, a trader submitting a sell order may be less aggressive due to the enhanced depth on 
the opposite side of the order book.  Thus, a large depth on one side of the order book 
increases order submission aggressiveness on the same side and reduces order submission 
aggressiveness on the opposite side of the order book.
46
 
                                                 
46
 This argument is a modified version of the crowding out effect presented by Parlour (1998) suitable for the 
preopening period. In Parlour‟s representation, the execution of a market order increases the execution 
probability of an order on the opposite side of the book.  However, during the preopening period there is no 
execution of trades and as a result only a crowding of orders at the top of the book will increase the execution 
probability of opposite side orders. 
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Since an increase in the depth on one side of the order book reduces the execution 
probability of an order on the same side, it also increases the probability of an order 
cancellation on that side of the order book.  In addition, with an increased probability of 
execution and improved pricing terms for orders on the opposite side of the book, there 
should be a reduction in the probability of order cancellations on the opposite side.  Hence, 
we expect large depth on one side of the order book to increase aggressiveness in order 
cancellations on that side and reduce order cancellation aggressiveness on the opposite side. 
The argument for aggressiveness of order revisions follows a similar logic.  A reduction in 
the execution probability, due to increased depth on the one side of the order book, increases 
aggressiveness in forward revisions on the same side of the market in order to retain the 
same level of execution probability.  However, the favourability of price and execution 
probability has been improved for orders on the opposite side of the book, reducing the 
incentive to revise these limit order prices forward and increasing the incentive for backward 
revisions. Hence, an increase in depth on one side of the order book positively impacts the 
aggressiveness of forward revisions and reduces aggressiveness in backward revisions on the 
same side of the order book.  In addition, there will be a positive impact on backward 
revisions and a negative impact on forward revisions on the opposite side of the limit order 
book.  Based on these arguments above the testable implications are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1:  An increase in depth on the bid (ask) side of the order book; 
(a) increases order submission aggressiveness on the bid (ask) side. 
(b) decreases order submission aggressiveness on the ask (bid) side. 
(c) increases forward revisions aggressiveness on the bid (ask) side. 
(d) decreases forward revisions aggressiveness on the ask (bid) side. 
(e) increases backward revision aggressiveness on the ask (bid) side. 
(f) decreases backward revision aggressiveness on the bid (ask) side. 
(g) increases order cancellation aggressiveness on the bid (ask) side. 
(h) decreases order cancellation aggressiveness on the ask (bid) side. 
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5.3.2   Inside Spread 
The inside spread represents an important measure of market liquidity, and determines the 
cost faced by a potential trader when executing market orders during the regular trading 
period.  Therefore, the inside spread should impact the aggressiveness of orders that are 
submitted or modified by traders.  In the dynamic model of Foucault et al. (2005), strategic 
liquidity traders differ based on their level of patience, and decide whether to submit limit or 
market orders.  For a certain level of the inside spread, more patient traders submit limit 
orders while impatient traders tend to submit market orders.  As the inside spread increases, 
previously impatient traders exhibit a greater tendency to submit limit rather than market 
orders.  In this fashion, the spread increase serves to reduce order aggressiveness as trading 
by means of market orders becomes more expensive.  Handa et al. (2003) also provide an 
explanation for the relationship between the inside spread and order aggressiveness.  They 
claim that the size of the inside spread increases with adverse selection risk and represents 
the difference between the high and low valuation traders in the market.  When traders are 
faced with a high chance of being “picked off”, they respond by placing orders with more 
conservative prices, thereby widening the bid-ask spread.  This makes market orders more 
expensive and as a consequence reduces the aggressiveness of order submissions.  
Empirical evidence supporting the impact of the size of the spread on the level of order 
aggressiveness is confirmed by Biais et al. (1995), Cao et al. (2008), Griffiths et al. (2000), 
Ranaldo (2004), Hall and Hautsch (2006), Ellul et al. (2007) and Pascual and Veredas 
(2008).  However, the pre-opening period presents a separate challenge in determining the 
spread‟s likely impact on the aggressiveness of trader strategy.  First, due to the lack of trade 
execution during the pre-opening period, it is highly possible that the spread is locked or 
crossed before the opening trade is executed.
47
  Second, market regulations on many 
exchanges do not reveal a negative (crossed) inside spread to traders.  Specifically, when the 
inside spread is crossed, traders realise that the inside spread is equal to zero but only the 
exchange and the trader that crossed the inside spread know the actual price of the crossing 
                                                 
47
 In the regular trading period it is not possible for the spread to be locked or crossed under normal 
circumstances.  If the price associated with an incoming bid (ask) is equal to or greater than the price of the best 
ask (bid) in the limit order book, then this will result in a trade being automatically executed. 
 139 
 
order.
48
  In such a situation, we define the visible spread as that revealed to the market and it 
is this spread which forms the basis of inference for trader‟s pre-opening order strategy and 
aggressiveness. 
Since the inside spread represents the cost faced by a trader to improve the probability of 
execution at the opening, a larger spread increases the cost faced by a trader submitting an 
order which maximises the probability of execution at the opening.  Thus, we expect the 
spread to impact the aggressiveness of order submissions during the pre-opening comparable 
to the effect during the regular trading period.  Hence, a larger inside spread reduces the 
level of aggressiveness of limit order submissions on both sides of the limit order book. 
There is no formal theoretical predictions for the impact of the inside spread on the 
aggressiveness of order revisions and cancellations.  However, Cao et al. (2008) find that a 
large inside spread (normalised) discourages forward revisions that result in market orders 
and backward amendments between steps 2 and 10 from the top of the order book.
49
  In 
addition, they reveal that both forward revisions below the best quotes and backward 
revisions beyond ten steps of the best order are encouraged by a wide inside spread.  Clearly, 
during the pre-opening period changes in the size of the inside spread are not determined by 
orders being executed, as in the regular trading period.  Instead, changes in the inside spread 
are attributable to order submissions, revisions and cancellations at the top of the book.  We 
argue that whenever the inside spread is altered, the execution probability of existing limit 
orders is also altered.  Therefore, if the inside spread is reduced this results in a reduction of 
the execution probability of orders in the limit order book.  In order for traders to increase or 
maintain the same level of execution probability prior to the spread tightening, they must 
revise their prices forward.  In addition, a tighter spread reduces the incentive to revise prices 
backward.  Therefore, we expect a negative (positive) relationship between the 
aggressiveness of forward (backward) order revisions and the size of the inside spread. 
                                                 
48
 In addition to being able to view the volume and price associated with a pending order, traders also view the 
possible opening price based the calculation of the opening algorithm employed by the exchange.  However, 
when the inside spread is crossed, the incoming order that crossed the spread is reflected at the opening price 
on the limit order book visible to other traders. 
49
 In the case of a forward revised bid order, the price of the bid order is revised forward to a price greater than 
the best ask price to result in a trade being executed. 
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The impact of the inside spread on the aggressiveness of order cancellations is opposite to 
the expectations for aggressiveness in order submissions.  Namely, a large inside spread 
reduces the incentive for traders to keep orders in the limit order book.  Therefore, we expect 
a large inside spread to positively impact the aggressiveness of order cancellations on both 
sides of the limit order book.  Based on the arguments outlined above the testable 
implications are as follows: 
Hypothesis 2:  A reduction in the inside spread; 
(a) increases order submission aggressiveness on both sides of the 
order book. 
(b) increases forward order revision aggressiveness on both sides 
of the order book. 
(c) decreases backward order revision aggressiveness on both sides 
of the order book. 
(d) decreases order cancellation aggressiveness on both sides of the 
order book. 
5.3.3   Order Book Height 
The order book height refers to the price dimension of the order book, in a similar sense to 
the order book depth, which measures the volume dimension of the limit order book.  Order 
book height is calculated by finding the difference in prices at two specific points in the 
order book.  For instance, the height of the limit order book at one step away from the best 
order will be the difference between the price of the best order and the price of the second 
best order.  The height at the first step on the opposite side of the order book represents the 
marginal cost faced by a trader to consume more volume than that available at the best order 
on the opposite side of the order book.  Pascual and Veradas (2008) argue that a lengthy 
(equivalent to height) order book on the ask side indicates an increased time to execution of 
limit orders on the bid side.  Thus, if a trader is interested in executing an order quickly, s/he 
will have to submit a more aggressive order to increase the execution probability.  In 
addition, they argue that the height of the book has a similar impact as the “crowding out” 
effect, since an increase in the height on the ask side of the order book, increases the 
aggressiveness of orders submitted on the bid side of the order book and vice versa. 
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Even in the absence of trade execution during the pre-opening period, we expect the effects 
of changes in height on order placement strategy to be similar to that for the regular trading 
period.  We argue that a greater height in the limit order book on one side increases the level 
of aggressiveness of limit order submissions on the opposite side of the order book.  When 
the height of, for instance, the ask side shortens, the cost faced by the incoming trader to 
improve the execution probability of a buy order at the opening is lower, thus requiring 
placement of a less aggressive order.  In addition, a large height on one side of the order 
book forces incoming traders (on the same side) who are interested in execution at the 
opening to place more aggressive orders to maximise their execution probability at the 
opening.  Thus, there will be a positive relationship between the height of the limit order 
book on the same and opposite side of the limit order book, and the aggressiveness of limit 
order submissions. 
The impact of order book height on the aggressiveness of forward order revisions is similar.  
A lengthening of the height on one side of the order book reduces the execution probability 
of existing limit orders on the same side. As a result traders are forced to revise their prices 
forward to at least maintain the same level of execution probability as before.  Similarly, if 
the height on the opposite side is reduced, this reduces the incentive to revise their prices 
forward since the prices on the opposite side have become more favourable for order 
execution and therefore, increases the execution probability at a lower cost.  In addition, a 
low height on both sides of the order book reduces the incentives to revise prices away from 
their current position in the order book due to the increased execution probability.  With 
regards to order cancellations, a widening of the height reduces the probability of execution 
and, therefore, provides an incentive to cancel existing orders.  As a result, the probability of 
a cancellation of an existing limit order is positively impacted by the height of the order 
book on both sides.  The testable implications are as follows: 
Hypothesis 3:  An increase in the height of the order book on both sides; 
(a) increases order submission aggressiveness on both sides of the 
order book. 
(b) increases forward revision aggressiveness on both sides of the 
order book. 
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(c) decreases backward revision aggressiveness on both sides of the 
order book. 
(d) increases order cancellation aggressiveness on both sides of the 
order book. 
5.4   Econometric Methodology 
5.4.1   Ordered Probit Model      
The current literature on order aggressiveness conventionally implements an ordered probit 
model in empirical analysis.  The adoption of the order aggressiveness classification scheme 
proposed by Biais et al. (1995) results in a univariate framework, in which different levels of 
aggressiveness are explained by the variables suggested in the theoretical literature.  
Consequently, such a framework is ideal for implementation of the ordered probit model.  
The ordered probit model is constructed by utilising a latent variable regression model, in 
which the unobserved latent variable y falls between the range   to   and is mapped 
to an observed variable y .  The variable y in this case represents a discrete variable that 
captures the different ordered categories to be modelled.
50
  Essentially, the variable y
provides information about the underlying y such that, 
   Jmymy mimi ,...,1for               if        1 

      (1) 
Here, the values of  represents the thresholds or cut off points for the range of the latent 
variable y  given the different categories of y .  For the end points of the categories (1 and 
J), these are defined as open ended intervals with 0  and J .  Therefore, we 
observe; 
                                                 
50
 The observed variable y will be the series comprising the different level of aggressiveness as presented 
section 2. 
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The s'  are unknown parameters to be estimated.  If we define x as a row vector with 1 in the 
first column and the k explanatory variables in the remaining columns, and β  a column 
vector with associated parameters, then the latent regression can be defined as: 
    xβy         (3) 
where   is distributed standard normal with a mean of 0 and variance of 1.  With this 
formulation, the probability of observing an outcome equivalent to a specific threshold 
(category) such that my   given the explanatory variables is, therefore; 
   )|Pr()|Pr( 1 xx mm ymy  

      (4) 
If we substitute equation (3) into equation (4) and subtracting xβ from both sides of the 
inequalities we have, 
   )|Pr()|Pr( 1 xxβxβx   mmmy      (5) 
The probability that the random variable   falls between two values is equivalent to the 
difference between the cumulative frequency distribution (cdf) of the random variables 
evaluated at both values.  Thus, 
   )()()|Pr( 1 xβxβx  mm FFmy      (6) 
Since   is distributed standard normal, then if )(  denotes the cdf of the standard normal 
distribution we have the following, 
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5.4.2   Inference 
Unlike normal ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, the marginal effects of the 
explanatory variables )(x on the probability in an ordered probit model are not equivalent to 
the estimated coefficients )(β .  In order to arrive at the marginal effects of the explanatory 
variables for the ordered probit model, we take the partial derivative of equation (7) with 
respect to each variable in the matrix )(x .
51
  Define kx as the k
th
 explanatory variable such 
that; 
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Here, k  is the coefficient associated with the variable kx  and )( is the probability density 
function for the standard normal distribution.  Evident from equation (7) is that the sign of 
the marginal effect is not necessarily the same sign as the coefficient k  except for the 
boundary thresholds (1 or J).  For instance, when 1y  the marginal effect is opposite in sign 
to the coefficient and when Jy   the marginal effect and the coefficient are the same sign.  
For the thresholds that fall in between the sign of the marginal effect will depend on the 
value of the individual variables.  Since the marginal effects are ambiguous for 
1  to2  Jm , since they depend on the level of the level of the explanatory variables, we 
will have to decide at what value of  the variable to evaluate the marginal effect.   
One concern is that the interpretation of the marginal effect under a changing probability 
curve may prove to be misleading if the variables are evaluated at their mean.  This becomes 
more evident in the case of dummy variables, since evaluating these variables at their mean 
does not provide much interpretation.  Therefore, we evaluate the discrete changes in the 
predicted probabilities for changes in the explanatory variables.  In the case of the dummy 
variables, the discrete change is calculated by shifting the variables from zero to one while 
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 Except the first column which is a column vector of 1s to calculate the constant parameter in the model. 
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holding other variables at their respective mean.  For the other variables, the discrete change 
in the predicted probability is computed by changing the variable by its standard deviation 
centred around the mean.
52
  If kx  and ks  are the mean and standard deviation of the k
th
 
variable, the discrete probability is; 
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5.4.3   Estimation 
If τ  is defined as a vector containing the m threshold parameters and β is the parameter 
vector of the latent regression, then one characteristic of the ordered probit model is that it is 
unidentified, since changes in the intercept are compensated for by equivalent changes in the 
thresholds.
53
  This problem is circumvented by setting either the intercept 0  or the lower 
boundary of the threshold 1  equal to zero, which identifies the model.
54
  Hence, the 
probability of a specific threshold is:, 
)()(),|Pr( 1 xβxβτβ,x  mm FFmy              
(10) 
while the probability of observing a particular threshold (category) for the i
th
 observation is 
given as, 
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Thus, assuming independence between the probabilities associated with each threshold, the 
likelihood function is; 
                                                 
52
 Alternative methods include calculating the discrete change in the predicted probability for changes in the 
variable from the minimum to the maximum value, or calculate the change for a one standard deviation 
increase from the mean value of each variable.  
53
 See J Scott Long (1997) for a more in-depth discussion of identification issues with the ordered probit model.  
54
 The same probability will be generated irrespective of which parameter is set equal to zero. 
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Substituting for ip  gives, 
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such that the log likelihood is, 
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The log-likelihood is maximised to estimate the parameters for the latent regression. 
5.5   Data and Explanatory Variables 
The empirical analysis is conducted on a microstructure database obtained from the Malta 
Stock Exchange (MSE), a small but active stock exchange which opened in January 1992.  
The MSE is an electronic continuous limit order market, with no designated market makers 
providing liquidity.  The sample period utilised in this study covers the period January 2000 
to June 2007.  Normal trading commences at 10:00 am and the trading day comes to an end 
at 12:30 pm.  Preceding the initiation of trading is the market pre-opening period which 
begins at 8:30 am and ends at 10:00 am. It is the pre-opening period which is the focus of 
this analysis.   
During the pre-opening period, traders submit limit orders that queue in the limit order book 
and await execution at the opening.  Prior to the opening execution, traders have the option 
to cancel or revise their pending limit order without cost.  Essentially, the pre-opening period 
is akin to a call auction process where the market clearing price is determined by an opening 
algorithm.  We select the three most actively traded stocks to conduct the pre-opening period 
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tests, corresponding to the shares of HBSC Bank Malta plc (HSB), Bank of Valletta plc 
(BOV) and Maltacom plc (MLC), which is a telecommunications company.   
To construct the dependent and explanatory variables, we recreate the precise state of the 
limit order book subsequent to every event (order submission, revision or cancellation) in the 
sample.  This is possible as the data set contains all the requisite information about each 
order event such as the associated price and volume, identification attributes and any other 
submissions rules.  By replicating the limit order book subsequent to every event, then 
whenever a trader submits, revises or cancels a limit order, the level of aggressiveness can be 
determined based on the existing limit order book and applying the set of criteria outlined in 
section 5.2.  Based on the four categories of aggressiveness for each order strategy outlined 
in table 5.1, the frequency distribution is tabulated for each of the three stocks and for a 
combination of the three, in tables 5.2 to 5.5.  
From table 5.5, it is evident that the majority of orders are either submitted between the best 
orders or within five steps below the best order on the same side of the order book.  
Specifically, approximately 72% of bid order submissions and approximately 70% of ask 
order submissions occur either between the best bid and ask orders or within five steps from 
the best order on the same side of the order book.  For forward price revisions, the pattern is 
similar, except that revisions of orders above the best order on the opposite side is 
approximately double the proportion of orders submitted in that category.  This may be an 
indication that traders first place more conservative orders then as the pre-opening period 
progresses they revise their orders towards the top of the limit order book reflective of their 
improved estimation of the asset‟s fundamental value and their prediction of execution 
probability at the opening. 
When order prices are revised backward, the majority of these orders end up either within or 
below five steps from the best order on the own side of the order book.  This is also 
consistent on both sides of the market as approximately 95% of backward bid order price 
revisions and 93% of backward ask order price revisions end up either below or within five 
steps of the best order on the corresponding side of the order book.  Though we do not 
incorporate revision of order volume or other revisions that results in no change in our 
analysis, we report their frequency in the tables for completeness. 
  
 
Table 5.2 
BOV Order Submission, Revision and Cancellation Frequency Distribution 
Steps 
Order  
Submissions 
Forward  
Price Revision 
Backward  
Price Revision 
Forward  
Volume Revision 
Backward  
Volume Revision 
No Change   
Revision 
Order  
Cancellation 
Total 
Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell   
Above the Best Opposite Order 8.38% 6.47% 15.76% 11.62% 5.01% 3.29% 3.95% 6.82% 8.11% 6.67% 4.56% 2.35% 2.72% 5.23%   
Between the Best Orders 44.51% 38.61% 56.93% 57.29% 0.19% 1.35% 32.89% 28.03% 44.14% 26.67% 42.74% 25.88% 14.59% 10.52%   
Within 5 steps of the Best Order 31.19% 30.27% 20.55% 23.35% 67.82% 51.65% 47.37% 37.12% 35.14% 35.83% 34.02% 24.41% 26.46% 21.67%   
Below 5 steps of the Best Order 15.92% 24.65% 6.76% 7.74% 26.97% 43.71% 15.79% 28.03% 12.61% 30.83% 18.67% 47.35% 56.22% 62.59%   
                                
Column Sum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%   
Row Proportion 29.26% 28.35% 9.94% 11.61% 2.17% 2.79% 0.32% 0.55% 0.46% 0.50% 1.01% 1.42% 5.07% 6.55% 100% 
Total Count 7,005 6,788 2,380 2,779      519       668         76       132       111       120       241       340  1,213 1,569 23,941 
Note: This table provides a frequency distribution for all the major events that occur within the different levels of aggressiveness for the stock BOV.  These include the proportion of the total events such as 
order submissions, forward and backward price revisions, forward and backward volume revisions and order cancellations that comprise the defined level of aggressiveness. 
 
Table 5.3 
HSB Order Submission, Revision and Cancellation Frequency Distribution 
Steps 
Order  
Submissions 
Forward  
Price Revision 
Backward  
Price Revision 
Forward  
Volume Revision 
Backward  
Volume Revision 
No Change   
Revision 
Order  
Cancellation 
Total 
Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell   
Above the Best Opposite Order 13.89% 7.05% 18.59% 9.02% 6.16% 1.12% 9.68% 11.76% 10.67% 5.13% 16.17% 3.15% 8.44% 1.77%   
Between the Best Orders 44.06% 42.00% 59.22% 63.53% 1.03% 1.40% 40.32% 35.29% 34.67% 30.77% 31.35% 34.23% 15.16% 16.58%   
Within 5 steps of the Best Order 24.41% 35.28% 15.69% 20.58% 66.10% 63.59% 35.48% 37.25% 36.00% 51.28% 26.73% 29.28% 25.92% 33.56%   
Below 5 steps of the Best Order 17.65% 15.66% 6.50% 6.86% 26.71% 33.89% 14.52% 15.69% 18.67% 12.82% 25.74% 33.33% 50.49% 48.10%   
                                
Column Sum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%   
Row Proportion 38.50% 23.64% 11.96% 8.93% 1.66% 2.02% 0.35% 0.29% 0.43% 0.44% 1.72% 1.26% 4.64% 4.17% 100% 
Total Count 6,789     4,169    2,109    1,574       292       357         62         51         75         78       303       222       818       736  17,635 
Note: This table provides a frequency distribution for all the major events that occur within the different levels of aggressiveness for the stock HSB.  These include the proportion of the total events such as 
order submissions, forward and backward price revisions, forward and backward volume revisions and order cancellations that comprise the defined levels of aggressiveness. 
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Table 5.4 
MLC Order Submission, Revision and Cancellation Frequency Distribution 
Steps 
Order  
Submissions 
Forward  
Price Revision 
Backward  
Price Revision 
Forward  
Volume Revision 
Backward  
Volume Revision 
No Change   
Revision 
Order  
Cancellation 
Total 
Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell   
Above the Best Opposite Order 5.79% 8.73% 13.95% 18.56% 2.04% 5.40% 1.41% 8.48% 4.88% 7.36% 0.76% 3.94% 1.72% 4.43%   
Between the Best Orders 42.38% 38.73% 51.83% 54.23% 2.87% 5.51% 47.18% 26.67% 38.62% 32.52% 39.75% 37.27% 13.54% 13.24%   
Within 5 steps of the Best Order 30.16% 27.68% 23.29% 19.65% 51.94% 48.84% 24.65% 35.15% 28.46% 28.22% 30.89% 21.06% 29.14% 23.22%   
Below 5 steps of the Best Order 21.67% 24.85% 10.93% 7.56% 43.15% 40.24% 26.76% 29.70% 28.05% 31.90% 28.61% 37.73% 55.61% 59.10%   
                                
Column Sum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%   
Row Proportion 29.64% 22.94% 12.39% 9.51% 3.73% 3.13% 0.49% 0.57% 0.85% 0.56% 1.36% 1.49% 6.84% 6.47% 100% 
Total Count     8,579      6,640    3,585    2,753    1,080       907       142       165       246       163       395       432    1,980    1,873    28,940  
Note: This table provides a frequency distribution for all the major events that occur within the different levels of aggressiveness for the stock MLC.  These include the proportion of the total events such as 
order submissions, forward and backward price revisions, forward and backward volume revisions and order cancellations that comprise the levels of aggressiveness. 
 
Table 5.5 
Pooled Order Submission, Revision and Cancellation Frequency Distribution 
Steps 
Order  
Submissions 
Forward 
Price Revision 
Backward  
Price Revision 
Forward  
Volume Revision 
Backward  
Volume Revision 
No Change   
Revision 
Order  
Cancellation 
Total 
Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell   
Above the Best Opposite Order 9.06% 7.46% 15.69% 13.73% 3.49% 3.88% 3.93% 8.33% 6.71% 6.65% 6.71% 3.22% 3.39% 4.26%   
Between the Best Orders 43.56% 39.46% 55.26% 57.49% 1.85% 3.31% 41.79% 28.45% 39.35% 30.19% 37.81% 32.70% 14.19% 12.81%   
Within 5 steps of the Best Order 28.74% 30.48% 20.50% 21.31% 58.49% 52.54% 33.21% 36.21% 31.48% 35.73% 30.35% 24.04% 27.67% 24.46%   
Below 5 steps of the Best Order 18.65% 22.59% 8.55% 7.47% 36.17% 40.27% 21.07% 27.01% 22.45% 27.42% 25.13% 40.04% 54.75% 58.47%   
                                
Column Sum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%   
Row Proportion 31.73% 24.95% 11.45% 10.08% 2.68% 2.74% 0.40% 0.49% 0.61% 0.51% 1.33% 1.41% 5.69% 5.92% 100% 
Total Count   22,373    17,597    8,074    7,106    1,891    1,932       280       348       432       361       939       994    4,011    4,178    70,516  
Note: This table provides a frequency distribution for all the major events that occur within the different levels of aggressiveness for the pooled data.  These include the proportion of the total events such as 
order submissions, forward and backward price revisions, forward and backward volume revisions and order cancellations that comprise the levels of aggressiveness. 
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The aggressiveness of order cancellations exhibits somewhat similar characteristics to 
backward price revision.  On both sides of the order book, more than half the orders 
cancelled are below five steps from best order on the same side of the order book as the 
cancelled order.  The percentage of cancellation diminishes for each category as the position 
of the order in the book is closer to the top, indicative of a negative relationship between the 
execution probability and the probability of cancellation. 
In section 5.3, we propose that the order book depth, inside spread and the order book height 
will impact the level of aggressiveness in order submissions, revisions and cancellations.
55
  
For instance, in section 5.3.1 we argue that the order book depth on one side of the order 
book positively impacts order submission aggressiveness on the same side, and negatively 
impacts order submission aggressiveness on the book‟s opposite side. To test this 
hypothesis, we separate the total depth in the order book on both sides into three main 
categories, corresponding to the depth at the top, the depth one step below the top, and the 
cumulative depth between two and five steps from the top of the order book.  During the 
regular trading period, the depth at the top of the limit order book corresponds to the depth at 
the best bid or ask.  However, due to the absence of trade execution during the pre-opening 
period, the spread can be crossed.  Therefore, we propose that whenever the inside spread is 
crossed, the additional volume above the point at which the best bid is equal to the best ask 
forms the depth at the top of the book. 
We define 0lbd as the log of the total volume at the top of the bid order book, and similarly 
define 0lad as the log of the total volume at the top of the ask order book.  These variables 
are important in explaining order aggressiveness, since the depth at the top of the order book 
is indicative of the likely execution volume at the opening.  Thus, it provides information 
about the execution probability of existing limit orders.  In addition, we define 1lbd  and 
1lad  as the log volume at one step below the top of the bid and ask order book, respectively.  
Similar to the depth at the top of the order book, the depth at one step below the top of the 
order book provides the trader with an idea of the volume that can be acquired if s/he decides 
to cross the market in order to improve their execution probability.  The depth at two to five 
steps below the top of the order book is defined as 25lbd  and 25lad , the log  
                                                 
55
 The depth corresponds to the aggregated volume of orders at a specific location in the limit order book.  
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Table 5.6 
Summary Definition of Explanatory Variables 
Variable Description of variable 
ilbd 0  Log of depth at the top of the bid order book for the i
th
 event. 
ilad 0  Log of depth at the top of the ask order book for the i
th
 event. 
ilbd1  Log of depth at one step below the top of the bid order book for the i
th
 event. 
ilad1  Log of depth at one step below the top of the ask order book for the i
th
 event. 
ilbd 25  
Log cumulative depth between two and five steps below the top of the bid order book for 
the i
th
 event. 
ilad 25  
Log cumulative depth between two and five steps below the top of the ask order book for 
the i
th
 event. 
ibh01  Height between the top and one step below the top of the bid order book for the i
th
 event.   
iah01  Height between the top and one step below the top of the ask order book for the i
th
 event.   
ibh15  Height between one and five steps below the top of the bid order book for the i
th
 event.   
iah15  Height between one and five steps below the top of the ask order book for the i
th
 event.   
ispr  The inside spread adjusted for negative spread for the i
th
 event. 
idlc  
Dummy variable indicating when the best bid is greater than or equal to the best ask for 
the i
th
 event. 
Note: Table 5.2 provides a summary definition of the explanatory variables utilized in the empirical analysis.  
 
of the cumulative volume between two and five steps from the top of the bid and ask order 
book respectively. 
Hypotheses 2a through to 2d posit that the inside spread impacts the aggressiveness of order 
submissions, revisions and cancellations.  In addition, since the absence of trade execution 
results, in some instances, in a locked or crossed inside spread that produces a spread that is 
zero or negative, respectively.  We denote bblog  as the log of the best bid price and balog  
as the log of the best ask price, and the spread is calculated as )]log(log,0max[ bbbaspr  , 
which is the maximum of zero or the difference between the log of the best ask and the log 
of the best bid prices, since there is no meaningful interpretation of a negative spread.  To 
compensate for the loss of information when the spread is non-positive, we measure the 
impact of a locked or crossed spread on the aggressiveness of order strategies by traders.  
We define dlc  as an indicator variable that takes the value of one when the spread is locked 
or crossed.  Since a locked or crossed inside spread is indicative of price discovery during  
  
 
Table 5.7 
Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
 Statistic lbd0 lad0 lbd1 lad1 lbd25 lad25 bh01 ah01 bh15 ah15 vspr dlc 
BOV 
Mean  3.04 3.22 2.74 2.94 3.51 3.69 0.03 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.05 0.21 
Min 0.30 0.30 0.60 1.00 2.48 2.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 5.21 5.07 4.63 4.48 4.84 4.54 0.45 0.50 4.80 2.91 3.90 1.00 
Std Dev 0.67 0.61 0.52 0.50 0.31 0.28 0.05 0.04 0.59 0.15 0.09 0.41 
Skewness 0.05 -0.22 -0.12 -0.43 0.24 -0.23 4.20 4.24 6.50 7.70 16.45 1.42 
Kurtosis 0.90 0.58 0.12 0.10 0.24 0.07 23.69 27.41 43.14 88.15 555.90 0.03 
HSB 
Mean  3.09 3.16 2.78 3.03 3.43 3.74 0.07 0.11 0.85 0.11 0.06 0.24 
Min 0.70 0.95 0.70 0.90 2.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 5.14 5.11 4.40 4.54 4.53 4.73 1.15 1.64 6.80 2.42 7.41 1.00 
Std Dev 0.61 0.57 0.54 0.49 0.37 0.30 0.12 0.29 1.82 0.16 0.13 0.43 
Skewness -0.06 0.05 -0.24 -0.45 -0.29 -0.37 3.59 3.58 2.26 4.90 22.87 1.22 
Kurtosis -0.22 0.56 0.17 0.67 0.13 0.54 16.70 12.14 3.54 37.59 1215.81 -0.51 
MLC 
 
Mean  3.46 3.53 3.01 3.20 3.81 3.89 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.27 
Min 1.08 0.78 0.70 1.00 2.00 3.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 5.81 5.60 5.15 4.70 5.32 4.93 0.27 0.95 2.35 0.75 0.26 1.00 
Std Dev 0.78 0.63 0.48 0.42 0.32 0.24 0.03 0.02 0.20 0.06 0.03 0.44 
Skewness 0.85 0.42 0.06 -0.28 0.40 0.39 3.32 5.32 7.62 6.84 1.72 1.04 
Kurtosis 0.64 0.73 0.41 0.91 1.19 0.60 14.38 103.72 60.88 67.30 4.49 -0.92 
POOLED 
 
Mean  3.23 3.34 2.87 3.08 3.62 3.79 0.04 0.05 0.30 0.07 0.04 0.24 
Min 0.30 0.30 0.60 0.90 2.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 5.81 5.60 5.15 4.70 5.32 4.93 1.15 1.64 6.80 2.91 7.41 1.00 
Std Dev 0.73 0.63 0.52 0.47 0.38 0.29 0.08 0.16 1.05 0.13 0.09 0.43 
Skewness 0.59 0.19 -0.15 -0.47 0.02 -0.21 5.54 7.20 4.68 7.24 26.45 1.20 
Kurtosis 1.19 0.83 0.33 0.66 0.68 0.68 44.56 55.33 21.49 84.68 1,844.26 -0.57 
Note: This table provides a statistical summary including the mean, minimum (Min), maximum (Max), standard deviation (Std Dev), the Skewness and Kurtosis 
for the explanatory variables for BOV, HSB, MLC and the pooled data. 
1
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the pre-opening (Cao et al. 2008), this should have an impact on the aggressiveness of order 
strategy. 
Section 5.3.3 proposes that the height of the limit order book increases aggressiveness in 
order submissions, forward price revisions and cancellations and decreases aggressiveness in 
backward price revisions.  We define the height as the difference between the prices of two 
orders at different positions on the same side in the order book.  Since there can be numerous 
combination of height calculations, we propose measures of height that focus on orders at, or 
close to, the top of the order book.  Two measures are proposed for this analysis; first we 
find the height between the price at the top of the order book and the price of an order at one 
step below the top, denoted 01bh  for the bid, and 01ah  for the ask height, respectively.56 
Second, we measure the height between the order one step below the top of the order book 
and the order that is five steps below the top of the order book, denoted 15bh  for the bid 
order book and 15ah  for the ask order book.  Table 5.6 provides a summary definition of the 
explanatory variables, while table 5.7 provides a statistical summary of the explanatory 
variables. 
5.6   Empirical Results 
We estimate two ordered probit models, one each for the bid and ask side, for each order 
strategy.  Tables 5.8 to 5.11 present the estimated results.  Within each table, Panel A reports 
the estimated coefficients and their related z-statistics, while Panel B reports the marginal 
effects on the predicted probability of each level of aggressiveness for a one standard 
deviation change in each explanatory variable centred around its mean, as outlined in section 
5.4.2.  Table 5.12 provides a summary of the proposed hypotheses, the expected sign of the 
coefficients, the estimated sign and whether the estimated variables are statistically 
significant (at the 5% level), while table 5.13 summarises the model diagnostic statistics. 
                                                 
56
 Notice here that the order of the ask variable is different from the order of the bid variable.  This is done to 
ensure that the both variables are positive, since the bid prices decrease below the top of the order book and the 
ask prices increase as the order moves away from the top of the book. 
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5.6.1   Order Submission Aggressiveness 
In section 5.3.1, we propose that an increase in depth on one side of the order book increases 
order aggressiveness on the same side and reduces that for orders submitted on the opposite 
side, as explained in hypothesis 1a and 1b respectively.  As shown in table 5.8, we find 
strong evidence supporting hypothesis 1a as the results reveal a positive relationship 
between the order book depth on the bid (ask) side and the aggressiveness of order 
submissions on the bid (ask) side.  Specifically, we find that on the bid (ask) side of the 
order book, the depth at the top and between two and five steps from the top of the order 
book positively impact the aggressiveness of bid (ask) orders submitted.  However, the depth 
at one step below the top of the order book on either side ( 1lbd  and 1lad ) has no significant 
impact.  As shown in panel B of table 5.8, a one standard deviation centred shock to either 
the depth at the top, or between two and five steps from the top of the order book on the bid 
(ask) side, increases the probability of orders submitted between the best orders and above 
the best order on the opposite side of the bid (ask) order book and reduces the probability of 
orders submitted below the best bid (ask) order. 
The results also highlight the fact that enhanced depth on one side of the order book 
negatively impacts the aggressiveness of orders submitted on the opposite side.  This 
provides support for Parlour‟s crowding out effect despite the absence of trading.  Moreover, 
the bid side of the order book is more responsive to increases in depth on the ask side than 
vice-versa.  Specifically, on the bid side we find that an increase in depth at the top, one step 
below the top and between two and five steps from the top of the ask order book reduces the 
aggressiveness of bid order submissions.  On the ask side, we find that only the depth 
between two and five steps from the top of the bid order book significantly and negatively 
affects the aggressiveness of ask order submissions.  The evaluation of the marginal change 
in the predicted probability for each level of aggressiveness indicates that for a one standard 
deviation shock to either variable there is a reduction in the probability of orders being 
submitted at or above the best order, and an increase in probability of orders being submitted 
below the best order.  In order words, when the depth on one side of the order book 
increases, traders on the opposite side of the order book reduce their submissions of orders 
above the best order and submit more orders below the best order. 
  
 
Table 5.8 
Ordered Probit Model for Order Submissions Aggressiveness 
Buy Side             
Panel A.  
Estimated Coefficients lbd0 lad0 lbd1 lad1 lbd25 lad25 bh01 ah01 bh15 ah15 vspr dlc 
Coefficients 0.082 -0.031 -0.010 -0.049 0.046 -0.099 1.744 2.315 0.129 -0.069 -0.306 0.276 
Z - Statistic 16.430 -5.110 -1.460 -7.120 4.690 -8.360 11.700 35.220 11.430 -1.190 -2.080 12.660 
Panel B.  
Marginal Effects (%) 
            
Above Best Opposite Order 1.69 -0.50 -0.14 -0.64 0.47 -0.77 1.19 5.43 1.15 -0.11 -0.21 4.06 
Between Best Orders 3.93 -1.18 -0.32 -1.50 1.11 -1.80 2.78 12.33 2.68 -0.25 -0.49 6.71 
Within five steps below Best Order -1.91 0.57 0.15 0.73 -0.54 0.88 -1.35 -5.98 -1.30 0.12 0.24 -4.45 
Below five steps from Best Order -3.70 1.11 0.30 1.41 -1.04 1.69 -2.62 -11.79 -2.52 0.24 0.46 -6.32 
Sell Side             
Panel A.  
Estimated Coefficients bd0 ad0 bd1 ad1 bd25 ad25 bh01 ah01 bh15 ah15 vspr dlc 
Coefficients -0.006 0.096 -0.011 0.003 -0.060 0.029 0.012 -0.286 0.006 0.630 -0.519 0.386 
Z - Statistic -0.940 15.310 -1.580 0.420 -5.580 2.270 0.100 -3.020 0.750 10.030 -4.890 15.680 
Panel B.  
Marginal Effects (%) 
            
Above Best Opposite Order -0.10 1.60 -0.15 0.04 -0.58 0.22 0.01 -0.29 0.09 1.01 -0.55 5.94 
Between Best Orders -0.24 3.90 -0.37 0.10 -1.41 0.55 0.03 -0.71 0.23 2.46 -1.34 9.36 
Within five steps below Best Order 0.07 -1.16 0.11 -0.03 0.42 -0.16 -0.01 0.21 -0.07 -0.73 0.40 -4.98 
Below five steps from Best Order 0.27 -4.35 0.42 -0.11 1.56 -0.61 -0.03 0.79 -0.25 -2.74 1.50 -10.31 
Note: This table reports the estimation results of the ordered probit model for order submissions.  The estimates are generated using maximum likelihood method.  Panel A reports 
the estimated coefficients and their associated Z-Statistic.  Panel B reports the marginal effects on the estimated probability for a positive change in the dependent variables.  The 
dependent variable takes on four different levels of aggressiveness where an action above the best opposite order is the most aggressive while an action below five steps from the 
best order is regarded as the least aggressive.  Definitions for the explanatory variables are presented in table 5.2. 
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These results confirm that order book depth is informative and plays an important role in 
determining the aggressiveness of order submissions during the pre-opening period. 
Implicitly, large depth on the buy (sell) side reduces buy (sell) execution probability and 
therefore, leads to aggressive buy (sell) order submissions.  This corroborates results 
obtained for the active trading period by Ranaldo (2004), Hall and Hautsch (2006), Cao et al. 
(2008) among others.  Overall, the results indicate that traders examine the depth that is 
available on the own and opposite side of the market to determine the degree of 
aggressiveness to apply in their submission of orders.  In addition, the submission decision 
faced by traders on the ask side of the order book is not affected by the depth at the top of 
the bid order book.  This result suggests that ask side traders appear to pay more attention to 
the price dimension of the ask order book. 
Hypothesis 2a proposes that a reduction in the inside spread increases the order submission 
aggressiveness on both sides of the order book.  The results provide strong support for this 
hypothesis. There is a negative and significant relationship between the spread and order 
submission aggressiveness on both sides of the order book.  The evaluation of the marginal 
probabilities reveal the same trade off between placing orders above or below the best order 
on either side, as reported for order book depth.  In the event of a one standard deviation 
shock to the spread, the probability of orders placed at or above the best order on either side 
reduces, and the probability of orders placed below the best order increases.  These results 
provide further support to the existing empirical literature (Biais et al., 1995; Ranaldo, 2004; 
Hall and Hautsch, 2006; Cao et al., 2008), confirming a negative relationship between the 
spread and the aggressiveness of orders submissions despite the absence of trading. 
The results also indicate that when the spread is locked or crossed as indicated by the 
variable dlc , there is an increase in the aggressiveness of order submissions on both side of 
the order book.  Therefore, in addition to lowering the cost of increasing the probability of 
execution at the opening, a locked or crossed inside spread indicates price discovery and as a 
consequence, more orders are placed towards the top of the order book on both sides of the 
market. 
With regards to order book height, we predict in hypothesis 3a that a reduction in height on 
either side of the order book decreases bid and ask order submission aggressiveness in the 
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order book.  Our results reveal consistent support for this hypothesis.  For example, the 
height between the top and one step from the top and between one and five steps from the 
top of the bid order book ( 01bh and 15bh ) both positively impacts the aggressiveness of bid 
order submissions.  Results on the ask side are somewhat weaker, with only the height 
between the top and one step from the top of the ask order book ( 01ah ) positively and 
significantly impacting the aggressiveness of bid order submissions.  There is an increase in 
the probability of order submission above the best order, and a decrease in the probability of 
orders submitted below the best order on the same side as the submitted order when either of 
these variables is shocked by one standard deviation. 
On the ask side, the results indicate mixed support for the hypothesis.  First, there is no 
significant impact of the bid height on the aggressiveness of ask order submissions.  Second, 
in line with our predictions, the height between one and five steps from the top of the ask 
order book positively impacts the aggressiveness of ask order submissions.  The trade-off 
between placing an order above or below the best order is also present when there is a one 
standard deviation shock to the variable.  Third, we find that contrary to our predictions, 
there is a negative and significant relationship between the height at the top and one step 
below the top of the ask order book and the aggressiveness of ask order submissions.  Based 
on a one standard deviation shock there is a reduction in the probability of an order being 
placed above the best order. We do observe the hypothesised result, but only below the best 
ask, in the sense there is an increase in the probability of an order being submitted below the 
best ask.  We conjecture that this negative relationship may occur as a result of sell side 
traders viewing the price at the top of the ask order book as being too low and resist sending 
additional negative signals into the market. 
5.6.2   Forward and Backward Price Revision Aggressiveness 
In hypotheses 1c and 1d we propose that an increase in depth on one side of the order book 
increases the aggressiveness of forward revision on the same side, and reduces the 
aggressiveness of forward revisions on the opposite side of the order book.  In addition, 
hypotheses 1e and 1f predict that an increase in depth on one side of the order book reduces 
backward revision on the same side and increases backward revision on the opposite side of 
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the order book.  The results in table 5.9 indicate that the depth at the top of the bid (ask) 
order book, 0lbd ( 0lad ), positively impacts the aggressiveness of forward bid (ask) order 
revisions.  This suggests that traders gauge the execution likeliness of their order by 
observing the depth at the top of the order book and revise the price of their order to reflect 
any reduction in execution probability.  This provides support for hypothesis 1c and 
consistent with findings during the trading period (Cao et al. 2008).  The marginal change in 
the probability for a one standard deviation increase in the depth at the top of the order book 
increases the probability of a forward revision above the best order, and reduces the 
probability of a forward order revision below the best order, on either side of the order book. 
Interestingly, we find that on the ask side, the aggressiveness of forward price revisions is 
not significantly impacted by the depth at the top of the bid order book.  However, the depth 
at one step below, and between two and five steps below the top of the bid order book 
negatively and significantly reduces the aggressiveness of forward ask order revisions, again 
supporting hypothesis 1c.  The results also indicate that the depth at the top, and between 
two and five steps from the top of the ask order book, acts to reduce the aggressiveness of 
forward bid order revisions, thereby confirming hypothesis 2d.  This finding confirms the 
perspective that larger depth at the top of the order book on one side of the market signals a 
more favourable order execution probability to traders on the opposite side and as such 
reduces the incentive to revise prices towards the top of the order book.  In addition, a one 
standard deviation shock to these variables shows that the probability of forward revisions 
increases above the best order, and is reduced for revisions that end up below the best order 
on the respective side of the book.   
In the case of backward price revisions, the results in table 5.10 reveal that neither the depth 
on the bid, nor on the ask side has any overall significant impact on the aggressiveness of 
backward ask order revisions.  However, we find that on the bid side, only the ask depth at 
one step below the top and between two and five steps from the top of the ask order book 
negatively impacts the aggressiveness of backward bid order revisions, contrary to the 
prediction of hypothesis 1f.  Thus, an increase in the depth on the ask side reduces the 
aggressiveness of backward bid price revisions.  This indicates that traders on the bid side 
take advantage of the liquidity from the sell side when it becomes available.  Further, the   
  
 
Table 5.9 
Ordered Probit Model for Forward Revision Aggressiveness 
Buy Side             
Panel A.  
Estimated Coefficients lbd0 lad0 lbd1 lad1 lbd25 lad25 bh01 ah01 bh15 ah15 vspr dlc 
Coefficients 0.056 -0.037 -0.002 -0.014 -0.028 -0.135 -0.831 1.748 0.112 -0.010 -1.368 0.515 
Z - Statistic 7.020 -3.480 -0.170 -1.130 -1.750 -6.650 -2.660 14.920 5.080 -0.100 -5.190 14.770 
Panel B.  
Marginal Effects (%) 
            
Above Best Opposite Order 1.930 -0.912 -0.041 -0.265 -0.467 -1.616 -0.654 5.528 1.236 -0.022 -1.316 12.545 
Between Best Orders 1.866 -0.882 -0.039 -0.256 -0.452 -1.563 -0.633 5.295 1.196 -0.022 -1.272 3.286 
Within five steps below Best Order -1.955 0.925 0.041 0.269 0.473 1.638 0.664 -5.549 -1.253 0.023 1.333 -9.509 
Below five steps from Best Order -1.841 0.870 0.039 0.253 0.445 1.541 0.624 -5.273 -1.179 0.021 1.254 -6.322 
Sell Side             
Panel A.  
Estimated Coefficients bd0 ad0 bd1 ad1 bd25 ad25 bh01 ah01 bh15 ah15 vspr dlc 
Coefficients -0.006 0.112 -0.031 0.005 -0.084 0.035 0.043 -1.349 0.004 0.893 -0.722 0.858 
Z - Statistic -0.540 11.010 -2.620 0.410 -4.640 1.610 0.240 -6.120 0.370 4.700 -3.610 21.290 
Panel B.  
Marginal Effects (%) 
            
Above Best Opposite Order -0.123 2.573 -0.557 0.088 -1.054 0.361 0.067 -1.225 0.109 0.985 -0.927 21.710 
Between Best Orders -0.164 3.427 -0.744 0.118 -1.408 0.482 0.089 -1.636 0.146 1.316 -1.238 1.266 
Within five steps below Best Order 0.159 -3.317 0.720 -0.114 1.363 -0.467 -0.087 1.583 -0.141 -1.273 1.198 -15.480 
Below five steps from Best Order 0.128 -2.684 0.581 -0.092 1.100 -0.376 -0.070 1.278 -0.114 -1.027 0.967 -7.495 
Note: This table reports the estimation results of the ordered probit model for forward price revisions.  The estimates are generated using maximum likelihood method.  Panel A 
reports the estimated coefficients and their associated Z-Statistic.  Panel B reports the marginal effects on the estimated probability for a positive change in the dependent variables.  
The dependent variable takes on four different levels of aggressiveness where an action above the best opposite order is the most aggressive while an action below five steps from 
the best order is regarded as the least aggressive.  Definitions for the explanatory variables are presented in table 5.2. 
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Table 5.10 
Ordered Probit Model for Backward Revision Aggressiveness 
Buy Side             
Panel A.  
Estimated Coefficients lbd0 lad0 lbd1 lad1 lbd25 lad25 bh01 ah01 bh15 ah15 vspr dlc 
Coefficients 0.007 0.001 0.026 -0.056 0.002 -0.187 1.408 0.512 0.140 -0.413 -0.280 0.400 
Z - Statistic 0.360 0.040 1.050 -2.070 0.060 -4.160 2.410 2.570 3.660 -1.590 -0.320 5.070 
Panel B.  
Marginal Effects (%) 
            
Above Best Opposite Order 0.054 0.007 0.144 -0.278 0.008 -0.569 0.352 0.343 0.559 -0.214 -0.052 2.842 
Between Best Orders 0.029 0.004 0.078 -0.151 0.004 -0.308 0.191 0.186 0.303 -0.116 -0.028 1.331 
Within five steps below Best Order 0.359 0.044 0.959 -1.857 0.054 -3.789 2.350 2.291 3.723 -1.429 -0.345 10.292 
Below five steps from Best Order -0.442 -0.055 -1.180 2.285 -0.066 4.666 -2.892 -2.820 -4.584 1.759 0.425 -14.465 
Sell Side             
Panel A.  
Estimated Coefficients bd0 ad0 bd1 ad1 bd25 ad25 bh01 ah01 bh15 ah15 vspr dlc 
Coefficients 0.010 -0.007 -0.014 -0.044 0.040 0.023 -0.499 -0.338 0.107 1.520 -1.411 0.578 
Z - Statistic 0.550 -0.310 -0.630 -1.750 1.210 0.550 -1.270 -1.060 3.600 6.160 -2.710 7.920 
Panel B.  
Marginal Effects (%) 
            
Above Best Opposite Order 0.080 -0.044 -0.077 -0.213 0.158 0.068 -0.180 -0.127 0.533 0.743 -0.422 4.610 
Between Best Orders 0.072 -0.039 -0.069 -0.190 0.141 0.061 -0.161 -0.114 0.476 0.662 -0.377 3.212 
Within five steps below Best Order 0.575 -0.316 -0.552 -1.523 1.133 0.487 -1.291 -0.910 3.805 5.291 -3.017 13.593 
Below five steps from Best Order -0.727 0.399 0.698 1.926 -1.433 -0.616 1.632 1.151 -4.813 -6.697 3.816 -21.416 
Note: This table reports the estimation results of the ordered probit model for backward price revisions.  The estimates are generated using maximum likelihood method.  Panel A 
reports the estimated coefficients and their associated Z-Statistic.  Panel B reports the marginal effects on the estimated probability for a positive change in the dependent variables.  
The dependent variable takes on four different levels of aggressiveness where an action above the best opposite order is the most aggressive while an action below five steps from 
the best order is regarded as the least aggressive.  Definitions for the explanatory variables are presented in table 5.2. 
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probability of a backward revision that ends up above the best order is reduced when there is 
a one standard deviation increase in the ask depth ( 1lad  and 25lad ), and increases the 
probability of prices ending up below the best order on the corresponding side of the order 
book.  Hypotheses 2b and 2c propose that an increase in the spread enhances the 
aggressiveness of forward order revisions and reduces the amount of backward order 
revisions, respectively, on both sides of the order book.  We find evidence supporting 
hypothesis 2b, in that a reduction in the spread increases forward revision aggressiveness, as 
traders take advantage of improved liquidity and lower costs to increase their probability of 
execution at the opening.  The probability of forward revisions above the best order reduces 
when the spread increases and instead orders are revised to below the best order when there 
is a one standard deviation shock to the spread.  This finding is consistent with the behaviour 
observed during the trading period revealed by Cao et al. (2008).  We also find a positive 
impact on the aggressiveness of forward revisions on both sides of the order book when the 
spread is locked or crossed.  Specifically, the probability of an order being revised above the 
best order increases when the spread is locked, and the probability of an order revised below 
the best order reduces.  
The results reveal conflicting evidence in support of hypothesis 2c.  The spread has no 
significant impact on the aggressiveness of backward revisions on the bid side except when 
it is locked or crossed.  Moreover, the sign is contrary to our prediction.  We find that a 
locked or crossed spread actually increases the aggressiveness of backward revisions.  One 
explanation is that traders who revise their orders may be more patient, and as such 
anticipate better prices subsequent to the market opening.  The same result is observed on 
the ask side except that now the impact of the spread is also significant.  In addition, 
evaluating the marginal probability reveals the trade off between revising orders above or 
below the best order on the corresponding side of the order book.  When the spread 
compresses, traders are more likely to revise their orders above the best order in the order 
book relative to the side of the book on which the order is placed. 
Hypotheses 3b and 3c postulate that a reduction in height on either side of the order book 
reduces forward revision aggressiveness and increases backward revision aggressiveness, 
respectively, on both sides of the order book.  However, the results indicate that the height 
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between the top and one step below the top of the bid order book negatively impacts the 
aggressiveness of forward order revisions.  This is contrary to our predictions.  One 
explanation is that when the price at one step below the top and the price at the top of the bid 
order book are close together, then the probability of an order below the top being executed 
is fairly high.  As a consequence, more patient traders may anticipate a better price after the 
opening, when the orders at or close to the top of the book have been executed.  However, 
the hypothesised result is confirmed for the height between one and five steps below the top 
of the bid order book and the height between the top and one step below the top of the ask 
order book.  In addition, the marginal probabilities highlight the trade off between revising 
orders above or below the best order when the height of the book is increased. 
On the ask side, we find that the height on the bid side of the order book does not 
significantly impact the aggressiveness of forward revisions.  However, analogous to the 
results for the bid side, the height between the top and one step below the top of the ask 
order book )01(ah negatively impacts the aggressiveness of forward ask order revisions, as 
traders on the ask side await more favourable prices subsequent to the opening of the market.  
The height between one and five steps below the top of the ask order book )15(ah positively 
impacts the aggressiveness of forward ask revisions as hypothesised.  A one standard 
deviation shock to the height on either side reveals the trade off between revising orders to 
above or below the best order. 
With respect to backward revision aggressiveness, we find that on the bid side the height of 
the bid order book, between the top and one step below the top ( 01bh ) and between one and 
five steps below the top of the bid order book ( 15bh ), and the height between the top and 
one step below the top of the ask order book ( 01ah ) positively impacts the aggressiveness of 
backward order revisions.  On the ask side, only the height between one and five steps from 
the top of the bid or ask order book positively impacts the backward order revision 
aggressiveness on the ask side.  These results are in contrast to the predictions of hypotheses 
3c.  One perspective here is that traders revise their orders backward when they see an 
increase in height, as they conclude that the prices at the top of the bid (ask) order book are 
too high (low) and as a result attempt to secure more favourable prices.  However, based on 
the evaluation of the marginal effects of a one standard deviation shock to the height on 
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either side centred around its mean, the probability of the order price being revised to 
somewhere above the best order increases and the probability of the order price being 
revised to below the best order decreases. 
5.6.3   Order Cancellation Aggressiveness 
In hypothesis 1g we argue that an increase in depth on the bid (ask) side of the order book 
increases the aggressiveness of bid (ask) order cancellations.  In addition, hypothesis 1h 
predicts that the depth on one side of the order book negatively impacts the aggressiveness 
of order cancellations on the opposite side of the order book.  The results in table 5.11 
indicate that there is minimal support for both hypotheses and inconsistent with prior finding 
for the trading session such as Hall and Hautsch (2006) and Cao et al. (2008).  We find that 
on both the bid and the ask side only the depth at one step below the top of the ask order 
book )0(lad  has any significant impact on the aggressiveness of order cancellation.  On the 
ask side, the depth at the top of the ask order book positively impacts the aggressiveness of 
ask order cancellations.  Further, we find that for a one standard deviation shock to the 
depth, there is an increase in the probability of order cancellation above the five step below 
the best ask order and a increase in probability of cancellation  below five steps from the top 
of the ask order book.   
On the bid side, the depth at one step below the top of the ask order book positively impacts 
the aggressiveness of bid order cancellation, a finding which is contrary to the prediction of 
the hypothesis.  For a one standard deviation shock to this variable, only the orders below 
five steps from the top of the bid order book show a reduction in probability of being 
cancelled.  One explanation here is that bid side traders that cancel when the depth at the top 
of the ask book is high conclude that the information flow is concentrated on the opposite 
side of the order book which reduces their incentive to hold the security. 
In relation to the effect of the spread on the aggressiveness of order cancellation, hypothesis 
2d postulates that a reduction in the spread decrease order cancellation aggressiveness on 
both sides of the order book.  The results in table 5.11 indicate that the spread has minimal   
  
 
Table 5.11 
Ordered Probit Model for Order Cancellation Aggressiveness 
Buy Side             
Panel A.  
Estimated Coefficients lbd0 lad0 lbd1 lad1 lbd25 lad25 bh01 ah01 bh15 ah15 vspr dlc 
Coefficients 0.003 0.042 0.027 -0.034 0.038 0.004 0.557 0.953 0.268 0.227 -0.137 0.060 
Z - Statistic 0.280 2.880 1.690 -1.910 1.620 0.120 1.800 8.650 10.020 1.650 -0.320 1.120 
Panel B.  
Marginal Effects (%) 
            
Above Best Opposite Order 0.037 0.370 0.195 -0.218 0.205 0.014 0.207 1.037 1.131 0.183 -0.040 0.385 
Between Best Orders 0.117 1.157 0.610 -0.683 0.641 0.045 0.650 3.234 3.523 0.573 -0.126 1.158 
Within five steps below Best Order 0.092 0.906 0.478 -0.535 0.502 0.035 0.509 2.528 2.753 0.449 -0.098 0.854 
Below five steps from Best Order -0.247 -2.433 -1.282 1.437 -1.347 -0.095 -1.366 -6.800 -7.407 -1.204 0.264 -2.396 
Sell Side             
Panel A.  
Estimated Coefficients bd0 ad0 bd1 ad1 bd25 ad25 bh01 ah01 bh15 ah15 vspr dlc 
Coefficients 0.021 0.110 -0.005 -0.002 -0.038 0.054 0.883 -0.115 -0.082 1.588 0.503 0.535 
Z - Statistic 1.560 8.020 -0.290 -0.090 -1.560 1.880 2.710 -0.700 -3.450 8.010 1.380 9.320 
Panel B.  
Marginal Effects (%) 
            
Above Best Opposite Order 0.192 0.970 -0.032 -0.010 -0.188 0.215 0.387 -0.074 -0.534 0.820 0.185 5.247 
Between Best Orders 0.524 2.639 -0.088 -0.027 -0.513 0.588 1.057 -0.202 -1.458 2.233 0.506 9.899 
Within five steps below Best Order 0.523 2.632 -0.088 -0.027 -0.513 0.587 1.055 -0.202 -1.456 2.228 0.505 5.943 
Below five steps from Best Order -1.239 -6.240 0.209 0.063 1.214 -1.390 -2.499 0.479 3.449 -5.280 -1.196 -21.089 
Note: This table reports the estimation results of the ordered probit model for order cancellations.  The estimates are generated using the maximum likelihood method.  Panel A 
reports the estimated coefficients and their associated Z-Statistic.  Panel B reports the marginal effects on the estimated probability for a positive change in the dependent variables.  
The dependent variable takes on four different levels of aggressiveness where an action above the best opposite order is the most aggressive while an action below five steps from 
the best order is regarded as the least aggressive.  Definitions for the explanatory variables are presented in table 5.2. 
1
6
4
 
 165 
 
impact on the aggressiveness of order cancellation on both sides of the order book.  We find 
that on the ask side, the spread only matters when it is locked or crossed.  However, here the 
impact is positive and contrary to our prediction.  Traders on the ask side increase the 
aggressiveness of cancellations when the spread is locked or crossed.  One interpretation is 
that with better estimation of the fundamental value of the asset, traders may decide not to 
sell in anticipation of a better price at a future time. 
Hypothesis 3d proposes that a reduction in the height of the order book on both sides 
decreases the aggressiveness of order cancellations on both sides of the order book.  The 
evidence in support of the hypothesis is again mixed.  We find that on the bid side, an 
increase in the height between one and five steps from the top of the bid order book and the 
height between the top and one step below the top of the ask order book increases the 
aggressiveness of bid order cancellations.  For a one standard deviation shock to either 
variable, there is a general increase in probability of bid order cancellation except below five 
steps below the top of the bid order book.   
The results also indicate that on the ask side, an increase in the height between the top and 
one step from the top of the bid order book )01(bh  and the height between one and five steps 
from the top of the ask order book  increases the aggressiveness of ask order cancellations.  
However, we find that an increase in the height between one and five steps below the top of 
the bid order book reduces the aggressiveness of ask order cancellations, contrary to the 
hypothesis.  We contend that when traders on the ask side observe that the height below the 
top of the order book is increasing, thereby reducing the downward pressure on prices they 
cancel their existing limit sell order, due to a deteriorating probability of trade execution at 
the present price. 
Evaluating the marginal probability reveals that for a one standard deviation increase in the 
height on both sides increases the probability of cancellation above five steps from the top of 
the order book on both sides, except for the depth between one and five steps below the top 
of the bid order book, which only increases the probability of order cancellations for orders 
below five steps from the top of the ask order book.  We provide a summary of all the 
proposed hypotheses and empirical results for this chapter in table 5.12, while table 5.13 
reports the model diagnostic statistics. 
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Table 5.12 
Summary of Proposed Hypotheses and Empirical Results 
Hyp 
 
Description of Hypothesis 
Rel.  
Var. 
Bid Side Ask Side 
Exp. 
Sign 
Est. 
Sign 
Sig. 
(y/n) 
Exp. 
Sign 
Est. 
Sign 
Sig. 
(y/n) 
1 Increase in depth on the bid (ask) side of the order book. 
 
a increases order submission aggressiveness 
on the bid (ask) side 
 
ilbd0  +ve +ve y -ve -ve n 
ilbd1  +ve 
-ve n -ve -ve n 
ilbd25  +ve +ve y -ve -ve y 
 
 b 
 
decreases order submission aggressiveness 
on the ask (bid) side 
ilad0  -ve -ve y +ve +ve y 
ilad1  -ve -ve y +ve +ve n 
ilad25  -ve -ve y +ve +ve y 
 
c increases forward revisions aggressiveness 
on the bid (ask) side 
 
ilbd0  +ve +ve y -ve -ve n 
ilbd1  +ve -ve n -ve -ve y 
ilbd25  +ve -ve n -ve -ve y 
 
d 
 
decreases forward revisions aggressiveness 
on the ask (bid) side 
ilad0  -ve -ve y +ve +ve y 
ilad1  -ve -ve n +ve +ve n 
ilad25  -ve -ve y +ve +ve n 
 
 
e increases backward revision aggressiveness 
on the ask (bid) side 
 
ilbd0  -ve +ve n +ve +ve n 
ilbd1  -ve +ve n +ve -ve n 
ilbd25  -ve +ve n +ve +ve n 
 
 f 
 
decreases backward revision aggressiveness 
on the bid (ask) side 
ilad0  +ve +ve n -ve -ve n 
ilad1  +ve -ve y -ve -ve n 
ilad25  +ve -ve y -ve +ve n 
 
g increases order cancellation aggressiveness 
on the bid (ask) side 
ilbd0  +ve +ve n -ve +ve n 
ilbd1  +ve +ve n -ve -ve n 
ilbd25  +ve +ve n -ve -ve n 
 
h 
 
decreases order cancellation aggressiveness 
on the ask (bid) side 
ilad0  -ve +ve y +ve +ve y 
ilad1  -ve -ve n +ve -ve n 
ilad25  -ve +ve n +ve +ve n 
2 A reduction in the inside spread     
 
  
 a 
increases order submission aggressiveness 
on both sides. 
ispr
 -ve -ve y -ve -ve y 
idlc
 +ve +ve y +ve +ve y 
 b 
increases forward order revision 
aggressiveness on both sides 
ispr
 -ve -ve y -ve -ve y 
idlc
 +ve +ve y +ve +ve y 
 c 
decreases backward order revision 
aggressiveness on both sides 
ispr
 +ve -ve n +ve -ve y 
idlc
 -ve +ve y -ve +ve y 
 d 
decreases order cancellation aggressiveness 
on both sides 
ispr
 +ve -ve n +ve -ve n 
idlc
 -ve +ve n -ve +ve y 
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Table 5.12 Cont’d 
Hyp 
 
Description of Hypothesis 
Rel.  
Var. 
Bid Side Ask Side 
Exp. 
Sign 
Est. 
Sig
n 
Sig. 
(y/n) 
Exp. 
Sign 
Est. 
Sig
n 
Sig. 
(y/n) 
3 An reduction in the height of the order book on both sides 
 
a 
decreases order submission aggressiveness 
on both sides 
ibh01  +ve +ve y +ve +ve n 
 ibh15  +ve +ve y +ve +ve n 
 iah01  +ve +ve y +ve -ve y 
 iah15  +ve -ve n +ve +ve y 
 
b 
decreases forward revision aggressiveness  
on both sides 
ibh01  +ve -ve y +ve +ve n 
 ibh15  +ve +ve y +ve +ve n 
 iah01  +ve +ve y +ve -ve y 
 iah15  +ve -ve n +ve +ve y 
 
c 
increases backward revision aggressiveness 
on both sides 
ibh01  -ve +ve y -ve -ve n 
 ibh15  -ve +ve y -ve +ve y 
 iah01  -ve +ve y -ve -ve n 
 iah15  -ve -ve n -ve +ve y 
 
d 
decreases order cancellation   aggressiveness 
on both sides 
ibh01  +ve +ve n +ve +ve y 
 
ibh15  +ve +ve y +ve -ve y 
 
iah01  +ve +ve y +ve -ve n 
 
iah15  +ve +ve n +ve +ve y 
Note: This table provides a summary of the proposed hypotheses, their related variables (Rel. Var.), the expected coefficient 
sign (Exp. Sign) based on the related hypothesis, the sign of the estimated coefficient (Est. Sign) and whether the coefficient 
is significant or not (at the 5% level) (sig. (y/n)), with n = no, y = yes. 
 
Table 5.13 
Model Diagnostics for each Order Probit Model 
 
Order  
Submission 
Forward  
Price Revision 
Backward  
Price Revision 
Order  
Cancellation 
 Buy  Side Sell Side Buy  Side Sell Side Buy  Side Sell Side Buy  Side Sell Side 
No. of Obs. 22,337 17,556 8,068 7,073 1,876 1,927 4,006 4,163 
LR Chi2 (12) 4,003.10 1,000.04 1,150.43 1,051.91 131.34 172.21 243.48 398.11 
Chi2 Prob. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 
Log-
Likelihood 
-25,953.50 -21,600.42 -8,731.78 -7,352.30 -1,573.27 -1,733.13 -4,186.61 -4,197.90 
Note: This table presents the model diagnostics for each estimated equation, such as the LR test (LR Chi2(12))and its related 
Chi squared P-value (Chi2 Prob), the Pseudo R-squared (Pseudo R2) that provides a measure of model fit and the value of 
the log likelihood function at maximisation (Log Likelihood). 
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5.7   Conclusions  
In this chapter we analyse the aggressiveness of limit order submissions, forward and 
backward revisions, and cancellations on both sides of the order book during a market pre-
opening period.  We estimate a pooled ordered probit model utilising the three most heavily 
traded stocks from the Malta Stock Exchange, over an extensive period January 2000 to June 
2007.  In addition, to explain the determinant of aggressiveness during the market pre-
opening period, we formulate variables that reflect the state of the limit order book such as 
the depth, spread and the height at various steps in the limit order book.  Specifically, we 
examine the impact of the depth at the top, one step below the top and between two and five 
steps from the top of the order book on both sides.  Additionally, we measure the impact of 
the height between the top and one step below the top and between one and five steps from 
the top of the order book on both sides.  The impact of the spread is also incorporated, as 
well as the effect on order placement strategy aggressiveness when the spread is locked or 
crossed.  
The empirical results indicate that an increase in depth on the bid side increase the 
aggressiveness of bid order submissions and forwards price revisions, and reduces the 
aggressiveness of ask order submissions and forward ask price revisions.  In addition, the 
depth on the ask side negatively impacts the aggressiveness of bid order submissions, 
forward bid order revisions and backward bid order revisions.  The results confirm that an 
increase in the depth at the top of the ask order book, increases the aggressiveness of 
cancellation on both sides of the order book.  The impact of the spread is consistent with 
previous findings in the literature.  A reduction in the spread increases the aggressiveness of 
order submissions and forward revisions on both sides of the order book.  We find that 
smaller spread increases the aggressiveness of backward revisions on the ask side and only a 
locked or crossed spread increases backward revisions on the bid side. This situation reduces 
cancellation aggressiveness on the ask side of the order book. 
The evidence confirms that a reduction in the height on the buy and sell side of the order 
book increases the aggressiveness of order submissions, forward or backward revision and 
cancellation on the buy side.  However, we find that only the height on the ask side has a 
positive and significant impact on the aggressiveness of sell order submission and forward 
 169 
 
price revisions.  The results indicate that traders pay close attention to the dynamics of both 
sides of the order book when determining their submission strategies and what action to take 
with regards to orders already place in the limit order book.  Furthermore, there is good 
evidence suggesting that traders view the state of the limit order book as a proxy for 
determining the execution probability of their order during, and subsequent to, the opening 
of the market.  The impact of the order book characteristics appears to be asymmetric for 
traders on different sides of the market.  For instance, we find that traders on the bid side 
appear to be more influenced by the dynamics of the order book in comparison to the 
reaction of sell side traders.   
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Chapter 6 
Price Discovery in the Absence of Trading: The Case of 
the Malta Stock Exchange Pre-opening Period 
6.1   Introduction 
The price discovery process is a central focus of market microstructure studies. This process, 
and the mechanism by which trading activity reveals private information, underpins much 
research since the early contributions of Kyle (1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and 
Easley and O‟Hara (1987), among others. However, there are other time periods when 
investors can reveal information without trading.  A market pre-opening period constitues 
one such period, where in the absence of trading, investors can submit, revise and cancel 
orders which queue in a limit order book awaiting execution at the market opening. The 
extent of price discovery which occurs throughout the market pre-opening period is the 
subject of debate in several theoretical and empirical studies in market microstructure 
research.  Several studies maintain the pre-opening constitues an efficient environment for 
aggregating information and significantly reducing adverse selection risks (see Madhavan, 
1992; Economides and Schwartz, 1995; Domowitz and Madhavan, 2001).  These factors 
distinguish the pre-opening from the continuous trading period, and highlight its potential 
importance as an institutional mechanism to facilitate price discovery after a halt in trading. 
This paper investigates the information content of the pre-opening order book and the 
period‟s contribution to daily price discovery by analysing data for six stocks traded on a 
nascent equity market, the Malta Stock Exchange.  The main focus of this paper is twofold: 
first, we measure the proportion of daily price discovery that is attributable to the pre-
opening and trading periods and identify how this has changed over time.  To measure the 
proportional price discovery, we utilise two methods; (1) the familiar weighted price 
contribution (WPC), and (2) the Wang and Yang (2009, 2010) sequential trading period 
extension of the Hasbrouck (1995) information share (IS) measure.  Our second objective is 
to examine which order book characteristic play a pivotal role in determining the 
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contribution to price discovery during the pre-opening.  We undertake this by measuring the 
impact of the relative height and depth of overnight and opening order books, and changes 
therein, attributable to order submissions and alterations during the pre-opening period. 
This analysis makes several contributions to the literature on market microstructure. To our 
knowledge, we are the first to empirically assess which characteristics of the order book 
information during the pre-opening period inform the price discovery process.  The previous 
pre-opening literature such as Vives, (1995), Biais et al. (1999) Medrano and Vives (2001), 
Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000) and Barclay and Hendershot (2003, 2008) customarily 
focuses on determining the presence and extent of price discovery.  In comparison to prior 
studies that measure the proportional contribution of the pre-opening to the daily price 
discovery such as Cao et al. (2000) and Barclay and Hendershott (2003, 2008), we compare 
results from the two main price discovery measures utilised in the literature.  In addition, this 
analysis examines the contribution of specific elements of order book information and 
traders‟ order submission strategy in determining opening returns.  Therefore, not only do 
we measure the proportion of price discovery that is attributable to the pre-opening period, 
but we also identify the factors that impact the return generated over this period. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows.  Section 6.2 provides a description of 
the data used in empirical analysis, where in section 6.3 we outline the methodology and 
discuss the results of our findings relative to the contribution of the pre-opening to the daily 
price discovery process.  In section 6.4, we develop testable hypotheses, outline the 
methodology employed and present results for the impact of specific order book variables on 
the return generated over the pre-opening.  The conclusions are presented in section 6.5.    
6.2   Data 
The empirical analyses conducted in this chapter utilize a unique microstructure data base 
obtained from the Malta Stock Exchange (MSE).  The MSE is a fully electronic continuous 
limit order market, with no designated market makers providing liquidity.  The sample 
utilised in this study comprises tick-by-tick data over the period January 2000 to June 2007.  
The data set contains all information about each event that occurs such as order submissions, 
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revisions or cancellations, their associated price and volume, order identification attributes 
and any other submission rule relating to orders queued in the order book.  Hence, by 
applying the rules governing the order book, we are able to replicate the state of the order 
book at every moment in time.  Normal trading at the MSE begins at 10:00 am and the 
trading day comes to an end at 12:30 pm.  Preceding the initiation of trading is the market 
pre-opening period which for the majority of the sample begins at 8:30 am and ends at 10:00 
am.
57
  It is the pre-opening period which is the main focus of this empirical analysis.   
Throughout the pre-opening period, traders submit limit orders that queue to form the pre-
opening limit order book.  At the end of the pre-opening the opening algorithm executes 
suitable orders.  The order book at the end of the pre-opening period, just prior to execution 
of the opening algorithm, is termed the opening order book.  Prior to the execution of the 
opening algorithm, traders have the option to cancel or revise any pending limit orders 
without cost or obligation.  Essentially, the MSE pre-opening period is similar to a single 
price call auction process where the market clearing price is determined by the opening 
algorithm.
58
   
For this analysis, we select the six MSE stocks which over the sample period were the most 
active during the pre-opening.  These correspond to the shares of HBSC Bank Malta plc 
(HSB), Bank of Valletta plc (BOV), Maltacom plc (MLC), Middlesea Insurance plc (MSI), 
Malta International Airport plc (MIA) and the International Hotel Investment plc (IHI).  We 
categorise these stocks into two groups.  First, the three most active stocks, that include 
BOV, MLC and HSB are categorised as A stocks.  Second, the three remaining less active 
stocks, which are MSI, MIA and IHI are categorised as B stocks.  In effect, these two 
categories are formulated to enable us to make a distinction between the characteristics of 
most active and less active stocks trading on the MSE.  Table 6.1 provides a summary of the 
order book activity, including submissions, forward and backward price revisions, and 
cancellations for the six stocks utilized. 
 
                                                 
57
 As of 23 October 2006, the preopening period changed to 9:30 am to 10:45 am with the continuous open 
from 10:45am to 12:30pm.  This has been accounted for in our estimation. 
58
 See chapter 2 for a more in-depth description of the institutional details that governs the MSE.  
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Table 6.1 
Summary of Pre-opening Order Book Activity 
Action Type BOV MLC HSB MIA MSI IHI 
Order 
Submissions 
Buy 7005 8579 6789 876 887 784 
Sell 6788 6640 4169 1210 1278 1529 
Forward         
Price Revisions 
Buy 2380 3585 2109 262 449 243 
Sell 2779 2753 1574 391 729 683 
Backward      
Price Revisions 
Buy 519 1080 292 56 128 62 
Sell 668 907 357 71 95 124 
Order 
Cancellations 
Buy 1213 1980 818 196 264 154 
Sell 1569 1873 736 161 166 278 
Note: This table presents a summary of the order book activity during the market pre-opening 
period over the period January 4, 2000 to June 27, 2007.  The number of orders submitted, 
revised forward, revised backward or cancelled are categorised into buy and sell.  Other order 
book activity such as volume revisions or other exchange related activities are omitted.   
 
6.3   Price Discovery 
6.3.1   Contribution of Pre-opening to Daily Price Discovery 
The extent of price discovery which occurs throughout the market pre-opening period is the 
subject of debate in several theoretical and empirical studies in market microstructure 
research.  The pre-opening is characterised by an absence of trading and the queuing of non-
binding orders that await execution at the opening, thereby potentially creating an 
environment for aggregating information and significantly reduced adverse selection risks 
(see Madhavan, 1992; Economides and Schwartz, 1995; Domowitz and Madhavan, 2001).  
It is these factors that distinguish the pre-opening from the continuous trading period, and 
highlight its importance as a feature to provide price discovery after a halt in trading.  
Theoretical models of the pre-opening tâtonnement process conclude that pre-opening prices 
tend to converge to their fundamental value, although such convergence is noisy in models 
which incorporate manipulation or specialist intervention.  Vives (1995) concludes that in 
the presence of informed and uninformed traders both submitting orders during the pre-
opening, prices converge to their fundamental value at a rate proportional to the square root 
of time.  Following the incorporation of manipulative behaviour by informed traders, both 
Medrano and Vives (2001) and Bursco et al. (2003) show that while prices converges to 
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fundamentals, they are noisy around this value, a feature attributable to the added noise that 
manipulative behaviour induces into the learning process.  Within the framework of a quote 
driven market with a specialist facilitating the trading process, Madhavan and 
Panchapagesan (2000) demonstrate that inventory and price stability considerations lead to 
pre-opening prices being noisy around the fundamental value of the asset. 
These models (Vives, 1995; Medrano and Vives, 2001; Bursco et al., 2003; and Madhavan 
and Panchapagesan, 2000) attribute price discovery to the process of learning undergone by 
traders participating in the pre-opening.  Through observing the pre-opening order flow and 
the continuous updating of opening prices, traders are claimed to formulate inferences about 
the fundamental value of the asset.  Biais et al. (1999) empirically assess the pre-opening 
order flow to specifically ascertain the presence of learning in light of the non-binding nature 
of pre-opening orders.  They conclude that the pre-opening order flow is indeed informative 
and learning occurs only towards the end of the pre-opening period. 
Since the claim is that pre-opening period facilitates price discovery after a (weekend or 
overnight) halt in the trading process, the obvious question is; what is the relative 
contribution of the pre-opening to the overall process of price discovery through an entire 
trading day, considering that orders are non-binding and no trade execution occurs in this 
period?  Several studies, including Cao et al. (2000), Barclay and Hendershott (2003, 2008) 
and Ellul, Shin and Tonks (2005) among others, measure the proportion of price discovery 
over the trading day that is attributable to the pre-opening period by implementing the 
Weighted Price Contribution Method (WPC), introduced by Barclay and Warner (1993).  
Barclay and Hendershott (2003) attribute the occurrence of approximately 16% of overall 
price discovery for selected stocks trading on the NASDAQ to the pre-opening period, and 
this period accounts for approximately 74% of close-to-open price discovery.   
Cao et al. (2000), similarly, concludes that price discovery per unit of time during the pre-
opening is the same as that which occurs during the NASDAQ trading day.  In addition, 
Barclay and Hendershott (2008) conclude that the proportion of daily price discovery that 
occurs at the NASDAQ opening reduced from 11.8% to 1.8% over the period 1993 to 1999 
for the sample of stocks studied.  Essentially, the authors find that the reduction in price 
discovery at the opening of the market is attributable to the pre-opening contributing more to 
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daily price discovery.  The authors find that the increased trading on off-exchange ECNs, 
which operates concurrent with the NASDAQ pre-opening, contributed significantly to 
improving price discovery during this period.  
The WPC methodology is widely used as it provides fairly non-cumbersome method for 
quantifying price discovery occurring in designated periods within a trading day, or for 
stocks traded in separate locations.  However, Wang and Yang (2010) argue that the WPC 
measure is highly sensitive to serial correlation in returns.  They propose an alternative 
measure of price discovery based on the Information Share (IS) measure developed by 
Hasbrouck (1995).  Specifically, Wang and Yang (2010) maintain that the WPC measures 
proportional weighted returns over a period only if the variance of returns is small relative to 
the mean return.  Moreover, they show that the WPC is a function of mean returns and return 
serial correlations.
59
  They argue that the IS more accurately measures prices discovery 
attributable to sequential periods within the trading day, since the IS captures variations in 
the efficient price of an asset traded on an exchange.  
In this section, three basic questions are answered.  (1) What is the relative contribution of 
the pre-opening period to price discovery; (2) how has this relative contribution changed 
over time and (3) how does the level of order book activity during the pre-opening period 
influence the pre-opening‟s contribution to the daily price discovery process for a particular 
stock?  To empirically assess these questions, we utilise both the WPC and the IS measure 
proposed by Wang and Yang (2010) enabling us to compare the results from these two 
measures of price discovery. 
6.3.2   Methodology 
6.3.2.1   Information Share 
The price discovery literature employs two dominant methods to measure the extent of price 
discovery in the efficient prices for assets trading in different markets and/or trading venues.  
Hasbrouck (1995) proposes an Information Share (IS) method that measures the respective 
contribution of each market to the determination of the efficient price of an asset traded 
                                                 
59
 See Wang and Yang (2010) for a comprehensive proof of these claims. 
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simultaneously in several separate locations.  The other method includes models developed 
in the spirit of Gonzalo and Granger (1995), which use coefficient ratios to measure the 
contribution of each market to the efficient price.  Studies utilising this coefficient measure 
to estimate price discovery include: Booth, So and Tse (1999), Chu, Hsieh and Tse (1999) 
and Harris, McInish and Woods (2002).
60
  However, Yan and Ziot (2010) formulate a 
structural cointegration model which confirms that while both methods identify changes in 
efficient prices, only the IS provide information on the relative “informativeness” of 
different markets in relation to the price discovery process. 
An important point to note is that the above family of models both rely on the premise that 
the asset trades simultaneously in parallel markets, which results in the price in each location 
being partly driven by the no-arbitrage argument.  Essentially, these models then utilise a 
cointegrated VAR framework to model the interaction of these prices over time.  
Consequently, these price discovery measures are not directly applicable to measuring the 
relative contribution of sequential time periods within a trading day to the overall daily price 
discovery process.  To measure the proportion of price discovery over the trading day 
attributable the pre-opening period, we implement a structural VAR model in the spirit of 
Hasbrouck (1995), formulated by Wang and Yang (2009, 2010) that measures the 
contribution of sequential markets (or time periods) to the efficient price of an asset within a 
separate time period.
61
   
To illustrate, let tip ,  and tir ,  denote the log price and return for period i, respectively, on day 
t for a specific asset.  Period i can be further sub-divided into n sequential trading periods.  
Denote the daily return from close of trade on day t-1 to day t as 1,,1 ,   tntn
n
i tit
pprr .  
Assuming returns within the i
th
 period are subject to period specific shocks ti ,  that are 
serially uncorrelated, it follows that only the component of the shock related to the 
fundamental changes in the assets value will enter the efficient price.  Therefore, the price at 
the end of period i can be written as tititi ump ,,,  , where tim ,  is the unobservable efficient 
                                                 
60
 Studies that employ both methods include Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004) and Covrig, Ding and 
Low (2004).  
61
 Wang and Yang (2009) measure the contribution of four non-overlapping foreign exchange markets to price 
discovery in four currency pairs, and Wang and Yang (2010) measure the relative contribution overnight and 
daytime periods to the close-to-close price discovery process. 
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price that reflects information on the fundamental value of the asset and tiu ,  is a error term 
reflecting transitory factors. 
The change in the efficient price from one period to the next is tititi mmm ,1,,   for i = 
1,...,n.  The changes are serially uncorrelated and capture the permanent factors in the period 
specific shocks ti , .  In the spirit of Hasbrouck (1995),  i,tmVar  denotes the information 
flow in period i.  Hence, if the change in the efficient price over day t is   
n
i tit
mm
1 ,
, 
then the information share (IS) of period i on day t is defined as 
   
 
 t
ti
i
m
m
IS



Var
Var ,
   for i = 1,...,n    (1) 
Denote top ,  and tcp ,  as the log opening price generated by the opening algorithm at the end 
of the pre-opening, and log closing price on day t, respectively.  Thus, the close-to-open 
(opening) and open-to-close return are 1,,,1  tctot ppr  and totct ppr ,,,2  , respectively.  
The vector of returns is defined as )',( ,2,1 ttt rrR  .
62
  Providing returns are stationary, the 
vector tR  can be modelled using a structural VAR process as follows: 
   
t
K
k
ktkt RR  


1
0 a       (2) 
where )',( ,2,1 ttt    is the vector of serially uncorrelated structural shocks that are 
specific to the pre-opening and the trading periods, respectively.  In addition, 0)( tE  , 
0)'( kttE   for 0k  and I)'( ttE  , where I is the identity matrix.  Due to the 
sequential nature of the pre-opening and the trading periods within one trading day, the 
close-to-open returns tr ,1  impacts the open-to-close return tr ,2  but not vice versa.  As a 
consequence, 0  will be a lower triangular matrix as follows: 
   






2212
11
0
0
bb
b
       (3) 
                                                 
62
 The close-to-close return is the sum of both returns. 
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The reduced form of the structural VAR in (2) is, therefore: 
    ttRL   )(        (4) 
where Kk LLL  ...)( 1 , kk 
1
0 , a
1
0

 
and the reduced form errors 
relates to the structural shocks by tt 
1
0
 .  Therefore, t,1  is proportional to t,1  and t,2  
is a linear combination of t,1  and t,2 .  The covariance matrix is given by, 
)(),( 10
1
0
 sttE  .  Since 0  is a lower triangular matrix and   is symmetric, the 
VAR can be estimated using OLS and   can be estimated using the lower triangular 
Cholesky factor of the OLS estimated variance matrix of t . 
6.3.2.2   Estimating the Information Share 
From the reduced form VAR in equation (4) the moving average representation based on the 
Beverage-Nelson (1981) decomposition is as follows: 
   ttt LR  )()1(
1         (5) 
where  1)1(  , K ...)1( 1 , 


 
0
)(
j
j
j LL ,   )0(~)( IL t
  and 
j
  converges to zero as j increases.  The matrix 1)1(   captures the cumulative impact of 
the reduced form innovations ( t ) on the returns.  To derive an expression for the 
unobservable efficient prices tim , , Wang and Yang (2009) contend that the change in the log 
price at the end of day t is the accumulation of each period‟s return, such that: 
   
tc
t
i
itc
t
i
itc upupp ,
1
1
0
1
0,
1
1
0, )1()1(  



   (6) 
where 0p  is the initial price at t = 0, 

 
 
0,
))((
j jtjttc
Lu   and   is a vector of 
ones.  Evident here is that equation (6) is similar to the Stock and Watson (1988) common 
trend representation.  Thus, the price at the end of day t consists of the full information value 
of the asset and a transitory pricing error, which captures deviations from efficient prices.  
Hence, the efficient price can be defined as: 
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where tF  is the information set at the end of the day t.  Therefore, the change in the daily 
efficient price is  
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Note that in the Hasbrouck presentation of the IS, the ordering of prices impacts the resulting 
IS measure and as such upper and lower bounds are necessarily established.  However, 
Wang and Yang (2009) demonstrate that in this formulation, the ordering of returns does not 
impact the value of the resulting IS measure. 
6.3.2.3   Weighted Price Contribution 
Barclay and Warner (1993) utilise the WPC method to determine the impact of different 
trade sizes on trade price.  Their method is adopted to measure the contribution of different 
periods within a trading day to the price discovery process by Cao et al. (2000), Barclay and 
Hendershott (2003, 2008), Huang (2002) and Ellul et al (2005).  In this study, the WPC of 
the opening and open-to-closing return to the daily stock price return is computed and 
presented along with the IS measure.  As defined previously, if tr ,1  and tr ,2  are the opening 
and open-to-close returns respectively, such that ttt rrr ,2,1   is the close-to-close return, 
then the WPC for period i is computed as follows: 
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The second term in parentheses measures the relative contribution of period i to the close-to-
close return and the product of the first two term is a weighting factor that reduces the 
impact of small absolute daily returns.  Essentially, the WPC relies on the average return 
process over the sample to reduce the effect of transitory price movements on the return 
series (Huang, 2002). 
6.3.2.4   Opening Returns and Open-to-Close Returns 
Ideally, the opening return is calculated as the difference between the log opening price, 
determined by the opening algorithm, and the log price of the last trade in the previous 
trading day.  However, two issues may arise in the case of the MSE.  First, the last trade 
price might not reflect the last valuation for the stock at market close.  Second, at the end of 
the pre-opening period an opening price is determined only when there are matching buy and 
sell orders such that the price of the best buy is at least equal to the price of the best sell 
order.  Hence, not in all cases will there be an opening price generated at the end of the pre-
opening.  To alleviate these problems, we set the closing price of each stock to the mid-quote 
at the end of the trading day, and the opening price is set equal to either the opening price if 
there are executable orders or to the mid-quote at the end of the pre-opening otherwise.
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Table 6.2 presents a statistical summary of the opening (r1) and open-to-close (r2) returns for 
the six stocks utilised in this study.  Evident from the table is that the average opening return 
for five of the six stocks is positive and all with a negative open-to-close return.  This 
indicates that there is in general a reversal of returns after the opening: if a stock realises a 
positive opening return, then it is often followed by a negative return during the trading 
period. For all the stocks, there is evidence of excess dispersion as the standard deviation in 
all cases is greater than their respective mean return.  The table also reveals that both the 
opening and open-to-close returns for the six stocks are significantly serially correlated, even 
at large lags as the Ljung-Box test statistics at lags four, eight, sixteen and thirty six are all 
statistically significant at the five percent level.  This finding indicates caution should be 
exercised when using the WPC as a measure of sequential price discovery.      
                                                 
63
 An opening price is generated for the three most active stocks (BOV, MLC and HSB) between 77% and 81% 
of the time, and between 50% and 57% for the less active three stocks (MSI, MIA and IHI) in our sample. 
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Table 6.2 
Statistical Summary of Opening Return (r1) and Open-to-Close Returns (r2) 
A Stocks  BOV 
 
MLC 
 
HSB 
 r1 r2 
 
r1 r2 
 
r1 r2 
Mean 
 
0.002 -0.002 
 
0.001 -0.001 
 
0.003 -0.002 
Maximum 
 
0.080 0.075 
 
0.066 0.078 
 
0.086 0.099 
Minimum 
 
-0.078 -0.074 
 
-0.075 -0.092 
 
-0.064 -0.095 
Std. Dev. 
 
0.009 0.012 
 
0.012 0.015 
 
0.012 0.015 
Skewness 
 
1.024 -0.345 
 
0.451 -0.318 
 
1.495 -0.285 
Kurtosis 
 
18.47 9.75 
 
7.76 8.43 
 
11.92 10.90 
LB(4) 
 
163.94 64.88 
 
151.91 28.34 
 
752.01 214.02 
LB(8) 
 
185.12 67.87 
 
158.44 30.08 
 
1156.80 359.76 
LB(16) 
 
191.18 73.06 
 
168.84 38.55 
 
1446.90 454.32 
LB(36) 
 
211.26 109.68 
 
191.34 52.12 
 
1801.90 585.05 
No. Obs. 
 
1838 1838 
 
1842 1842 
 
1778 1778 
B Stocks 
 
MSI 
 
MIA 
 
IHI 
 
r1 r2 
 
r1 r2 
 
r1 r2 
Mean 
 
-0.001 0.001 
 
0.000 0.001 
 
0.001 -0.001 
Maximum                              
 
0.089 0.100 
 
0.068 0.082 
 
0.087 0.094 
Minimum 
 
-0.087 -0.088 
 
-0.043 -0.086 
 
-0.089 -0.090 
Std. Dev. 
 
0.014 0.017 
 
0.010 0.012 
 
0.015 0.018 
Skewness 
 
-0.154 0.041 
 
0.931 -0.514 
 
0.664 0.002 
Kurtosis 
 
11.83 11.19 
 
10.62 11.11 
 
9.41 8.45 
LB(4) 
 
67.29 33.31 
 
20.66 8.32 
 
26.68 15.31 
LB(8) 
 
111.00 43.80 
 
30.19 14.81 
 
36.75 19.64 
LB(16) 
 
143.18 53.99 
 
46.97 25.36 
 
49.06 36.50 
LB(36) 
 
178.12 90.84 
 
78.85 57.15 
 
60.94 64.32 
No. Obs. 
 
1470 1470   1016 1016   1492 1492 
Note: This table reports the mean, maximum, minimum, standard deviation (Std. Dev.), skewness, 
kurtosis, Ljung-Box test statistics (LB(·)) for lags 4 to 36 and the number of observations (No. 
Obs.) for opening returns (R1) and open-to-close returns (R2) for the six stocks utilized in the 
empirical analyses.    
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6.3.3   Empirical Results 
The estimates for both the sequential information share (IS) and the weighted price 
contribution (WPC) measure of the pre-opening period price contribution are reported in 
table 6.3.  Results are presented for the entire sample and for each year within the sample.  
The IS is estimated from the structural VAR in equation (2) and the WPC is estimated using 
equation (10).  In addition, the table reports the correlation between the opening and open-to-
close return, the computed difference between the WPC and the IS measure, and the number 
of lags incorporated in the structural VAR model used to calculate the IS.  The lag length of 
the structural VAR is selected using the maximum AIC statistic.  Table 6.4 provides a 
summary of table 6.4 for both the most active (A) stocks and the less active (B) stocks.  
Evident from table 6.4 is that, on average, there is a negative relationship between opening 
returns and open-to-close return for both the A and B stocks for each year in the sample, and 
also for the full sample.  Thus, a positive return during the pre-opening tends to be followed 
by a negative return over the subsequent trading period.  For the A stocks, the average 
correlation ranges between -0.07 and -0.35.  The B stocks tend to be even more negatively 
correlated, with averages ranging between -0.17 to -0.45. 
The contribution of the pre-opening period to daily price discovery varies depending upon 
the estimation method chosen.  Based on the IS measure, the proportion of price discovery 
attributable to the pre-opening period is on average approximately 30% for the A stocks and 
32% for the B stocks.  The WPC estimates are slightly higher on average for both type of 
stock, with approximately 35% and 38% of the daily price discovery attributable to the pre-
opening across the A and B stocks, respectively.  Hence, the pre-opening period seems to 
account for similar levels of price discovery for both the A and B stocks in our sample.    
For both categories of stocks, there is a small reduction in price discovery during the pre-
opening over the sample period, irrespective of method used.  The WPC shows a more 
gradual decline over the period as compared to the IS, which exhibits a more volatile pattern.  
For the A stocks, the average IS decreased from approximately 36% to 30% with a high of 
55% and low of 17% in 2003 and 2006, respectively.  The WPC decreases gradually from   
  
 
Table 6.3 
Information Share (IS) and Weighted Price Contribution (WPC) for the Pre-opening Period 
Panel A 
 
BOV 
 
MLC 
 
HSB 
Year 
 
Corr 
(r1,r2) 
WPC1 
(%) 
IS1 
(%) 
Diff 
(%) 
Var 
Lags  
Corr 
(r1,r2) 
WPC1 
(%) 
IS1 
(%) 
Diff 
(%) 
Var 
Lags  
Corr 
(r1,r2) 
WPC1 
(%) 
IS1 
(%) 
Diff 
(%) 
Var 
Lags 
2000 
 
-0.06 26.80 50.23 -23.42 1 
 
-0.21 37.64 33.98 3.66 1 
 
-0.43 46.78 23.05 23.73 1 
2001 
 
-0.30 44.30 43.71 0.59 1 
 
-0.14 37.44 45.78 -8.35 1 
 
-0.43 56.71 32.39 24.33 7 
2002 
 
-0.36 32.28 22.46 9.81 2 
 
-0.38 34.31 12.24 22.06 1 
 
-0.32 33.38 17.09 16.29 1 
2003 
 
-0.05 33.52 71.93 -38.41 1 
 
-0.27 44.67 44.53 0.14 1 
 
-0.27 41.75 48.94 -7.19 1 
2004 
 
-0.01 32.22 29.82 2.41 1 
 
-0.01 38.54 29.88 8.66 1 
 
-0.32 23.12 24.03 -0.91 2 
2005 
 
-0.11 33.42 34.63 -1.20 1 
 
-0.07 30.11 36.36 -6.26 2 
 
-0.45 36.16 49.91 -13.74 9 
2006 
 
-0.06 22.62 15.41 7.22 1 
 
-0.29 32.41 29.59 2.82 1 
 
-0.53 33.40 6.13 27.26 1 
2007 
 
0.06 11.90 33.79 -21.89 3 
 
-0.30 40.24 39.34 0.91 2 
 
0.04 22.76 15.80 6.95 1 
Full   -0.15 31.39 35.89 -4.50 1 
 
-0.20 36.60 33.217 3.38 1 
 
-0.43 38.14 21.63 16.51 1 
Panel B 
 
MSI 
 
MIA 
 
IHI 
Year 
 
Corr 
(r1,r2) 
WPC1 
(%) 
IS1 
(%) 
Diff 
(%) 
Var 
Lags  
Corr 
(r1,r2) 
WPC1 
(%) 
IS1 
(%) 
Diff 
(%) 
Var 
Lags  
Corr 
(r1,r2) 
WPC1 
(%) 
IS1 
(%) 
Diff 
(%) 
Var 
Lags 
2000 
 
-0.23 46.59 36.30 10.29 1 
 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
-0.52 42.24 12.44 29.80 4 
2001 
 
-0.26 58.21 60.78 -2.57 9 
 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
-0.23 37.44 32.44 5.00 1 
2002 
 
-0.37 32.20 17.87 14.33 7 
 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
-0.37 50.98 44.45 6.53 1 
2003 
 
-0.42 49.31 21.06 28.25 5 
 
-0.56 30.51 26.05 4.46 1 
 
-0.36 41.22 27.67 13.55 5 
2004 
 
-0.30 38.90 17.77 21.13 2 
 
0.08 38.88 60.91 -22.03 5 
 
-0.29 35.93 25.31 10.62 2 
2005 
 
-0.33 37.83 23.60 14.22 1 
 
-0.13 34.33 64.65 -30.32 1 
 
-0.18 40.82 35.05 5.77 1 
2006 
 
-0.41 19.41 17.55 1.86 4 
 
-0.27 28.57 22.23 6.35 1 
 
-0.33 45.08 36.35 8.72 1 
2007 
 
-0.48 32.46 31.43 1.03 2 
 
-0.56 33.56 13.00 20.56 3 
 
-0.32 25.17 16.44 8.73 1 
Full   -0.34 39.47 30.29 9.18 2   -0.27 33.59 39.34 -5.75 1   -0.32 39.49 26.01 13.48 4 
Note: This table reports the correlation between opening return and opening-to-close return (Corr), information share (IS), weighted price contribution (WPC), 
the difference between the WPC and the IS (Diff) and the number of lags included in the structural VAR in the IS calculation (Var Lags) for the Pre-opening 
period. Panel A reports the statistics for the full sample and subsamples based on each year in the sample for the three most active stocks.  Panel B reports the 
statistics for the full sample and subsamples based on each year in the sample for the three less active stocks. 
1
8
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Table 6.4 
Summary of Pre-opening Information Share and Weighted Price Contribution 
  
A Stock Averages 
 
B Stock Averages 
Year 
 
Corr 
(r1,r2) 
WPC1 
(%) 
IS1 
(%) 
Diff 
(%) 
Var 
Lags 
 
Corr 
(r1,r2) 
WPC1 
(%) 
IS1 
(%) 
Diff 
(%) 
Var 
Lags 
2000 
 
-0.23 37.07 35.75 1.32 1.00 
 
-0.38 44.41 24.37 20.05 2.50 
2001 
 
-0.29 46.15 40.63 5.52 3.00 
 
-0.24 47.82 46.61 1.21 5.00 
2002 
 
-0.35 33.32 17.27 16.06 1.33 
 
-0.37 41.59 31.16 10.43 4.00 
2003 
 
-0.20 39.98 55.13 -15.15 1.00 
 
-0.45 40.34 24.92 15.42 3.67 
2004 
 
-0.11 31.30 27.91 3.39 1.33 
 
-0.17 37.91 34.67 3.24 3.00 
2005 
 
-0.21 33.23 40.30 -7.07 4.00 
 
-0.21 37.66 41.10 -3.44 1.00 
2006 
 
-0.29 29.48 17.04 12.43 1.00 
 
-0.34 31.02 25.38 5.64 2.00 
2007 
 
-0.07 24.97 29.65 -4.68 2.00 
 
-0.45 30.40 20.29 10.11 2.00 
Avg. 
 
-0.22 34.44 32.96 1.48 1.83 
 
-0.33 38.89 31.06 7.83 2.90 
Full   -0.26 35.38 30.25 5.13 1.00   -0.31 37.52 31.88 5.63 2.33 
Note: This table summarizes the results presented in table 6.3.  The averages for the correlation (corr), 
weighted price contribution (WPC), information share (IS), the difference between the IS and the WPC (diff) 
and the number of lags in the structural VAR are presented for the most active (A) stocks and for the least 
active (B) stocks.  The average yearly value for each statistic (Avg.) is reported along with the estimates for the 
full sample (Full). 
 
approximately 37% to 25% over the sample period, with a high of 46% and a low of 25% in 
2001 and 2007, respectively.  For the B stocks, the average IS decreased from approximately 
24% to 20% over the sample with a high of 47% in 2001 and a low of 20% in 2007.  The 
WPC for the B stocks declines from approximately 44% to 30% over the sample with a high 
of 48% in 2001 and a low of 30% in 2007. 
On average, the difference between the IS and the WPC for both the A and B stocks is in the 
region of 5% to 6% respectively, for the full sample.  This suggests that over the long run, 
both methods may produce similar conclusions.  In addition, the yearly averages of the IS 
and the WPC for both A and B stocks are close to their respective estimates for the full 
sample.  In contrast, the annual estimates of the WPC and the IS are similar for some year 
but reveal large differences for other years.  In the A stocks, on average the difference 
between the IS and WPC ranges between -15% and 16% and between is -3% and 20% for 
the B stocks.  These differences are driven by numerous factors that affects the IS and the 
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WPC separately, such as the correlation between the opening and open-to-close returns, the 
level of excess dispersion in the return series, return serial correlation and the number of lags 
incorporated into the structural VAR model.  However, in contrast to the finding of Wang 
and Yang (2010), we find no distinct relationship between these parameters and the 
difference between the IS and the WPC.  Consequently, using the IS or the WPC to 
determine the level of price discovery might lead to different empirical conclusions. 
Overall, irrespective of the methodology employed, the pre-opening period contributes 
significantly to the daily price discovery process, with values of between 30% and 38% for 
both the most and the less active stocks in this study.  Essentially, we find no evidence that 
there is a significant difference between the contributions of the pre-opening to the daily 
price discovery process of stocks that are highly active compared to stocks that are 
significantly less active during the pre-opening period.  We also find that the price discovery 
attributable to activity in the pre-opening period has been slightly reduced over the 2000 to 
2007 period.           
6.4   Limit Order Book and Opening Returns 
The information content of the open limit order book is a major topic of debate in studies 
focusing on price discovery.  On the one hand, various studies contend that only information 
at the top of the order book provides investors with information about the full information 
value of the asset.  Theoretical models of Glosten (1994), Rock (1996), Angel (1997), Seppi 
(1997) and Harris (1998) show that informed traders prefer the use of market orders to profit 
from their short lived private informational advantage.  Hence, informed traders trade-off a 
higher cost and reveal their private information to guarantee immediate execution of their 
orders, due to the non-execution risk associated with the submission of limit orders.  Thus, 
under these assumptions the order book below the best quotes provides no information about 
future price discovery.   
On the other hand, other studies argue that the order book below the best quotes is 
informative and its composition should be a basis of ongoing research.  This debate in some 
instances focuses on the use of limit versus market orders by informed agents to profit from 
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their informational advantage.  In essence, if informed traders utilise limit orders which are 
more discrete and reveal less information to the market, then the private information will be 
reflected in the limit order book.  However, if informed traders utilise market orders that are 
certain and immediate even though expensive and reveal their impatience, then their private 
information will not be present in the limit order book (Cao et al. 2009). 
Bloomfield et al. (2005), show that it is more profitable for informed traders to submit 
proportionally more limit than market orders so as to conceal and maximise the payoff from 
their private information.  The theoretical model of Kaniel and Lui (2006) confirms this 
behaviour, and concludes that limit orders in the order book will be more informative when 
traders posses “long-lived” information.  Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) provide 
empirical support for this proposition by showing that specialists at the New York Stock 
exchange (NYSE) utilise information from the limit order book to gain advantage over limit 
order traders. 
Essentially, the choice between the submission of market or limit orders represents a trade-
off between the non-execution cost and picking off risk associated with limit orders and 
bearing the cost of immediate execution provided by market orders (Cohen et al., 1981, 
Copeland and Galai, 1983 and Handa and Schwartz, 1996).  To determine this trade-off, 
studies argue that in formulating their order submission strategy, traders utilise information 
that can be inferred from the limit order book, which further supports the notion that the 
order book is informative.  Specifically, Parlour (1998) proposes the “crowding out” effect, 
whereby traders gauge their submission of limit or market orders based on the thickness on 
both sides of the order book.  Foucault (1999) and Foucault et al. (2005) contend that the 
proportion of limit order submission relative to market order depends on the fundamental 
asset price volatility and the bid-ask spread, respectively.  Goettler et al. (2005) also find that 
the level of the spread affects the trade-off between the submission of market and limit 
orders, such that larger spreads increase the cost of market orders and, therefore, reduce their 
use by informed agents. 
Several empirical studies corroborate these theoretical predictions, and in the process 
confirming that the limit order book is informative about order strategy employed by traders.  
Biais et al. (1995), Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski (2000), Ranaldo (2004) and Ellul et al. 
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(1995) show that the smaller the spread the greater the probability of market order relative to 
limit order submission. The impact of the order book depth (“crowding out” effect) on order 
choice and aggressiveness is confirmed by Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995), Cao, Hansch and 
Wang (2008), Griffiths et al. (2000), Ranaldo (2004), Hall and Hautsch (2006) and Pascual 
and Veredas (2008).  In addition, Cao et al. (2008) show that the price dimension along the 
order book, referred to as order book height, is also informative and impacts the use of 
market versus limit orders for trade executions.  Hence, from both a theoretical and empirical 
perspective, there is strong evidence supporting the premise that the order book is 
informative and should provide information about future prices and by extension price 
discovery.   
The context of the pre-opening period differs, as there are no market orders per se (due to the 
lack of order execution).  Orders submitted and not cancelled sit in the pre-opening order 
book, awaiting execution at the opening.  The lack of continuous order execution during the 
pre-opening should translate into an order book that becomes increasingly informative as the 
pre-opening period progresses and is most informative at market opening.  Vives (1995) 
maintains that in the presence of informed and uninformed traders submitting orders during 
the pre-opening, both types of traders submit orders until the subsequent opening price 
reveals the full information value of the asset.  In this situation, the structure of the pre-
opening order book is informative regarding the fundamental value of the asset and, 
correspondingly, the return generated over the pre-opening.  
To qualify the above, traders have the option to revise or cancel orders sitting in the order 
book during the pre-opening period, thereby creating an opportunity for traders to “game” 
the order book.  In other words, manipulative behaviour during the pre-opening period could 
distort inferences about the informational content of the order book.  Specifically, in the 
models of Medrano and Vives (2001) and Brusco et al. (2003), manipulation by an informed 
trader will induce additional noise in the order book, which limits the ability of other traders 
to make inferences about the fundamental value of the asset.  If manipulative behaviour is 
present, then it is expected that the pre-opening order submission strategy provides little 
information about the fundamental value of the asset and consequently returns over the 
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period.  In contrast, if traders learn about the fundamental value of the asset (Biais et al. 
1995) the order book will be informative about returns over the pre-opening. 
In this section, we empirically asses the “informativeness” of the state of the pre-opening 
order book in relation to the pre-opening period return.  Specifically, we investigate the 
information content of the overnight order book, changes to the order book throughout the 
pre-opening, and the state of the opening order book.  To our knowledge, this is the first 
study that attempts to assess the relationship between the evolution of the pre-opening order 
book and the return realised over the pre-opening period.  There are other empirical studies 
that examine the relationship between the limit order book and short-term returns, but these 
focus exclusively on the continuous trading period.  For instance, Huang and Stoll (1994) 
show that the difference between the depth of the best buy and sell orders predicts future 
price change.  Chordia, Roll and Subrahanyam (2002) and Boehner and Wu (2008) maintain 
that trading imbalances impact future returns, while Cao et al. (2009) find that order book 
imbalances between the buy and sell side at, and below, the top of the order book impacts 
future short term returns.  Of these studies, this analysis is most closely related to that of Cao 
et al (2009). 
6.4.1   Overnight Order Book and Opening Returns 
At the end of trading each day, orders submitted which remain unexecuted are queued to 
form the overnight order book, which subsequently serves as the initial basis for inference to 
traders participating in the pre-opening period.  To determine the information content of the 
overnight order book we examine the order book on both the price and liquidity dimensions.  
First, to examine the volume dimension, we measure relative volume imbalances along the 
order book.  We maintain that if there is an excess amount of demand (supply) pressure in 
the previous trading session resulting in large unexecuted buy (sell) orders relative to sell 
(buy) orders queued in the overnight order book, then this excess demand (supply) results in 
an upward (downward) pressure on pre-opening prices.  Alternatively stated, when the order 
book on the buy (sell) side is “thick” in relation to the sell (buy) side, then subsequent orders 
submissions and forward price revision in the buy (sell) order book need to be more 
aggressive to enhance their probability of execution at the opening.  This increased 
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aggressiveness in buy (sell) orders submission or forward price revision results in an upward 
(downward) pressure on opening prices. 
Previous empirical studies including as Biais et al. (1995), Ranaldo (2004), Hall and Hautsch 
(2006), Pascual and Veredas (2008), Cao et al. (2008) among others find a positive 
relationship between large buy (sell) side depth and the aggressiveness of prices associated 
with future order submissions.  Cao et al. (2009) empirically identify a positive relationship 
between relative excess demand and short term returns during the regular trading period.  
Hence, the testable hypothesis is as follows; 
Hypothesis 1a:  Increase in relative buy (sell) depth in the overnight order book 
positively (negatively) impacts opening returns.   
The information content of imbalances along the price dimension of the overnight order 
book is captured by measuring the relative height at different steps along the order book.  
Similar to the volume imbalance, the price imbalances along the overnight order book 
measures the relative buy or sell pressure resulting from high demand or supply during the 
previous trading session.  Essentially, the overnight order book reflects higher buy (sell) 
pressure when the prices along the buy (sell) dimension of the book are closer together 
relative to the prices along the sell (buy) side of the order book.   
If the supply side pressure exceeds that on the demand side in the previous trading session, 
then the absolute distance between the prices of unexecuted sell orders along the overnight 
order book will be (relatively) smaller than the distance between prices on the buy side.  
Similarly, if there was demand side pressure during the previous trading session then this 
should be reflected in the distance between the unexecuted buy orders that queue in the 
overnight order book.  We argue that when the relative buy (sell) side height is small, this 
leads to the submission of aggressive buy (sell) orders and forward revisions which results in 
upward (downward) pressure on opening prices.  Therefore, the testable hypothesis is; 
Hypothesis 1b: Decrease in relative buy (sell) height in the overnight order book 
positively (negatively) impacts opening returns.   
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6.4.2   Pre-opening Order Book Evolution and Opening Returns 
At commencement of the pre-opening period, traders can examine the extant order book 
when deciding on their optimal order placement strategy.  However, as the pre-opening order 
book evolves and traders are able to make more reliable inferences about the full information 
value of the stock, we expect the submission and placement strategy to be refined 
accordingly.  Intuitively, any changes to the state of the overnight order book are attributable 
to four main actions taken by traders during the pre-opening period.  These are the 
submission of new orders, revisions of order prices towards and away from the top of the 
order book (referred to as forward and backward revisions, respectively) and cancellation of 
existing orders in the order book during the pre-opening period. 
During the pre-opening period, buy or sell side pressure can be ascertained by examining the 
increase in depth on either side of the book as traders submit new orders.  Essentially, if 
during the pre-opening period there is buy side pressure resulting in relatively larger 
incoming buy compared to sell order being submitted, then this excess demand pressure 
places upward pressure on the opening price.  In addition, if the supply volume is relatively 
greater than the demand then this exerts downward pressure on prices.   
Additionally, changes in the buy and/or sell side pressure can also be ascertained by 
observing the order book height on both sides of the order book.  If the height on the buy 
side relative to the sell side reduces as more order submissions on the buy side fill in any 
price gaps in the buy order book during the pre-opening, then this is indicative of an increase 
in buy side pressure.  Consequently, we expect this increase in buy side pressure to have a 
positive impact on prices and as a consequence a positive impact on opening returns.  The 
converse of the argument hold true as it relates to the relative sell side height.  Hence, a 
reduction in the relative sell side height attributable to pre-opening order submission is 
indicative of sell side pressure which translates into downward pressure on prices.  Hence, 
we test the following two hypotheses; 
Hypothesis 2a: Cumulative increases in relative buy (sell) depth attributable to 
submissions during pre-opening, positively (negatively) impacts 
opening returns.   
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Hypothesis 2b: Cumulative decreases in relative buy (sell) height attributable to 
submissions during pre-opening, positively (negatively) impacts 
opening returns.   
One of the main characteristics of the pre-opening period is the ability for traders to cancel 
or revise the price of a previously submitted limit order without any cost or obligations 
anytime before the opening.  As new orders are submitted to the order book and traders are 
able to form more reliable estimates about the fundamental value of the stock, then if their 
information set is inconsistent with inferences made from the order book, then they have the 
option to cancel or revise the price of their queued orders.
64
  Essentially, when traders on the 
buy side, for instance, revise the price of an order closer to the top of the bid order book, the 
result is an increase in buy side pressure since the volume associated with the revised order 
increases the depth closer to the top of the order book.  Conversely, if a buy side trader 
revises a buy order away from the top of the order book, then there will be a reduction in buy 
side pressure on opening prices.  The opposite argument holds true for order revisions on the 
sell side. 
When traders revise the price of their order towards the top of the order book, there is a 
resulting impact on the order book height:  a forward revision of a buy order results in a 
reduction in the relative height towards the top of the order book.  This reduction in relative 
height translates into an increase in buy side pressure during the pre-opening period.  
Consequently, as other traders observe the decrease in the relative buy side height, they 
contemplate revising the price of their queued order closer to the top of the buy order book 
in order to restore the desired order execution probability.  Conversely, if the price of a buy 
order is revised backward from the top of the order book, this results in a reduction in buy 
side pressure and a reduction in the upward pressure on prices.  Therefore, the testable 
hypotheses are as follows; 
Hypothesis 2c: Cumulative increases in relative buy (sell) depth attributable to 
revisions during pre-opening, positively (negatively) impacts opening 
returns.   
                                                 
64
 Traders also have the option to modify the volume and other attributes associated with their order.  However, 
their occurrence in our sample is so infrequent that as a consequence, their impact is not assessed. 
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Hypothesis 2d: Cumulative decreases in relative buy (sell) height attributable to 
revisions during pre-opening, positively (negatively) impacts opening 
returns.   
A similar argument can be made for cancellation of queued limit orders.  If sell side traders 
remove liquidity from the order book during the pre-opening by cancelling their orders, there 
are two resulting changes that indicate a reduction in sell side pressure. First, the depth at the 
position of the cancelled order is reduced by the amount of the cancelled volume.  Second, 
the height at the position of the cancelled order may increase, resulting in an increase in the 
relative sell side height.  The consequent reduction in relative depth and the increase in the 
relative height combined reduce the downward pressure on prices.  Similarly, reduction in 
the demand pressure due to cancellations of queued buy orders reduces the upwards pressure 
on the opening price due to the reduction in relative buy side depth and the increase in 
relative sell side depth.  In addition, the relative buy side height at the position of the 
cancelled buy order may increase and, therefore, increase the relative buy side height.  The 
ensuing reduction in the relative buy depth and the increase in the relative buy height results 
in a reduction in the upward pressure on prices.  Based on these arguments, the testable 
hypotheses are as follows; 
Hypothesis 2e: Cumulative decreases in relative buy (sell) depth attributable to 
cancellations during pre-opening, negatively (positively) impacts 
opening returns.   
Hypothesis 2f: Cumulative increases in relative buy (sell) height attributable to 
cancellations during pre-opening, negatively (positively) impacts 
opening returns.   
6.4.3   Opening Order Book and Opening Return 
By the end of the pre-opening period, all queued orders constitute the opening order book 
and await execution by the opening algorithm.  At this time the full information value of the 
stock should be reflected by the extant state of the order book.  In an analogous fashion to 
the arguments presented in relation to the overnight order book, we examine the price and 
volume dimensions of the opening order book to determine its information content.  We 
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argue that if there is buy (sell) side pressure during the pre-opening which translate to an 
excess demand (supply) for (of) the stock, then this results in an upward (downward) 
pressure on the opening price.  Therefore, this excess demand (supply) pressure will be 
reflected along both the price and volume dimension of the opening order book.  Hence, the 
demand (supply) pressure is present when the depth on the buy (sell) side is larger relative to 
the depth on the sell (buy) side, which translates into an upward (downward) pressure on 
opening prices. 
In addition, if the relatively larger demand (supply) pressure is reflected along the price 
dimension of the opening order book then we expect the relative height on the buy (sell) to 
be smaller.  Hence, the smaller the relative height along the buy (sell) order book, the greater 
the upward (downward) pressure on opening prices.  Therefore, the testable hypotheses are 
as follows; 
Hypothesis 3a: Increase in relative buy (sell) depth in the opening order book 
positively (negatively) impacts opening returns. 
Hypothesis 3b: Decrease in relative buy (sell) height in the opening order book 
positively (negatively) impacts opening returns.     
During the opening session, trade execution occurs only for orders that lock or cross the 
inside spread.
65
  The locked or crossed orders effectively supply liquidity at the open, in a 
similar way to market orders in the trading session, since they have execution priority at the 
opening.  In the Cao et al. (2000) empirical study of the pre-opening period, they show that 
locked or crossed inside spread is informative about the fundamental value of the stock and 
should impact opening prices.  To reveal the impact of a locked or crossed inside spread on 
the opening price, the side of the market that locked or crossed the inside spread has to be 
determined.  We therefore argue that if the buy side locked or crossed the inside spread 
during the pre-opening, then this results in a positive signal that is indicative of buy side 
pressure and therefore upward pressure on the opening price.  Similarly, if the inside spread 
was locked or crossed by sell side traders, then this results in a negative signalling effect and 
                                                 
65
 The inside spread is locked when the price of the best bid is equal to the price of the best ask.  Similarly, the 
inside spread is crossed when the price of the best bid is less than the price of the best ask. 
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therefore, translates into downward pressure on the opening price.  The testable hypothesis is 
therefore; 
Hypothesis 3c: Buy (sell) side locking or crossing of the inside spread positively 
(negatively) impacts opening returns.  
6.4.4   Econometric Methodology 
6.4.4.1   Opening Returns 
The empirical analysis focuses on the impact of the characteristics of the pre-opening order 
book on the returns generated from the previous close to the opening of the market.  Similar 
to the previous section, the opening (close-to-open) return on day t is 1,,,1  tctot ppr , 
where top ,  and tcp ,  denotes the log opening and closing prices on day t respectively.  From 
the previous section, the Ljung-Box test statistics indicates that tr ,1  is highly serially 
correlated even at high lags for all six stocks considered in this analysis.  To correct for the 
presence of serial correlation in returns, we pre-whiten the returns (similar to Cao et al., 
2009) and focus our analysis on the innovations in opening returns.  Initially, the opening 
return innovation is used as the dependent variable instead of the opening return in the 
analysis since these innovations represent the portion of return that is not explained by 
previous changes in returns.  We corroborate our findings using the opening returns itself. 
The opening return innovations are obtained by estimating an AR(p) model for each stock 
and collecting the residuals, such that  
    





 


t
P
i
i
it rL ,1
1
1                     (11) 
where t  is the opening return innovation,   and i  are the estimated constant and slope 
parameters, respectively, from the AR(p) model, L is the lag operator and the lag length P is 
determined by the maximum Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) value.  Since this study 
focuses on the return over the pre-opening period which only accounts for a proportion of 
the total returns generated over an entire trading day, we also control for the effect of the 
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open-to-close return from the previous day  1,1,1,2   tctot ppr  on the opening return.  For 
robustness checks, we also use the opening returns as the dependent variable in this analysis 
and report the results.  The t-statistics reported are calculated using the Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.    
6.4.4.2   Explanatory Variables 
The hypotheses outlined in sections 6.4.1, 6.4.2 and 6.4.3, propose that the upward and 
downward pressure along the volume and price dimensions, namely the depth and height, 
impacts the opening returns.  For instance, in section 6.4.1 we contend that the relative depth 
and height of the overnight order book impacts opening returns.  To test these hypotheses, 
we measure the relative depth and height from the top to step five in the order book queue.  
If BjD  and 
S
jD  denotes the total volume at position j in the buy and sell order book 
respectively, the relative depth at position j is therefore; 
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Hence, the relative depth at position j is the excess demand (supply) proportional to the total 
volume at position j on both sides of the order book.  Similarly, if BjP  and 
S
jP  denotes the 
prices at position j in the buy and sell order book respectively, then the relative height is 
measured as follows, 
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where, we set 000 
SB PP .  Hence, the relative height measures the relative distance 
between the prices on either sides of the order book.  Rearranging the terms in equation (13) 
reveals that the relative height is the difference between the spread at different steps along 
the order book.  In addition, since 000 
SB PP , the relative height at j = 1 is the relative 
spread.  Due to the extended lack of trading activity over the weekend or long holiday period 
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such as during Christmas, the likelihood is that the information in the overnight order book 
that precedes the pre-opening in these situations has a greater tendency to become “stale”.  
To accommodate this possibility, we incorporate a dummy variable  tDS  that takes the 
value of one if the market is closed for more than one day prior to day t.  The first regression 
is therefore; 
   t
n
j
n
j
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In section 6.4.2 we argue that the changes to the relative order book height and depth over 
the pre-opening period impact the opening return.  To measure the change in the relative 
height over the pre-opening period attributable to order submissions, we denote ijSRH ,  as 
the change in the relative height attributable to the price of an order submitted at position j in 
period i.  Therefore, the cumulative change over the pre-opening will be 
  
T
i ijj
SRHSRH
1 ,
.   
By a similar construct, if ijFRH ,  and ijBRH ,  
denotes the change in relative height in 
period i attributable to forward and backward order revision to position j in the order book, 
then the cumulative changes over the pre-opening are   
T
i ijj
FRHFRH
1 ,
 and 
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T
i ijj
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1 ,
, respectively.  In addition, if ijCRH ,  is the change in relative 
height in period i attributable to cancellation of an order from position j in the order book, 
then   
T
i ijj
CRHCRH
1 ,
 is the cumulative cancellation change over the pre-opening 
period.  The second regression is as follows; 
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For changes in relative depth, analogous to the changes in relative height, we focus on the 
cumulative changes over the pre-opening period attributable to submissions, revisions and 
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cancellations.  If ijSRD ,  is the change in the relative depth in period i due to an order 
submission at position j in the order book, then   
T
i ijj
SRDSRD
1 ,
 is the cumulative 
impact over pre-opening period.  Similarly,   
T
i ijj
FRDFRD
1 ,
, 
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1 ,
 and   
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1 ,
 are the cumulative changes in relative 
depth at position j attributable to forward and backward price revisions and cancellations at 
position j in the order book during the pre-opening.  Therefore, the third regression is; 
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Section 6.4.3 proposes that the relative depth and height and locking or crossing of the inside 
spread in the opening limit order book impacts the opening return.  The relative height and 
depth at the end of the pre-opening are measured in the same way as equations (12) and (13) 
respectively.  To capture the impact of locking or crossing of the inside spread by the buy or 
sell side, we define four dummy variables BDL , BDC , SDL  and SDC    The variable BDL  
and BDC  takes the value of one if the spread is locked or crossed initially during the pre-
opening by an incoming buy order, respectively and SDL  and SDC  takes the value of one if 
the spread is initially locked or crossed by an incoming sell order, repectively.  The fourth 
regression is therefore; 
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To assess the additional information contained in the order book as we move from the top to 
step five along the order book, we run separate regressions for j = 0 to j = 5 and report the 
average increase in the adjusted R
2
 for the four regressions outlined above
 
.  In essence, we 
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estimate each regression without the relative height and depth measures then recursively add 
these measures from steps one to five and collect the changes in the R
2
.  Table 6.5 provides a 
description of all the explanatory variables used in this empirical analysis.  
Table 6.5 
Description of Explanatory Variables 
Variables Description of Variable 
tr ,1  Close-to-open return. 
tr ,2  Open-to-close (opening) return. 

t  Opening return innovation. 
0
,tjRD  Relative depth at position j in the overnight order book. 
0
,tjRH  Relative height at position j in the overnight order book. 
T
tjRD ,  Relative depth at position j in the opening order book. 
T
tjRH ,  Relative height at position j in the opening order book. 
tjSRD ,  Accumulated change in the relative depth at position j due to order submissions. 
tjFRD ,  Accumulated change in the relative depth at position j due to forward price revisions. 
tjBRD ,  Accumulated change in the relative depth at position j due to backward price revisions. 
tjCRD ,  Accumulated change in the relative depth at position j due to order cancellations. 
tjSRH ,  Accumulated change in the relative height at position j due to order submissions. 
tjFRH ,  Accumulated change in the relative height at position j due to forward price revisions. 
tjBRH ,  Accumulated change in the relative height at position j due to backward price revisions. 
tjCRH ,  Accumulated change in the relative height at position j due to order cancellations. 
B
tDL  
Dummy variable taking the value of one when the inside spread is locked by an 
incoming buy order. 
S
tDL  
Dummy variable taking the value of one when the inside spread is locked by an 
incoming sell order. 
B
tDC  
Dummy variable taking the value of one when the inside spread is crossed by an 
incoming buy order. 
S
tDC  
Dummy variable taking the value of one when the inside spread is crossed by an 
incoming sell order. 
tDS  
Dummy variable taking the value of one if there is not trading for more than one day 
previous. 
Note: This table provides a summary definition of the explanatory variables employed in the empirical analysis. 
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6.4.5   Empirical Results 
In sections 6.4.1 to 6.4.3 we argue that the relative height and depth of the overnight and 
opening order book and the evolution of the order book over the pre-opening period impacts 
the innovations in opening returns.  To empirically assess this claim, we estimate equations 
(14), (15), (16) and (17), which regresses relative height and depth related measures at steps 
one to five along the order book onto opening return innovations.  The opening return 
innovations are collected from estimating opening return AR(p) models, where the lag length 
is determined by maximising the AIC statistic.  For robustness, we re-estimate all 
regressions using the actual opening returns as the dependent variable and report t-statistics 
based on Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.  The 
qualitative results are similar using either opening return innovations or opening returns. 
6.4.5.1   Overnight Order Book and Opening Return 
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 report the results for the impact of the overnight order book on opening 
return innovations and actual opening returns, respectively.  Table 6.8 provides a summary 
of the results based on the impact on the most active (A) and less active (B) stocks 
separately.  From panel A of table 6.8, it is evident that there is a strong negative relationship 
between the opening return innovations ( t ) and the previous open-to-close return ( 1,2 tr ).  
We find that two of the three A stocks and all three B stocks have a negative and significant 
coefficient associated with the open-to-close return lagged on period.  We find the dummy 
variable capturing weekend or extended market closure is not significant for either type of 
stock.  This indicates that informational content of the overnight order book about 
subsequent opening returns is not affected by extended closure of the market. 
Table 6.8 also reveals that the relative depth at the top of the order book ( 0,1 tRD ) positively 
impacts the opening returns for the A stocks but has no effect of the B stocks.  This provides 
evidence supporting hypothesis 1a which claims that large relative buy depth in the 
overnight order book resulting from large unexecuted buy order from the previous trading 
session, results in upward pressure on prices during the pre-opening.  We find that the   
  
 
Table 6.6 
Impact of the Overnight Order Book on Opening Return Innovations (

t ) 
Panel A 
 
BOV 
 
MLC 
 
HSB 
 
MSI 
 
MIA 
 
IHI 
Variable 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
0  
 
-0.0006 -2.07 
 
-0.0013 -3.13 
 
0.0001 0.38 
 
0.0002 0.46 
 
0.0000 0.06 
 
-0.0003 -0.49 
1,2 tr  
 
-0.0238 -1.36 
 
-0.0481 -2.71 
 
-0.1019 -6.00 
 
-0.1531 -7.10 
 
-0.1840 -7.43 
 
-0.1933 -9.25 
tDS  
 
0.0009 1.76 
 
-0.0003 -0.47 
 
-0.0005 -0.81 
 
0.0002 0.23 
 
0.0002 0.26 
 
0.0001 0.08 
0
,1 tRD  
 
0.0004 1.15 
 
0.0032 6.48 
 
0.0018 3.82 
 
-0.0002 -0.31 
 
0.0005 1.00 
 
0.0002 0.34 
0
,2 tRD  
 
-0.0005 -1.35 
 
-0.0006 -1.18 
 
-0.0009 -1.74 
 
-0.0010 -1.64 
 
-0.0003 -0.44 
 
-0.0006 -0.82 
0
,3 tRD  
 
-0.0001 -0.25 
 
-0.0003 -0.51 
 
0.0005 0.99 
 
0.0006 0.93 
 
-0.0002 -0.28 
 
-0.0014 -1.83 
0
,4 tRD  
 
0.0004 0.97 
 
-0.0005 -1.06 
 
-0.0004 -0.76 
 
-0.0005 -0.65 
 
0.0001 0.22 
 
-0.0005 -0.50 
0
,5 tRD  
 
-0.0012 -3.33 
 
-0.0004 -0.88 
 
-0.0007 -1.55 
 
-0.0005 -0.91 
 
-0.0004 -0.70 
 
0.0007 0.84 
0
,1 tRH  
 
0.0017 0.53 
 
0.1798 6.05 
 
-0.0091 -5.46 
 
-0.0099 -4.42 
 
-0.0048 -1.63 
 
-0.0122 -3.18 
0
,2 tRH  
 
0.0000 -0.03 
 
0.0017 3.58 
 
0.0009 1.95 
 
0.0007 1.16 
 
0.0000 0.00 
 
-0.0009 -1.27 
0
,3 tRH  
 
-0.0003 -0.81 
 
-0.0001 -0.24 
 
0.0001 0.13 
 
-0.0003 -0.58 
 
-0.0008 -1.60 
 
0.0015 2.44 
0
,4 tRH  
 
0.0001 0.14 
 
0.0002 0.33 
 
0.0004 0.90 
 
0.0011 2.00 
 
0.0002 0.32 
 
0.0002 0.31 
0
,5 tRH  
 
0.0002 0.43 
 
0.0012 2.49 
 
0.0008 1.97 
 
0.0003 0.54 
 
0.0005 1.04 
 
0.0003 0.55 
Panel B 
                  Adj. R2     0.01     0.06     0.05     0.05     0.07     0.08 
F-stat. 
  
1.89 
  
10.08 
  
9.09 
  
7.37 
  
6.95 
  
11.61 
Prob. 
  
0.03 
  
0.00 
  
0 
  
0 
  
0 
  
0 
AR Lags 
  
3 
  
6 
  
8 
  
6 
  
2 
  
2 
Note: This table reports the regression estimates of the relative height and depth from one to five steps away from the top of the order book in determining 
opening return innovations.  Panel A reports the coefficients (coef.) and t-statistic (t-stat.) for the six stocks utilised in this analysis.  Panel B reports the adjusted 
R-square (Adj. R
2
), F-statistic (F-stat.) and related probability (P-val.) for all six stocks and the number of autoregressive lags used to generate the return 
innovation series.  The coefficients highlighted in bold are significant at the five percent level of significance. 
2
0
0
 
  
 
Table 6.7 
Impact of the Overnight Order Book on Opening Returns ( tr ,1 ) 
Panel A 
 
BOV 
 
MLC 
 
HSB 
 
MSI 
 
MIA 
 
IHI 
Variable 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
0  
 
0.0009 2.28 
 
-0.0007 -1.28 
 
0.0031 5.80 
 
-0.0007 -1.22 
 
0.0002 0.38 
 
0.0010 1.22 
1,2 tr  
 
-0.0559 -1.17 
 
-0.0855 -2.67 
 
-0.2795 -5.36 
 
-0.1871 -5.60 
 
-0.2139 -3.96 
 
-0.2211 -6.92 
tDS  
 
0.0008 1.62 
 
-0.0002 -0.38 
 
-0.0004 -0.74 
 
0.0002 0.29 
 
0.0001 0.15 
 
0.0000 0.05 
0
,1 tRD  
 
0.0004 0.86 
 
0.0033 4.91 
 
0.0021 3.94 
 
-0.0005 -0.72 
 
0.0005 0.87 
 
0.0001 0.08 
0
,2 tRD  
 
-0.0007 -1.47 
 
-0.0007 -1.38 
 
-0.0010 -1.46 
 
-0.0013 -2.05 
 
-0.0002 -0.39 
 
-0.0006 -0.98 
0
,3 tRD  
 
-0.0001 -0.17 
 
-0.0003 -0.48 
 
0.0012 2.15 
 
0.0002 0.33 
 
-0.0001 -0.16 
 
-0.0012 -1.68 
0
,4 tRD  
 
0.0005 1.15 
 
-0.0004 -0.72 
 
-0.0001 -0.14 
 
-0.0004 -0.60 
 
0.0002 0.37 
 
-0.0004 -0.40 
0
,5 tRD  
 
-0.0011 -2.24 
 
-0.0002 -0.48 
 
-0.0004 -0.60 
 
-0.0004 -0.64 
 
-0.0004 -0.75 
 
0.0008 1.07 
0
,1 tRH  
 
-0.0002 -0.05 
 
0.2004 3.74 
 
-0.0116 -4.04 
 
-0.0100 -3.20 
 
-0.0047 -1.68 
 
-0.0115 -2.50 
0
,2 tRH  
 
-0.0004 -1.01 
 
0.0013 2.46 
 
0.0012 1.31 
 
-0.0001 -0.17 
 
0.0000 -0.01 
 
-0.0014 -1.77 
0
,3 tRH  
 
-0.0006 -1.24 
 
-0.0004 -0.82 
 
-0.0007 -1.59 
 
-0.0010 -1.60 
 
-0.0008 -1.36 
 
0.0011 1.59 
0
,4 tRH  
 
0.0000 0.02 
 
0.0001 0.26 
 
0.0001 0.21 
 
0.0006 0.94 
 
0.0002 0.33 
 
0.0002 0.35 
0
,5 tRH  
 
0.0003 0.64 
 
0.0011 2.14 
 
0.0004 0.81 
 
0.0002 0.38 
 
0.0006 1.20 
 
0.0003 0.66 
Panel B 
 
                 
Adj. R
2
 
 
  0.01 
 
  0.0668 
 
  0.17 
 
  0.07 
 
  0.08 
 
  0.10 
F-stat. 
 
 
2.92 
  
11.97 
  
31.69 
  
10.75 
  
8.72 
  
14.11 
P-val. 
 
 
0.00 
  
0.00 
  
0.00 
  
0.00 
  
0.00 
  
0.00 
Note: This table reports the regression estimates of the relative height and depth from one to five steps away from the top of the order book in determining 
opening return.  Panel A reports the coefficients (coef.) and t-statistic (t-stat.) for the six stocks utilised in this analysis.  The t-statistic is calculated using the 
Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.  Panel B reports the adjusted R-square (Adj. R
2
), F-statistic (F-stat.) and related 
probability (P-val.) for all six stocks.  The coefficients highlighted in bold are significant at the five percent level of significance. 
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Table 6.8 
Impact of Overnight Order Book Results Summary 
  
Opening Return Innovations (

t ) 
 
Opening Return ( tr ,1 ) 
Panel A. 
 
A Stocks 
 
B Stocks 
 
A Stocks 
 
B Stocks 
Variable 
 
Avg. 
Coefs. 
No. 
Sig. 
 
Avg. 
Coefs. 
No. 
Sig. 
 
Avg. 
Coefs. 
No. 
Sig. 
 
Avg. 
Coefs. 
No. 
Sig. 
0  
 
-0.061 2 
 
-0.002 0 
 
0.107 2 
 
0.017 0 
1,2 tr  
 
-5.793 2 
 
-17.679 3 
 
-14.031 2 
 
-20.737 3 
tDS  
 
0.004 0 
 
0.014 0 
 
0.004 0 
 
0.012 0 
0
,1 tRD  
 
0.180 2 
 
0.020 0 
 
0.196 2 
 
0.001 0 
0
,2 tRD  
 
-0.066 0 
 
-0.063 0 
 
-0.080 0 
 
-0.074 1 
0
,3 tRD  
 
0.005 0 
 
-0.032 0 
 
0.028 1 
 
-0.036 0 
0
,4 tRD  
 
-0.018 0 
 
-0.026 0 
 
0.001 0 
 
-0.021 0 
0
,5 tRD  
 
-0.078 1 
 
-0.007 0 
 
-0.057 1 
 
0.002 0 
0
,1 tRH  
 
5.745 2 
 
-0.898 2 
 
6.288 2 
 
-0.873 2 
0
,2 tRH  
 
0.084 2 
 
-0.008 0 
 
0.070 1 
 
-0.049 0 
0
,3 tRH  
 
-0.012 0 
 
0.011 1 
 
-0.058 0 
 
-0.023 0 
0
,4 tRH  
 
0.020 0 
 
0.048 1 
 
0.008 0 
 
0.031 0 
0
,5 tRH  
 
0.069 2 
 
0.038 0 
 
0.059 1 
 
0.037 0 
Panel B. 
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
    
Steps (j) 
 
Avg. 
Adj. R
2
 
Change 
(%) 
 
Avg.  
Adj. R
2
 
Change 
(%) 
 
Avg.  
Adj. R
2
 
Change 
(%) 
 
Avg.  
Adj. R
2
 
Change 
(%) 
j = 0 
 
1.059 
  
5.619 
  
5.010 
  
7.475 
 
j = 1 
 
3.158 2.099 
 
6.110 0.491 
 
7.910 2.900 
 
8.103 0.628 
j = 2 
 
3.473 0.314 
 
6.278 0.168 
 
8.172 0.262 
 
8.333 0.230 
j = 3 
 
3.399 -0.074 
 
6.501 0.223 
 
8.222 0.051 
 
8.550 0.218 
j = 4 
 
3.471 0.072 
 
6.513 0.012 
 
8.194 -0.029 
 
8.480 -0.070 
j = 5   3.785 0.314   6.464 -0.048   8.365 0.171   8.437 -0.043 
Note: This table reports a summary of the impact of the overnight order book on opening returns and returns 
innovations.  The t-statistic for coefficients in the opening returns regressions are based on the Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.  The stocks are categorized into two main 
groups.  A stocks represents the three most active stocks and B stocks represents the three least active of the six 
stocks studied.  Panel A reports the average coefficient value (Avg. Coef.) and the number of significant 
coefficient at the five percent level of significance for both group of stocks.  The coefficient values are scaled 
by a multiple of 100 for better presentation in the table.  Panel B reports the findings about the information 
below the top of the order book.  Essentially, we estimate the regression for each stock without incorporation of 
the relative depth or height and measure the adjusted R
2
 then recursively add relative depth and height from 
steps 1 to 5 and measuring the change in the adjusted R
2 
in the resulting regressions.  The average adjusted R
2
 
(Avg. Adj. R
2
) and the percentage change in the adjusted R
2 
(Change (%)) is calculated for both A stocks and B 
stocks.     
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relative height  0,tjRH  of the overnight order book at positions j = 1, 2, 5 positively impacts 
the opening returns for two of the three A stocks and the relative height at j = 1 negatively 
impact the opening return of two B stocks.  At position j = 1 the relative height is the relative 
spread.  Therefore, large spread in the overnight order book positively impacts opening 
return for A stocks and negatively impacts opening return for B stocks.  In essence, a large 
spread in the overnight order book is reduced in general by incoming (or forward revised) 
buy orders.  This leads to an upward pressure on the opening price for the A stocks.  
Contrarily, when the spread is larger in the overnight order book for the B stocks, the spread 
is reduced by lower price of incoming sell (or forward revised) order, which results in a 
downward pressure on prices.   
In addition, the results for the relative height for j = 2, 5 for the A stocks provides support for 
hypothesis 1b since smaller relative buy side height, which increases the relative height 
measure, positively impacts opening return and smaller sell side relative height, which 
reduces the relative height measure, negatively impacts opening returns.  This suggests that 
demand and supply pressure present in the overnight order book from unexecuted orders in 
the previous trading session results in upward and downward pressure on opening prices, 
respectively.  These finding are consistent with the finding of Cao et al. (2009) for short run 
price change during the opening trading session. 
Panel B in table 6.8 reports the change in the adjusted R
2
 when adding the order book 
relative height and depth at different positions in the order book.  This reveals the level of 
information contained in the overnight order book from the top to step five in the order book.  
From the base model without any relative height or depth variable included, the adjusted R
2
 
increase from 1.05% to 3.16% for the A stocks and from 5.62% to 6.11% for the B stocks 
when we incorporate relative height at step one into the regression.  However, by adding 
steps two to five for both A and B stocks, we find only marginal increases in the adjusted R
2
.  
This indicates that the information at the top of the overnight order book is the most 
informative about opening returns.  In addition, we arrive at almost identical conclusions if 
the realised opening return is used as the dependent variable in the regression instead of 
opening return innovations. 
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6.4.5.2   Pre-opening Order Book Evolution and Opening Return   
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 report the findings for the impact of cumulative changes in relative 
depth during the pre-opening on opening return innovations and realised opening returns, 
respectively.  While tables 6.12 and 6.13 report the findings of cumulative changes in 
relative height during the pre-opening on opening return innovations and realised opening 
returns, respectively.  Table 6.11 summarises the findings in tables 6.9 and 6.10, while table 
6.14 summarises tables 6.12 and 6.13, by categorising the results for the A and B stocks.  
Table 6.15 reports the model fit statistics for the changes in the order book relative depth and 
height, equations (15) and (16).  Table 6.16 reports the average adjusted R
2
 and changes in 
the average adjusted R
2
 for A and B stocks when the relative depth and height at steps one to 
five are incorporated into the regression. 
Evident from the results in table 6.11, is that cumulative changes in relative depth during the 
pre-opening period impacts opening returns of the B stocks to a greater extent compared 
with the A stocks.  Specifically, we find that an increase relative depth attributable to order 
submissions  tjSRD ,  at the top of the order book (step j = 1) positively impacts the 
opening return for two of the B stocks, and only one A stock.  This result is consistent with 
the prediction of hypothesis 2a which proposes that increases in relative buy (sell) depth 
attributable to order submission during the pre-opening positively (negatively) impacts 
opening return.  However, for the less active B stocks there is a strong negative relationship 
between the opening return and cumulative increases in depth below the top of the order 
book attributable to order submissions.  This finding is contradictory to the implications of 
hypothesis 2a.  In essence, this result suggests that when the depth below the top of the buy 
order book increases relative to the sell side, it may indicate a consensus that the current 
valuation for the asset is too high.  As a result, sell side traders have to be more aggressive in 
their price to attract a desired level of liquidity which, therefore, places a downward pressure 
on prices.     
We find that cumulative increases in relative depth at the top of the order book attributable to 
forward price revisions  tFRD ,1  positively impact opening returns, consistent with 
  
 
Table 6.9 
Impact of the Order Book Evolution on Opening Return Innovations (

t ) 
  
BOV 
 
MLC 
 
HSB 
 
MSI 
 
MIA 
 
IHI 
Variable 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
0  
 
0.0000 0.20 
 
-0.0001 -0.21 
 
-0.0004 -1.42 
 
0.0004 1.02 
 
0.0006 1.12 
 
-0.0012 -2.21 
1,2 tr
 
 
-0.0208 -1.17 
 
-0.0584 -3.22 
 
-0.1016 -5.63 
 
-0.1926 -6.27 
 
-0.1718 -5.74 
 
-0.2823 -9.99 
tSRD ,1  
 
0.0007 1.84 
 
0.0021 4.27 
 
0.0013 2.81 
 
0.0020 2.80 
 
0.0031 3.04 
 
0.0002 0.19 
tSRD ,2  
 
0.0005 1.32 
 
0.0011 2.28 
 
-0.0013 -2.65 
 
-0.0004 -0.44 
 
-0.0025 -2.28 
 
-0.0023 -2.25 
tSRD ,3  
 
-0.0005 -1.37 
 
0.0008 1.65 
 
-0.0007 -1.54 
 
-0.0024 -2.76 
 
-0.0039 -3.85 
 
-0.0036 -3.17 
tSRD ,4  
 
-0.0005 -1.33 
 
0.0002 0.50 
 
-0.0024 -5.22 
 
-0.0021 -2.51 
 
-0.0028 -2.63 
 
-0.0047 -4.01 
tSRD ,5  
 
-0.0005 -1.43 
 
0.0000 -0.05 
 
-0.0017 -3.29 
 
-0.0004 -0.50 
 
-0.0016 -1.47 
 
-0.0041 -2.80 
tFRD ,1  
 
0.0011 2.01 
 
0.0025 3.60 
 
0.0018 2.73 
 
0.0044 3.36 
 
0.0032 1.86 
 
0.0068 3.87 
tFRD ,2  
 
0.0006 1.08 
 
0.0021 3.11 
 
-0.0011 -1.55 
 
0.0054 4.04 
 
0.0001 0.03 
 
0.0011 0.62 
tFRD ,3  
 
0.0013 2.26 
 
0.0006 0.82 
 
-0.0001 -0.19 
 
0.0041 2.70 
 
-0.0008 -0.38 
 
0.0000 0.02 
tFRD ,4  
 
0.0006 1.09 
 
0.0012 1.63 
 
-0.0013 -1.57 
 
0.0012 0.74 
 
0.0012 0.56 
 
0.0000 0.00 
tFRD ,5  
 
0.0001 0.11 
 
-0.0020 -2.98 
 
-0.0001 -0.13 
 
0.0017 1.05 
 
-0.0008 -0.35 
 
0.0075 2.97 
tBRD ,1  
 
0.0016 1.42 
 
-0.0002 -0.21 
 
0.0030 1.86 
 
0.0005 0.12 
 
0.0113 2.81 
 
0.0017 0.29 
tBRD ,2  
 
0.0005 0.58 
 
-0.0004 -0.36 
 
0.0011 0.67 
 
0.0019 0.51 
 
-0.0011 -0.24 
 
0.0051 1.12 
tBRD ,3  
 
-0.0011 -1.19 
 
0.0025 2.38 
 
-0.0009 -0.60 
 
0.0028 0.62 
 
-0.0078 -2.50 
 
0.0033 0.74 
tBRD ,4  
 
0.0007 0.76 
 
0.0017 1.64 
 
-0.0007 -0.46 
 
-0.0010 -0.24 
 
-0.0032 -0.66 
 
0.0039 0.67 
tBRD ,5  
 
-0.0026 -2.81 
 
-0.0003 -0.33 
 
0.0017 1.18 
 
0.0007 0.21 
 
0.0022 0.55 
 
-0.0023 -0.35 
tCRD ,1  
 
-0.0010 -1.08 
 
0.0019 1.70 
 
0.0009 0.84 
 
0.0004 0.19 
 
-0.0009 -0.34 
 
0.0060 2.36 
tCRD ,2  
 
0.0003 0.31 
 
0.0017 1.57 
 
-0.0037 -3.74 
 
-0.0060 -2.61 
 
-0.0100 -3.78 
 
-0.0028 -0.94 
tCRD ,3  
 
0.0002 0.26 
 
-0.0013 -1.29 
 
-0.0023 -2.42 
 
-0.0027 -1.18 
 
-0.0073 -2.68 
 
-0.0004 -0.15 
tCRD ,4  
 
-0.0001 -0.16 
 
-0.0012 -1.27 
 
-0.0022 -2.38 
 
-0.0013 -0.67 
 
-0.0063 -2.30 
 
-0.0057 -1.91 
tCRD ,5    -0.0017 -2.35   0.0002 0.19   -0.0022 -2.39   -0.0005 -0.27   -0.0086 -3.39   -0.0047 -1.46 
Note: This table reports the regression estimates of the changes in the relative depth attributable to submission, revisions and cancelations from one to five steps 
away from the top of the order book in determining opening return innovations.  The table reports the coefficients (coef.) and t-statistic (t-stat.) for the six stocks 
utilized in this analysis.  The coefficients highlighted in bold are significant at the five percent level of significance. 
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Table 6.10 
Impact of the Order Book Evolution on Opening Returns ( tr ,1 ) 
  
BOV 
 
MLC 
 
HSB 
 
MSI 
 
MIA 
 
IHI 
Variable 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
0  
 
0.0016 5.47 
 
0.0008 2.18 
 
0.0020 5.24 
 
-0.0007 -1.06 
 
0.0005 1.23 
 
0.0008 1.33 
1,2 tr
 
 
-0.0558 -1.15 
 
-0.0994 -3.04 
 
-0.2942 -5.54 
 
-0.2521 -5.38 
 
-0.2235 -4.27 
 
-0.3345 -7.58 
tSRD ,1  
 
0.0007 1.28 
 
0.0022 4.17 
 
0.0019 3.07 
 
0.0033 2.25 
 
0.0019 2.09 
 
0.0002 0.18 
tSRD ,2  
 
0.0005 0.95 
 
0.0012 2.10 
 
-0.0010 -1.66 
 
-0.0022 -1.68 
 
-0.0003 -0.35 
 
-0.0021 -1.50 
tSRD ,3  
 
-0.0003 -0.64 
 
0.0012 1.92 
 
-0.0005 -0.75 
 
-0.0040 -2.56 
 
-0.0022 -2.02 
 
-0.0034 -2.50 
tSRD ,4  
 
-0.0005 -0.93 
 
0.0007 1.17 
 
-0.0021 -3.51 
 
-0.0031 -2.44 
 
-0.0022 -2.34 
 
-0.0049 -3.76 
tSRD ,5  
 
-0.0007 -1.56 
 
0.0002 0.45 
 
-0.0018 -2.89 
 
-0.0013 -0.95 
 
-0.0004 -0.45 
 
-0.0037 -2.19 
tFRD ,1  
 
0.0011 1.95 
 
0.0027 3.23 
 
0.0029 3.11 
 
0.0026 1.46 
 
0.0042 3.42 
 
0.0066 3.28 
tFRD ,2  
 
0.0004 0.70 
 
0.0023 2.88 
 
-0.0006 -0.64 
 
0.0003 0.13 
 
0.0056 4.17 
 
0.0018 1.06 
tFRD ,3  
 
0.0011 1.31 
 
0.0009 0.98 
 
0.0006 0.57 
 
-0.0011 -0.33 
 
0.0042 3.52 
 
0.0000 0.03 
tFRD ,4  
 
0.0005 0.67 
 
0.0016 1.97 
 
-0.0008 -0.78 
 
0.0009 0.38 
 
0.0014 1.01 
 
-0.0001 -0.04 
tFRD ,5  
 
-0.0001 -0.11 
 
-0.0020 -2.16 
 
0.0002 0.30 
 
-0.0013 -0.48 
 
0.0019 1.49 
 
0.0074 2.56 
tBRD ,1  
 
0.0010 0.62 
 
-0.0006 -0.27 
 
0.0013 0.63 
 
0.0091 2.19 
 
0.0002 0.06 
 
0.0008 0.16 
tBRD ,2  
 
0.0005 0.39 
 
-0.0003 -0.19 
 
0.0047 2.10 
 
-0.0046 -0.72 
 
0.0023 0.49 
 
0.0049 1.55 
tBRD ,3  
 
-0.0004 -0.26 
 
0.0028 2.13 
 
-0.0003 -0.14 
 
-0.0098 -2.51 
 
0.0026 0.64 
 
0.0037 0.77 
tBRD ,4  
 
0.0009 0.51 
 
0.0019 1.19 
 
-0.0007 -0.29 
 
-0.0059 -1.12 
 
-0.0013 -0.39 
 
0.0033 0.68 
tBRD ,5  
 
-0.0028 -1.29 
 
-0.0004 -0.24 
 
0.0017 0.72 
 
0.0022 0.72 
 
0.0006 0.23 
 
-0.0028 -0.45 
tCRD ,1  
 
-0.0017 -1.39 
 
0.0020 1.75 
 
-0.0008 -0.52 
 
-0.0019 -0.71 
 
0.0000 -0.01 
 
0.0052 1.92 
tCRD ,2  
 
0.0000 0.01 
 
0.0025 1.97 
 
-0.0041 -2.88 
 
-0.0111 -3.29 
 
-0.0062 -2.66 
 
-0.0035 -1.14 
tCRD ,3  
 
0.0002 0.14 
 
-0.0009 -0.69 
 
-0.0031 -2.06 
 
-0.0095 -2.93 
 
-0.0029 -1.43 
 
-0.0010 -0.34 
tCRD ,4  
 
-0.0002 -0.24 
 
-0.0008 -0.61 
 
-0.0029 -2.23 
 
-0.0070 -2.74 
 
-0.0020 -0.99 
 
-0.0051 -1.77 
tCRD ,5  
 
-0.0020 -1.68 
 
0.0004 0.42 
 
-0.0039 -2.62 
 
-0.0078 -3.78 
 
-0.0010 -0.47 
 
-0.0038 -1.11 
Note: This table reports the regression estimates of the changes in relative depth attributable to submissions, revisions and cancellations from one to five steps 
away from the top of the order book in determining opening return.  The table reports the coefficients (coef.) and t-statistic (t-stat.) for the six stocks utilized in 
this analysis.  The t-statistic is calculated using the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The coefficients highlighted in 
bold are significant at the five percent level of significance. 
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Table 6.11 
Impact of Order Book Evolution Results Summary 
  
Opening Return Innovations (

t ) 
 
Opening Return ( tr ,1 ) 
  
A Stocks 
 
B Stocks 
 
A Stocks 
 
B Stocks 
Variable 
 
Avg. 
Coefs. 
No. 
Sig. 
 
Avg. 
Coefs. 
No. 
Sig. 
 
Avg. 
Coefs. 
No. 
Sig. 
 
Avg. 
Coefs. 
No. 
Sig. 
0  
 
-0.014 0 
 
-0.007 1 
 
0.148 3 
 
0.021 0 
1,2 tr  
 
-6.028 2 
 
-21.558 3 
 
-14.983 2 
 
-27.003 3 
tSRD ,1  
 
0.133 1 
 
0.177 2 
 
0.161 2 
 
0.182 2 
tSRD ,2  
 
0.013 1 
 
-0.171 2 
 
0.026 1 
 
-0.154 0 
tSRD ,3  
 
-0.014 0 
 
-0.327 3 
 
0.011 0 
 
-0.318 3 
tSRD ,4  
 
-0.089 1 
 
-0.322 3 
 
-0.062 1 
 
-0.338 3 
tSRD ,5  
 
-0.074 1 
 
-0.203 1 
 
-0.076 1 
 
-0.178 1 
tFRD ,1  
 
0.181 3 
 
0.479 2 
 
0.222 3 
 
0.445 2 
tFRD ,2  
 
0.053 1 
 
0.218 1 
 
0.068 1 
 
0.255 1 
tFRD ,3  
 
0.056 1 
 
0.111 1 
 
0.085 0 
 
0.103 1 
tFRD ,4  
 
0.017 0 
 
0.079 0 
 
0.045 1 
 
0.074 0 
tFRD ,5  
 
-0.067 1 
 
0.282 1 
 
-0.062 1 
 
0.270 1 
tBRD ,1  
 
0.144 0 
 
0.450 1 
 
0.056 0 
 
0.337 1 
tBRD ,2  
 
0.039 0 
 
0.196 0 
 
0.164 1 
 
0.087 0 
tBRD ,3  
 
0.013 1 
 
-0.059 1 
 
0.070 1 
 
-0.115 1 
tBRD ,4  
 
0.057 0 
 
-0.011 0 
 
0.070 0 
 
-0.128 0 
tBRD ,5  
 
-0.041 1 
 
0.018 0 
 
-0.050 0 
 
-0.001 0 
tCRD ,1  
 
0.060 0 
 
0.182 1 
 
-0.017 0 
 
0.109 0 
tCRD ,2  
 
-0.058 1 
 
-0.626 2 
 
-0.055 2 
 
-0.694 2 
tCRD ,3  
 
-0.112 1 
 
-0.347 1 
 
-0.127 1 
 
-0.446 1 
tCRD ,4  
 
-0.117 1 
 
-0.443 1 
 
-0.131 1 
 
-0.470 1 
tCRD ,5  
 
-0.124 2 
 
-0.461 1 
 
-0.185 1 
 
-0.420 1 
Note: This table reports a summary of the impact of changes in the order book height and depth during the 
pre-opening (order book evolution) on opening returns and returns innovations.  The stocks are 
categorized into two main groups.  A stocks represents the three most active stocks and B stocks 
represents the three least active of the six stocks studied.  The table reports the average coefficient value 
(Avg. Coef.) and the number of significant coefficient at the five percent level of significance for both 
group of stocks.  The coefficient values are scaled by a multiple of 100 for better presentation in the table.    
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hypothesis 2c.  The results indicate a positive and significant coefficient for all three of the A 
stocks and two of the B stocks.  Hence, when orders are revised towards the top of the buy 
(sell) order book, this results in an increase (decrease) in the relative depth measure.  The 
increase (decrease) in relative depth translates into an increase in buy (sell) side pressure 
and, as a consequence, has a positive (negative) impact on prices during the pre-opening.  
However, as we move away from the top of the order book we only find a weak positive 
effect for both types of stocks.  
The results indicate that cumulative changes in the relative depth attributable to backward 
price revisions  tjBRD ,  and order cancellations  tjCRD ,  have a weak impact on 
opening returns for both A and B stocks.  However, we find that increases in the relative 
depth at step 2 in the order book caused by cancelled sell orders negatively impacts opening 
returns for two of the B stocks and the same result is observed at step 5 for the A stocks.  
This result is contrary to the predictions of hypothesis 2e.  In these cases, it seems traders 
with orders below the top of the order book withdraw their buy (sell) order when they think 
the price of the stock is too high (low).     
From table 6.14 that reports the impact on opening returns for changes in relative height 
during the pre-opening period, we find that changes in relative height attributable to order 
submissions  tjSRH ,  has a strong impact on both the A and B stocks.  We find that 
increases in the relative height, resulting from relatively smaller height in the buy order 
book, from order submissions positively impact opening returns for both the A and B stocks 
except for the relative spread (j = 1).  Hence, the reduction in height on the buy (sell) sides 
indicates an upward (downward) pressure on prices during the pre-opening period and 
confirms hypothesis 2b. 
The results reveal a similar conclusion for the impact of cumulative changes in order book 
height attributable to forward price revisions  tjFRH ,  on opening returns.  Specifically, 
between steps 2 and 5 (inclusive) an increase in the relative height due to forward price 
revisions positively impacts opening returns for both A and B stocks.  In addition, we find 
that increases in the relative height at step 2 attributable to backward price revisions also 
positively impact opening returns.  These findings confirms hypothesis 2d that proposes that  
  
 
Table 6.12 
Impact of the Order Book Height Evolution on Opening Return Innovations (

t ) 
  
BOV 
 
MLC 
 
HSB 
 
MSI 
 
MIA 
 
IHI 
Variable 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
0  
 
-0.0002 -0.95 
 
-0.0014 -4.00 
 
-0.0001 -0.31 
 
0.0019 3.47 
 
0.0005 1.26 
 
-0.0008 -1.51 
1,2 tr
 
 
-0.0217 -1.27 
 
-0.0474 -2.96 
 
-0.1019 -5.85 
 
-0.1314 -4.67 
 
-0.1478 -5.12 
 
-0.1838 -7.31 
tSRH ,1  
 
0.0016 0.44 
 
0.2593 8.51 
 
-0.0185 -9.01 
 
-0.0284 -7.97 
 
-0.0310 -6.52 
 
-0.0446 -9.28 
tSRH ,2  
 
0.0035 9.49 
 
0.0074 17.19 
 
0.0035 7.10 
 
0.0086 8.57 
 
0.0079 9.85 
 
0.0140 12.84 
tSRH ,3  
 
0.0005 1.40 
 
0.0019 4.63 
 
0.0018 4.09 
 
0.0054 5.81 
 
0.0027 3.71 
 
0.0119 14.88 
tSRH ,4  
 
0.0007 2.08 
 
0.0012 2.86 
 
0.0009 2.27 
 
0.0057 7.23 
 
0.0028 4.57 
 
0.0064 9.09 
tSRH ,5  
 
0.0011 3.42 
 
0.0010 2.50 
 
0.0025 6.59 
 
0.0021 2.67 
 
0.0020 3.22 
 
0.0057 8.93 
tFRH ,1  
 
0.0464 0.91 
 
-0.0055 -0.12 
 
-0.0349 -3.28 
 
-0.4361 -6.13 
 
-0.0690 -0.81 
 
0.0357 0.58 
tFRH ,2  
 
0.0051 10.44 
 
0.0086 14.73 
 
0.0059 8.01 
 
0.0110 6.94 
 
0.0076 6.39 
 
0.0158 10.03 
tFRH ,3  
 
0.0023 4.26 
 
0.0016 2.59 
 
0.0018 2.29 
 
0.0032 1.84 
 
0.0016 1.09 
 
0.0090 5.70 
tFRH ,4  
 
0.0016 2.93 
 
0.0016 2.45 
 
0.0025 3.15 
 
0.0041 2.20 
 
-0.0013 -0.92 
 
0.0071 4.23 
tFRH ,5  
 
0.0005 0.90 
 
0.0006 0.97 
 
0.0026 3.06 
 
0.0022 1.30 
 
-0.0005 -0.34 
 
0.0033 2.44 
tBRH ,1  
 
0.0621 1.18 
 
0.2559 5.18 
 
-0.2121 -2.51 
 
0.5071 3.40 
 
-0.2990 -1.50 
 
-0.1230 -1.11 
tBRH ,2  
 
0.0042 5.04 
 
0.0095 11.59 
 
0.0033 2.54 
 
0.0052 2.31 
 
0.0083 2.97 
 
0.0105 3.02 
tBRH ,3  
 
0.0008 0.93 
 
0.0044 4.39 
 
-0.0008 -0.60 
 
0.0049 1.76 
 
-0.0010 -0.38 
 
0.0022 0.63 
tBRH ,4  
 
0.0010 1.10 
 
0.0029 2.87 
 
0.0025 1.77 
 
0.0037 1.22 
 
0.0006 0.14 
 
0.0072 1.95 
tBRH ,5  
 
-0.0027 -3.11 
 
0.0003 0.30 
 
0.0016 1.23 
 
0.0042 1.22 
 
-0.0001 -0.04 
 
-0.0015 -0.35 
tCRH ,1  
 
0.0119 1.84 
 
0.2455 4.03 
 
-0.0076 -1.56 
 
-0.0336 -3.20 
 
-0.0443 -3.64 
 
-0.0521 -6.09 
tCRH ,2  
 
0.0004 0.51 
 
0.0046 4.74 
 
-0.0008 -0.82 
 
0.0082 3.03 
 
0.0011 0.46 
 
0.0087 3.28 
tCRH ,3  
 
0.0002 0.30 
 
0.0011 1.20 
 
0.0017 1.93 
 
0.0075 3.68 
 
0.0019 1.00 
 
0.0109 5.03 
tCRH ,4  
 
0.0017 2.23 
 
0.0007 0.86 
 
0.0015 1.84 
 
0.0071 3.90 
 
-0.0044 -2.32 
 
0.0040 2.58 
tCRH ,5    -0.0002 -0.24   0.0024 3.07   0.0020 2.71   0.0041 2.34   -0.0041 -2.33   0.0043 3.95 
Note: This table reports the regression estimates of the changes in the relative height attributable to submission, revisions and cancelations from one to five steps 
away from the top of the order book in determining opening return innovations.  The table reports the coefficients (coef.) and t-statistic (t-stat.) for the six stocks 
utilised in this analysis.  The coefficients highlighted in bold are significant at the five percent level of significance. 
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Table 6.13 
Impact of the Order Book Height Evolution on Opening Returns ( tr ,1 ) 
  
BOV 
 
MLC 
 
HSB 
 
MSI 
 
MIA 
 
IHI 
Variable 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
0  
 
0.0015 4.35 
 
-0.0006 -1.24 
 
0.0025 6.89 
 
0.0008 1.47 
 
0.0006 1.38 
 
0.0012 2.11 
1,2 tr
 
 
-0.0580 -1.31 
 
-0.0873 -3.17 
 
-0.2952 -5.77 
 
-0.2115 -4.63 
 
-0.1781 -3.35 
 
-0.2350 -6.30 
tSRH ,1  
 
-0.0008 -0.12 
 
0.2675 4.12 
 
-0.0262 -7.75 
 
-0.0325 -5.50 
 
-0.0304 -3.92 
 
-0.0459 -6.20 
tSRH ,2  
 
0.0034 7.78 
 
0.0076 13.09 
 
0.0042 5.41 
 
0.0087 7.39 
 
0.0079 8.89 
 
0.0140 9.95 
tSRH ,3  
 
0.0003 0.63 
 
0.0021 4.10 
 
0.0019 2.65 
 
0.0053 3.83 
 
0.0028 3.16 
 
0.0118 9.52 
tSRH ,4  
 
0.0009 1.57 
 
0.0013 2.98 
 
0.0005 1.02 
 
0.0059 4.61 
 
0.0029 2.34 
 
0.0064 6.66 
tSRH ,5  
 
0.0014 2.95 
 
0.0009 1.83 
 
0.0021 3.51 
 
0.0024 2.53 
 
0.0020 1.99 
 
0.0059 6.27 
tFRH ,1  
 
-0.0245 -0.18 
 
-0.0021 -0.02 
 
-0.0318 -1.28 
 
-0.4565 -3.08 
 
-0.0669 -0.56 
 
0.0389 0.30 
tFRH ,2  
 
0.0051 6.13 
 
0.0088 11.38 
 
0.0071 7.66 
 
0.0108 5.75 
 
0.0076 6.96 
 
0.0158 8.81 
tFRH ,3  
 
0.0023 2.96 
 
0.0018 2.16 
 
0.0019 2.27 
 
0.0036 2.48 
 
0.0016 1.28 
 
0.0092 4.80 
tFRH ,4  
 
0.0017 2.16 
 
0.0016 1.60 
 
0.0029 2.91 
 
0.0047 2.05 
 
-0.0012 -0.94 
 
0.0074 4.56 
tFRH ,5  
 
0.0005 0.75 
 
0.0005 0.52 
 
0.0024 2.24 
 
0.0023 1.22 
 
-0.0002 -0.13 
 
0.0033 1.40 
tBRH ,1  
 
0.0075 0.07 
 
0.2532 2.79 
 
-0.1236 -0.57 
 
0.5325 2.18 
 
-0.3142 -1.38 
 
-0.1023 -1.02 
tBRH ,2  
 
0.0040 2.56 
 
0.0099 6.58 
 
0.0045 2.49 
 
0.0045 1.76 
 
0.0088 2.82 
 
0.0119 3.53 
tBRH ,3  
 
0.0005 0.33 
 
0.0040 2.94 
 
0.0005 0.25 
 
0.0056 1.54 
 
-0.0020 -0.59 
 
0.0027 1.29 
tBRH ,4  
 
0.0008 0.44 
 
0.0032 2.12 
 
0.0042 1.49 
 
0.0052 1.49 
 
-0.0001 -0.02 
 
0.0083 3.24 
tBRH ,5  
 
-0.0032 -1.59 
 
0.0002 0.13 
 
0.0034 1.67 
 
0.0049 1.10 
 
0.0002 0.08 
 
-0.0009 -0.25 
tCRH ,1  
 
0.0136 1.65 
 
0.2409 2.29 
 
-0.0030 -0.32 
 
-0.0324 -3.41 
 
-0.0409 -4.83 
 
-0.0491 -4.90 
tCRH ,2  
 
0.0003 0.24 
 
0.0039 3.26 
 
-0.0015 -1.09 
 
0.0077 2.72 
 
0.0005 0.16 
 
0.0087 3.05 
tCRH ,3  
 
0.0000 -0.03 
 
0.0007 0.73 
 
0.0000 -0.02 
 
0.0074 2.42 
 
0.0015 0.64 
 
0.0107 3.09 
tCRH ,4  
 
0.0017 1.61 
 
0.0003 0.35 
 
0.0005 0.34 
 
0.0081 3.57 
 
-0.0047 -1.90 
 
0.0042 2.69 
tCRH ,5  
 
-0.0001 -0.10 
 
0.0019 2.10 
 
0.0007 0.56 
 
0.0049 2.93 
 
-0.0041 -1.94 
 
0.0047 3.73 
Note: This table reports the regression estimates of the changes in relative height attributable to submissions, revisions and cancellations from one to five steps 
away from the top of the order book in determining opening return.  The table reports the coefficients (coef.) and t-statistic (t-stat.) for the six stocks utilised in 
this analysis.  The t-statistic is calculated using the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The coefficients highlighted in 
bold are significant at the five percent level of significance. 
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Table 6.14 
Impact of Overnight Order Book Results Summary 
  
Opening Return Innovations (

t ) 
 
Opening Return ( tr ,1 ) 
  
A Stocks 
 
B Stocks 
 
A Stocks 
 
B Stocks 
Variable 
 
Avg. 
Coefs. 
No. 
Sig. 
 
Avg. 
Coefs. 
No. 
Sig. 
 
Avg. 
Coefs. 
No. 
Sig. 
 
Avg. 
Coefs. 
No. 
Sig. 
0  
 
-0.056 1 
 
0.055 1 
 
0.112 2 
 
0.087 1 
1,2 tr  
 
-5.699 2 
 
-15.435 3 
 
-14.683 2 
 
-20.821 3 
tSRH ,1  
 
8.082 1 
 
-3.466 3 
 
8.019 2 
 
-3.625 3 
tSRH ,2  
 
0.479 3 
 
1.016 3 
 
0.505 3 
 
1.023 3 
tSRH ,3  
 
0.140 2 
 
0.667 3 
 
0.144 2 
 
0.662 3 
tSRH ,4  
 
0.095 3 
 
0.498 3 
 
0.091 1 
 
0.507 3 
tSRH ,5  
 
0.154 3 
 
0.327 3 
 
0.144 2 
 
0.345 3 
tFRH ,1  
 
0.201 1 
 
-15.645 1 
 
-1.947 0 
 
-16.151 1 
tFRH ,2  
 
0.650 3 
 
1.144 3 
 
0.699 3 
 
1.139 3 
tFRH ,3  
 
0.190 3 
 
0.459 1 
 
0.198 3 
 
0.481 2 
tFRH ,4  
 
0.192 3 
 
0.332 2 
 
0.208 2 
 
0.365 2 
tFRH ,5  
 
0.122 1 
 
0.168 1 
 
0.113 1 
 
0.181 0 
tBRH ,1  
 
3.531 2 
 
2.838 1 
 
4.568 1 
 
3.867 1 
tBRH ,2  
 
0.568 3 
 
0.798 3 
 
0.611 3 
 
0.838 2 
tBRH ,3  
 
0.147 1 
 
0.201 0 
 
0.164 1 
 
0.210 0 
tBRH ,4  
 
0.214 1 
 
0.384 0 
 
0.273 1 
 
0.449 1 
tBRH ,5  
 
-0.027 1 
 
0.088 0 
 
0.012 0 
 
0.138 0 
tCRH ,1  
 
8.331 1 
 
-4.331 3 
 
8.386 1 
 
-4.081 3 
tCRH ,2  
 
0.141 1 
 
0.603 2 
 
0.089 1 
 
0.563 2 
tCRH ,3  
 
0.099 0 
 
0.677 2 
 
0.022 0 
 
0.655 2 
tCRH ,4  
 
0.133 1 
 
0.224 3 
 
0.083 0 
 
0.252 2 
tCRH ,5  
 
0.140 2 
 
0.142 3 
 
0.085 1 
 
0.182 2 
Note: This table reports a summary of the impact of changes in the order book height during the pre-
opening (order book evolution) on opening returns and returns innovations.  The stocks are categorized 
into two main groups.  A stocks represents the three most active stocks and B stocks represents the three 
least active of the six stocks studied.  The table reports the average coefficient value (Avg. Coef.) and the 
number of significant coefficient at the five percent level of significance for both group of stocks.  The 
coefficient values are scaled by a multiple of 100 for better presentation in the table.     
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cumulative decrease in the relative buy (sell) side height attributable to price revisions 
positively impacts opening returns. 
We find strong evidence in support of hypothesis 2f for the B stocks and weak evidence for 
the A stocks.  Between steps 2 and 5 (inclusive) cumulative decreases in relative buy (sell) 
height due to the cancellation of a sell (buy) order, which increases the relative height 
measure  tjCRH , , positively (negatively) impacts opening returns for at least two B stocks 
and for no more than two of the A stocks.  Hence, order cancellations during the pre-opening 
are indicative of a reduction in either buy or sell side pressure, depending on the type of 
order cancelled.  Its effect mostly impacts the less active B stocks in general. 
From table 6.16 that reports the findings about the amount of order book information 
concerning opening returns, we find that changes in relative height along the order book 
have a greater impact on opening returns as compared to relative depth.  In the case of 
changes in relative depth, we observe incremental increases in the average adjusted R
2
 from 
1.1% to 3.7% for the A stocks, and from 6.4% to 10.7% for the B stocks when we add steps 
1 to 5 of the changes in relative depth measure to the regression.  For the B stocks, we 
observe a significant increase in the average adjusted R
2
 when we add the first step to the 
model (changes in relative spread) and then marginal increases as we add steps 2 to 5 to the 
regression.  On this basis, we conclude that changes in relative depth, even away from the 
top of the order book, contain significant information about the direction of opening returns.   
The average adjusted R
2
 of the full model is 3.7% and 10.8% for the A and B stocks 
respectively, indicating that changes in relative depth have a greater impact on the less active 
stocks in comparison to the most active stocks. 
Table 6.16 also reveals that in the case of cumulative changes in relative height, there is a 
significant increase in the adjusted R
2
 when we add steps 1 to 5 of the changes in relative 
height measures to the regression.  For the A stocks, adding steps 1 to 5 of the changes in the 
relative height measures to the regression increase the adjusted R
2
 from 1.1% to 15.7% with 
the largest change occurring when step 2 is added to the regression.  Similarly, by adding 
steps 1 to 5 of the changes in the relative height measures to the regression for the B stocks,  
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Table 6.15 
Model Fit Statistics for Order Book Evolution Regressions 
Panel A. Relative Depth Evolution 
  
BOV 
 
MLC 
 
HSB 
  
(

t ) ( tr ,1 ) 
 
(

t ) ( tr ,1 ) 
 
(

t ) ( tr ,1 ) 
Adj. R
2
 
 
1.58 1.99 
 
3.68 5.29 
 
5.78 18.45 
F-stat. 
 
2.34 2.7 
 
4.24 5.74 
 
5.74 18.49 
P-val. 
 
0 0 
 
0 0 
 
0 0 
AR Lags 
 
3 - 
 
6 - 
 
8 - 
  
MSI 
 
MIA 
 
IHI 
  
(

t ) ( tr ,1 ) 
 
(

t ) ( tr ,1 ) 
 
(

t ) ( tr ,1 ) 
Adj. R
2
 
 
8.64 12.5 
 
9.95 11.45 
 
13.65 16.52 
F-stat. 
 
5.38 7.59 
 
4.99 5.67 
 
8.81 10.77 
P-val. 
 
0 0 
 
0 0 
 
0 0 
AR Lags 
 
6 - 
 
2 - 
 
2 - 
Panel B. Relative Height Evolution 
  
BOV 
 
MLC 
 
HSB 
  
(

t ) ( tr ,1 ) 
 
(

t ) ( tr ,1 ) 
 
(

t ) ( tr ,1 ) 
Adj. R
2
 
 
9.54 9.52 
 
24.58 25.66 
 
13.03 25.76 
F-stat. 
 
9.79 9.76 
 
28.69 30.33 
 
12.58 27.81 
P-val. 
 
0 0 
 
0 0 
 
0 0 
AR Lags 
 
3 - 
 
6 - 
 
8 - 
  
MSI 
 
MIA 
 
IHI 
  
(

t ) ( tr ,1 ) 
 
(

t ) ( tr ,1 ) 
 
(

t ) ( tr ,1 ) 
Adj. R
2
 
 
21.5 26.1 
 
23.7 25.47 
 
34.47 37.28 
F-stat. 
 
13.7 17.3 
 
12.21 13.33 
 
26.98 30.35 
P-val. 
 
0 0 
 
0 0 
 
0 0 
AR Lags   6 -   2 -   2 - 
Note: This table reports the model fit statistics for the impact of order book 
height and depth evolution during the pre-opening on opening return and return 
innovations.  The statistics include the adjusted R
2 
(Adj. R
2
), the F-statistic (F-
stat.) and its associated probability value (P-val.) and the number of lags 
included in the autoregressive model (AR Lags) used to capture the return 
innovations.  The adjusted R
2
 is reported in percentages. 
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Table 6.16  
Order Book Evolution Information 
 
  Opening Return Innovations (

t ) 
 
Opening Returns ( tr ,1 ) 
Relative 
Depth 
 
A Stocks 
 
B Stocks 
 
A Stocks 
 
B Stocks 
Steps (j) 
 
Avg.  
Adj. R
2
 
Change 
(%) 
 
Avg.  
Adj. R
2
 
Change 
(%) 
 
Avg.  
Adj. R
2
 
Change 
(%) 
 
Avg.  
Adj. R
2
 
Change 
(%) 
j = 0 
 
1.120 
  
6.411 
  
5.484 
  
9.270 
 
j = 1 
 
1.826 0.706 
 
7.993 1.583 
 
6.518 1.035 
 
10.677 1.408 
j = 2 
 
2.249 0.423 
 
8.693 0.700 
 
7.067 0.549 
 
11.397 0.719 
j = 3 
 
2.429 0.180 
 
9.475 0.782 
 
7.240 0.172 
 
12.210 0.813 
j = 4 
 
3.154 0.725 
 
10.117 0.642 
 
7.835 0.595 
 
12.985 0.775 
j = 5 
 
3.703 0.549 
 
10.747 0.630 
 
8.578 0.743 
 
13.471 0.486 
Relative 
Height 
            
Steps (j) 
 
Avg.  
Adj. R
2
 
Change 
(%) 
 
Avg.  
Adj. R
2
 
Change 
(%) 
 
Avg.  
Adj. R
2
 
Change 
(%) 
 
Avg.  
Adj. R
2
 
Change 
(%) 
j = 0 
 
1.120 
  
6.411 
  
5.484 
  
9.270 
 
j = 1 
 
3.609 2.489 
 
9.662 3.252 
 
8.519 3.035 
 
12.727 3.457 
j = 2 
 
13.148 9.538 
 
16.616 6.954 
 
18.074 9.555 
 
19.627 6.900 
j = 3 
 
13.825 0.678 
 
20.441 3.825 
 
18.695 0.621 
 
23.232 3.605 
j = 4 
 
14.379 0.553 
 
24.021 3.580 
 
19.284 0.589 
 
26.922 3.690 
j = 5 
 
15.667 1.289 
 
26.543 2.522 
 
20.312 1.028 
 
29.601 2.678 
Note: This table reports the average adjusted R
2
 and the changes in the average adjusted R
2
 when the relative 
depth and height at steps one to five are incorporated in the model.  Essentially, we estimate the regression for 
each stock without incorporation of the relative depth or height and measure the adjusted R
2
 then recursively 
add relative depth and height from steps 1 to 5 and measuring the change in the adjusted R
2 
in the resulting 
regressions.  The average adjusted R
2
 (Avg. Adj. R
2
) and the percentage change in the adjusted R
2 
(Change 
(%)) is calculated for both A stocks and B stocks.     
 
we again observe a significant increase in the adjusted R
2
 from 6.4% to 26.5%, with the 
largest marginal increase when step 2 is added to the regression.  Hence, we conclude that 
cumulative changes in the relative height along the order book from steps 1 to 5 during the 
pre-opening contain significant information about the direction of opening returns.   
Overall, we find that during the pre-opening period cumulative changes in relative height 
contain significantly more information about the opening returns compared to the cumulative 
changes in the relative depth of the order book.  In addition, we find that a greater amount of 
variation in opening returns is captured by cumulative changes in relative depth and height 
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for the less active B stocks compared with the most active A stocks.  When opening return 
innovations are replaced by the actual opening returns as the dependent variable in this 
analysis on order book evolution, we reach almost identical conclusions as those obtained 
when using opening return innovations. 
6.4.5.3   Opening Order Book and Opening Returns    
Tables 6.17 and 6.18 report the results for the impact of relative depth and height of the 
opening order book on opening return innovations and opening returns, respectively.  Tables 
6.19 provides a summary of the results in tables 6.17 and 6.18 categorised in A and B stocks.  
The results reveal only partial support for hypotheses 3a which proposes that an increase in 
the relative buy (sell) depth in the opening order book positively (negatively) impacts 
opening returns.  We find that the coefficient associated with the relative depth measure 
 T tjRD ,  is positive and significant for at most one stock at different steps along the order 
book for the A stocks.  The results are stronger for the B stocks as the relative depth measure 
at step one is positive and significant for two of the three less active stocks.  This indicates 
that an increase in demand (supply) pressure reflected in the relative depth at the top of the 
order book for the less active stocks exerts upward (downward) pressure on prices.  
Hypothesis 3b proposes that demand pressure along the order book reflected in the relative 
height along the order book  T tjRH ,  positively impacts opening returns.  These findings are 
opposite to our predictions.  At step 2 (j = 2) we find that increases in the relative height, 
caused by a reduction in relative buy side height or increase in sell side height, negatively 
impacts the opening return.  Hence, a reduction in buy side height below the top of the order 
book indicates that the price at the top of the order book is too high and as such sell side 
trades have to place more aggressive prices, which in turn results in a downward pressure on 
prices.  Additionally, we find that a reduction in the relative spread (j = 1) negatively 
impacts the opening return for the B stocks.  Hence, this indicates that the spread is lowered 
by incoming sell orders during the pre-opening period.  This is consistent with the 
conclusion for the opening order book, which indicates that when the spread is larger in the  
  
 
Table 6.17  
Impact of the Opening Order Book on Opening Return Innovations (

t ) 
Panel A 
 
BOV 
 
MLC 
 
HSB 
 
MSI 
 
MIA 
 
IHI 
Variable 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
0  
 
-0.0020 -4.00 
 
-0.0015 -2.05 
 
-0.0023 -3.74 
 
-0.0009 -1.10 
 
-0.0013 -2.19 
 
-0.0046 -5.46 
1,2 tr  
 
0.0113 0.71 
 
-0.0804 -5.25 
 
-0.1054 -6.21 
 
-0.1501 -5.25 
 
-0.1708 -6.39 
 
-0.2018 -8.24 
B
tDL  
 
0.0046 8.06 
 
0.0062 7.36 
 
0.0060 8.76 
 
0.0099 7.82 
 
0.0071 7.97 
 
0.0121 10.55 
S
tDL  
 
-0.0015 -2.42 
 
-0.0039 -4.49 
 
-0.0025 -3.31 
 
-0.0073 -5.63 
 
-0.0035 -3.76 
 
-0.0048 -3.91 
B
tDC  
 
0.0073 8.61 
 
0.0106 9.30 
 
0.0112 10.62 
 
0.0152 6.55 
 
0.0098 6.12 
 
0.0228 12.54 
S
tDC  
 
-0.0059 -5.98 
 
-0.0060 -5.16 
 
-0.0025 -2.01 
 
-0.0097 -3.33 
 
-0.0040 -2.37 
 
-0.0100 -4.09 
T
tRD ,1  
 
-0.0001 -0.31 
 
0.0007 1.29 
 
0.0002 0.45 
 
0.0020 2.15 
 
0.0012 1.74 
 
0.0018 2.00 
T
tRD ,2
 
 
-0.0001 -0.18 
 
0.0004 0.84 
 
0.0016 3.32 
 
0.0014 1.64 
 
0.0004 0.59 
 
0.0014 1.65 
T
tRD ,3
 
 
0.0004 1.08 
 
0.0005 1.05 
 
0.0004 0.89 
 
0.0019 2.17 
 
0.0011 1.56 
 
0.0001 0.14 
T
tRD ,4
 
 
0.0005 1.46 
 
-0.0003 -0.76 
 
0.0011 2.38 
 
0.0008 0.93 
 
0.0014 2.08 
 
0.0012 1.26 
T
tRD ,5
 
 
-0.0005 -1.40 
 
0.0007 1.61 
 
-0.0002 -0.51 
 
-0.0001 -0.08 
 
-0.0003 -0.45 
 
0.0007 0.83 
T
tRH ,1
 
 
-0.0026 -0.53 
 
0.0323 0.68 
 
0.0051 2.18 
 
0.0098 2.55 
 
0.0133 3.11 
 
0.0132 1.99 
T
tRH ,2
 
 
-0.0020 -5.03 
 
-0.0041 -8.98 
 
-0.0015 -3.18 
 
-0.0039 -4.64 
 
-0.0048 -6.92 
 
-0.0056 -6.52 
T
tRH ,3
 
 
-0.0004 -1.03 
 
0.0002 0.51 
 
-0.0002 -0.42 
 
-0.0006 -0.86 
 
-0.0004 -0.63 
 
-0.0038 -4.99 
T
tRH ,4
 
 
-0.0002 -0.69 
 
-0.0004 -0.95 
 
0.0001 0.35 
 
-0.0017 -2.26 
 
-0.0008 -1.28 
 
-0.0004 -0.64 
T
tRH ,5
 
 
0.0001 0.38 
 
0.0011 2.63 
 
-0.0005 -1.35 
 
0.0007 0.95 
 
0.0009 1.65 
 
-0.0005 -0.83 
Panel B 
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
    
Adj. R2 
 
 
0.21 
  
0.31 
  
0.20 
  
0.25 
  
0.31 
  
0.39 
F-stat. 
 
 
31.05 
  
55.67 
  
27.82 
  
22.58 
  
23.94 
  
44.62 
Prob. 
 
 
0.00 
  
0.00 
  
0 
  
0 
  
0 
  
0 
AR Lags     3     6     8     6     2     1 
Note: This table reports the regression estimates of the relative height and depth from one to five steps away from the top of the opening order book in 
determining opening return innovations.  Panel A reports the coefficients (coef.) and t-statistic (t-stat.) for the six stocks utilized in this analysis.  Panel B reports 
the adjusted R-square (Adj. R
2
), F-statistic (F-stat.) and related probability (P-val.) for all six stocks and the number of autoregressive lags used to generate the 
return innovation series.  The coefficients highlighted in bold are significant at the five percent level of significance. 
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Table 6.18 
Impact of the Overnight Order Book on Opening Returns ( tr ,1 ) 
Panel A 
 
BOV 
 
MLC 
 
HSB 
 
MSI 
 
MIA 
 
IHI 
Variable 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
 
Coef. t-Stat. 
0  
 
-0.0006 -1.61 
 
-0.0010 -1.00 
 
0.0004 0.53 
 
-0.0024 -3.07 
 
-0.0011 -2.13 
 
-0.0031 -3.76 
1,2 tr  
 
-0.0084 -0.18 
 
-0.1183 -4.24 
 
-0.2848 -6.60 
 
-0.2211 -5.97 
 
-0.1982 -3.78 
 
-0.2469 -6.25 
B
tDL  
 
0.0052 10.94 
 
0.0066 5.99 
 
0.0064 9.58 
 
0.0108 6.79 
 
0.0071 7.65 
 
0.0122 10.48 
S
tDL  
 
-0.0017 -3.06 
 
-0.0037 -3.58 
 
-0.0031 -3.98 
 
-0.0077 -4.41 
 
-0.0035 -3.77 
 
-0.0045 -3.57 
B
tDC  
 
0.0084 6.21 
 
0.0112 5.30 
 
0.0170 8.44 
 
0.0169 5.47 
 
0.0097 5.09 
 
0.0229 9.97 
S
tDC  
 
-0.0058 -3.40 
 
-0.0060 -3.37 
 
-0.0032 -1.91 
 
-0.0101 -2.96 
 
-0.0043 -2.06 
 
-0.0097 -5.06 
T
tRD ,1  
 
-0.0002 -0.31 
 
0.0006 0.97 
 
-0.0003 -0.38 
 
0.0019 2.06 
 
0.0012 1.77 
 
0.0020 2.26 
T
tRD ,2
 
 
-0.0002 -0.38 
 
0.0004 0.79 
 
0.0017 3.04 
 
0.0009 1.34 
 
0.0003 0.51 
 
0.0010 1.05 
T
tRD ,3
 
 
0.0002 0.40 
 
0.0002 0.49 
 
0.0013 2.56 
 
0.0013 1.49 
 
0.0010 1.37 
 
0.0003 0.32 
T
tRD ,4
 
 
0.0006 1.56 
 
-0.0006 -1.36 
 
0.0016 3.22 
 
0.0010 1.09 
 
0.0015 2.35 
 
0.0014 1.77 
T
tRD ,5
 
 
-0.0001 -0.30 
 
0.0007 1.79 
 
0.0005 0.97 
 
0.0001 0.08 
 
-0.0002 -0.35 
 
0.0008 0.94 
T
tRH ,1
 
 
-0.0042 -1.62 
 
0.0637 0.70 
 
0.0043 1.88 
 
0.0127 2.43 
 
0.0126 1.61 
 
0.0134 1.16 
T
tRH ,2
 
 
-0.0022 -4.04 
 
-0.0045 -7.21 
 
-0.0014 -2.09 
 
-0.0044 -5.19 
 
-0.0050 -5.79 
 
-0.0062 -6.98 
T
tRH ,3
 
 
-0.0006 -1.26 
 
-0.0002 -0.46 
 
-0.0011 -2.10 
 
-0.0017 -1.88 
 
-0.0005 -0.69 
 
-0.0044 -5.40 
T
tRH ,4
 
 
-0.0005 -1.16 
 
-0.0005 -1.04 
 
-0.0003 -0.57 
 
-0.0025 -3.14 
 
-0.0007 -0.84 
 
-0.0006 -1.04 
T
tRH ,5
 
 
0.0000 -0.08 
 
0.0012 2.55 
 
-0.0006 -1.61 
 
0.0003 0.34 
 
0.0010 1.73 
 
-0.0005 -0.93 
Panel B 
                  Adj. R
2
 
 
  0.23 
 
  0.3431 
 
  0.38 
 
  0.31 
 
  0.34 
 
  0.43 
F-stat. 
  
35.01 
  
63.11 
  
67.00 
  
30.76 
  
26.52 
  
53.36 
P-val. 
  
0.00 
  
0.00 
  
0.00 
  
0.00 
  
0.00 
  
0.00 
Note: This table reports the regression estimates of the relative height and depth from one to five steps away from the top of the opening order book in 
determining opening return.  Panel A reports the coefficients (coef.) and t-statistic (t-stat.) for the six stocks utilised in this analysis.  The t-statistic is calculated 
using the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.  Panel B reports the adjusted R-square (Adj. R
2
), F-statistic (F-stat.) and 
related probability (P-val.) for all six stocks.  The coefficients highlighted in bold are significant at the five percent level of significance. 
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Table 6.19 
Impact of Opening Order Book Results Summary 
  
Opening Return Innovations (

t ) 
 
Opening Return ( tr ,1 ) 
Panel A. 
 
A Stocks 
 
B Stocks 
 
A Stocks 
 
B Stocks 
Variable 
 
Avg. 
Coefs. 
No. 
Sig. 
 
Avg. 
Coefs. 
No.  
Sig. 
 
Avg. 
Coefs. 
No.  
Sig. 
 
Avg. 
Coefs. 
No.  
Sig. 
0  
 
-0.192 3 
 
-0.225 2 
 
-0.042 0 
 
-0.219 3 
1,2 tr  
 
-5.817 2 
 
-17.425 3 
 
-13.714 2 
 
-22.205 3 
B
tDL  
 
0.561 3 
 
0.975 3 
 
0.607 3 
 
1.003 3 
S
tDL  
 
-0.263 3 
 
-0.520 3 
 
-0.285 3 
 
-0.524 3 
B
tDC  
 
0.967 3 
 
1.594 3 
 
1.221 3 
 
1.649 3 
S
tDC  
 
-0.481 3 
 
-0.791 3 
 
-0.499 2 
 
-0.800 3 
T
tRD ,1  
 
0.026 0 
 
0.166 2 
 
0.007 0 
 
0.173 2 
T
tRD ,2  
 
0.063 1 
 
0.104 0 
 
0.062 1 
 
0.075 0 
T
tRD ,3  
 
0.043 0 
 
0.103 1 
 
0.058 1 
 
0.086 0 
T
tRD ,4  
 
0.044 1 
 
0.114 1 
 
0.054 1 
 
0.128 1 
T
tRD ,5  
 
-0.002 0 
 
0.014 0 
 
0.037 0 
 
0.022 0 
T
tRH ,1  
 
1.158 1 
 
1.210 3 
 
2.129 0 
 
1.291 1 
T
tRH ,2  
 
-0.255 3 
 
-0.473 3 
 
-0.267 3 
 
-0.519 3 
T
tRH ,3  
 
-0.012 0 
 
-0.160 1 
 
-0.061 1 
 
-0.217 1 
T
tRH ,4  
 
-0.017 0 
 
-0.096 1 
 
-0.041 0 
 
-0.126 1 
T
tRH ,5  
 
0.025 1 
 
0.038 0 
 
0.017 1 
 
0.024 0 
Panel B. 
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
    
Steps (j) 
 
Avg.  
Adj.  
R
2
 
Change 
(%) 
 
Avg.  
Adj.  
R
2
 
Change 
(%) 
 
Avg.  
Adj.  
R
2
 
Change 
(%) 
 
Avg.  
Adj.  
R
2
 
Change 
(%) 
j = 0 
 
21.862 
  
27.806 
  
28.696 
  
31.285 
 
j = 1 
 
21.866 0.004 
 
27.938 0.132 
 
28.752 0.056 
 
31.440 0.155 
j = 2 
 
23.658 1.792 
 
30.702 2.763 
 
30.844 2.092 
 
34.643 3.203 
j = 3 
 
23.670 0.011 
 
31.469 0.767 
 
31.122 0.278 
 
35.659 1.016 
j = 4 
 
23.803 0.133 
 
31.658 0.189 
 
31.438 0.316 
 
36.068 0.408 
j = 5   23.935 0.132   31.647 -0.011   31.575 0.138   36.060 -0.007 
Note: This table reports a summary of the impact of the opening order book on opening returns and returns 
innovations.  The t-statistic for coefficients in the opening returns regressions are based on the Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.  The stocks are categorized into two main 
groups.  A stocks represents the three most active stocks and B stocks represents the three least active of the six 
stocks studied.  Panel A reports the average coefficient value (Avg. Coef.) and the number of significant 
coefficient at the five percent level of significance for both group of stocks.  The coefficient values are scaled by 
a multiple of 100 for better presentation in the table. Panel B reports the finding about the information below the 
top of the order book.  Essentially, we estimate the regression for each stock without incorporation of the relative 
depth or height and measure the adjusted R
2
 then recursively add relative depth and height from steps 1 to 5 and 
measuring the change in the adjusted R
2 
in the resulting regressions.  The average adjusted R
2
 (Avg. Adj. R
2
) and 
the percentage change in the adjusted R
2 
(Change (%)) is calculated for both A stocks and B stocks.  
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overnight order book for the B stocks, the spread is reduced by a lower price of incoming 
sell orders. 
We find strong evidence in support of hypothesis 3c which proposes that the initial locking 
or crossing of the inside spread by an incoming buy (sell) order during the pre-opening 
positively (negatively) impacts the opening return.  The results reveal that the coefficient for 
variables BtDL and 
B
tDC  which takes the value of one when the initial lock or cross is due to 
a buy order, are positive and significant for all the A and B stocks.  In addition, we find a 
negative and significant relationship between the locking or crossing of the inside spread by 
an incoming sell order  StSt DCDL ,  for all the A and B stocks.  Hence, the direction of the 
locking or crossing of the inside spread carries significant information about the direction of 
opening prices for both the most active and the less active stocks.  
From panel B in table 6.19 that reports the average adjusted R
2
 and the change in the 
adjusted R
2 
when the relative depth and height at steps 1 to 5 are recursively added to the 
regression model.  We find that when steps 1 to 5 are incorporated in the regression, the 
average adjusted R
2
 increases from 19.9% to 22.8% for the A stocks with the largest increase 
of 2.2% observed when step 2 is added to the regression.  In addition, we find that for the B 
stocks, the average adjusted R
2
 increases from 26.5% to 30.9% for the B stocks, with the 
highest increase of 3.25% occurring when step 2 is added to the regression model.  This 
reveals that including the dummy variables that captures locked or crossed inside spread 
explains a significant proportion of variability in opening returns.  In addition, it is evident 
that most of the opening order book information about opening returns is concentrated 
towards the top of the order book.  The conclusions remain the same when the realised 
opening return replaces return innovations in the regressions as the dependent variable. 
6.5   Conclusions 
In this chapter we measure the proportion of daily price discovery attributable to the pre-
opening period and determine the fundamental order book factors that impact the return 
generated over the pre-opening period.  The contribution of the pre-opening to the price 
discovery process is measured using the Wang and Yang (2009, 2010) extension of the 
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Hasbrouck (1995) information share (IS) measure that is applicable to sequentially trading 
period or markets.  In addition, we estimate the weighted price contribution (WPC), which is 
commonly used in the literature to measure price discovery attributable to periods within a 
trading day.   
To determine the factors that impact the return generated over the pre-opening period, we 
measure the impact of the relative depth and height of the overnight and opening order book 
and the changes in the relative depth and height attributable to order submissions and 
alterations during the pre-opening period.  Specifically, we measure the relative depth and 
height at steps one to five in the order book at the start and at the end of the pre-opening, and 
the changes at each step caused by order submission, forward and backward revisions and 
cancellations during the pre-opening.  We utilise microstructure data for the three most 
highly active and three relatively less active stocks from the Malta Stock Exchange over an 
extensive sample period covering January 2000 to June 2007. 
The results from the estimation of the IS and WPC reveal that the pre-opening period 
contributes between approximately 30% and 35% of daily price discovery for the three most 
active stocks and between 32% and 38% of daily price discovery for the three less active of 
the six stocks respectively.  This indicates that the pre-opening period provides between 2% 
and 3% more of daily price discovery for the less active stocks compared to the most active.  
In addition, we find that over the sample period, there is a marginal reduction in the 
contribution of the pre-opening to the daily price discovery process.  We find that the IS and 
WPC measure provide similar results over the full sample.  However, the annual estimates 
can be significantly different dependent on the measure used, leading to different 
conclusions about the amount of price discovery attributable to the pre-opening period. 
As it relates to the impact of the order book on the returns generated over the pre-opening 
period, the empirical results reveal that larger relative height at steps two and five and the 
relative buy depth at the top of the overnight order book positively impact the returns over 
the pre-opening period for the three most active stocks.  This indicates that the excess 
demand or supply pressure in the previous trading session results in relatively larger 
unexecuted buy or sell order queued in the overnight order book, respectively.  Therefore, 
this excess demand results in upward pressure on prices and excess supply results in 
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downward pressure on prices during the pre-opening.  In addition, we find that cumulative 
increases in relative depth below the top of the order book for the less active stocks 
attributable to order submissions, throughout the pre-opening, negatively impacts opening 
returns.  Hence cumulative increases in the relative depth below the top of the order book 
during the pre-opening, is suggestive of the fact that price at the top of the order book is too 
low.   
The results indicate that changes in the relative height from step one to five in the order book 
during the pre-opening period attributable to order submissions and alterations has a strong 
impact on the opening returns.  We find that increases in the relative buy side height from 
steps two to five attributable to order submissions, cancellations and forward and backward 
price revisions during the pre-opening suggests an increase in demand pressure and results in 
an upward pressure on prices.  This indicates that the changes in the order book away from 
the top contain significant information about opening returns.  In addition, we find that the 
variation in opening returns that are captured by the changes in relative depth and height are 
relatively larger for the less active stocks compared to the most active. 
The information content of the order book just before the opening (opening order book) 
seems to be relatively low.  The results indicate weak evidence to support a positive impact 
between relative depth at the top of the order book and opening return for the three less 
active stocks.  In addition, we find that smaller height on the buy side relative to the sell side 
at step two of the opening order book negatively impacts opening returns.  However, we find 
that whenever the inside spread is locked or crossed initially by an incoming buy (sell) order 
there is a positive (negative) impact on the opening return.  Hence, locking or crossing of the 
inside spread contains a strong signal about the fundamental value of the asset from which 
traders employ to inform their order submission strategy, which is consistent with the 
findings of Cao et al. (2008).   
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
7.1 Summary of Findings 
The thesis utilises data from the Malta Stock Exchange (MSE) over the period January 4, 
2000 to June 28, 2007.  The MSE is a fully computerised continuous limit order market, with 
brokers acting on behalf of clients.  For the majority of the sample, the pre-opening period 
begins at 8:30 am and ends at 10:00 am when continuous trading begins.  The thesis focuses 
on the information content of the limit order book by analysing the determinants of the 
intensity and aggressiveness of order submissions and the price discovery process.  
Specifically, the main section of the thesis contains three essays.  The first examines the 
impact of incoming limit orders and alterations to queued limit orders on the intensity of 
order submissions in the pre-opening period.  The second investigates the impact of the pre-
opening limit order book on the aggressiveness of order placement strategies.  The third 
essay composes two main sections; one measuring the contribution of the pre-opening to 
daily price discovery, and the other investigating the information content of the limit order 
book (and cumulative changes to the order book throughout the pre-opening) with regards to 
the return generated over the period.  
The first essay (chapter 4) utilizes an augmented Log-ACD model proposed by Bauwens and 
Giot (2000) to measure the extent to which order submission intensity in the pre-opening is 
impacted by incoming limit orders, the inside spread, mid-quote returns and revision or 
cancellation of orders queued in the pre-opening limit order book.  For this analysis, the 
three most active stocks during the pre-opening period over the entire sample are utilised.  
This essay examines whether information inferred from the limit order book by traders 
influences their decision to submit buy or sell orders in the pre-opening period.  To my 
knowledge this is the first study to empirically assess the impact of the order book on the 
intensity of order submissions in the absence of trading.   
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The results of this essay reveal that the greater the price of an incoming buy order relative to 
the price at the top of the buy order book, then the greater the increase in the intensity of buy 
order submissions.  In addition, the greater the price of an incoming sell order relative to the 
price at the top of the sell order book, then the greater the increase (decrease) in the intensity 
of sell (buy) order submissions.  This impact is exacerbated whenever the price associated 
with an incoming buy (sell) order is greater than or equal to the best sell (buy) price, 
resulting in a locked or crossed spread.  The intuition here is that order prices act as a signal 
about the information content of the orders and the level of investor aggressiveness towards 
attaining the asset.  Hence, a relatively high buy price produces a positive signalling effect, 
which leads to an increase in buy pressure, while a relatively large sell price results in a 
negative signalling effect and therefore reduces (increases) buy (sell) pressure in the pre-
opening period.  This is consistent with the findings of Hall and Hautsch (2007), despite the 
absence of active trading in the present study. 
Other order book information such as larger volume associated with an incoming order, 
increased mid-quote returns and the removal of liquidity from the order book through 
cancellations of buy and sell orders reduces both the intensity of both buy and sell order 
submissions in the pre-opening.  Interestingly, the results reveal an important characteristic 
of buy order submissions.  An increase in the volume of an incoming sell order or the 
volume associated with a sell order revised towards the top of the order increases the 
intensity of buy order submissions.  In addition, whenever the volume associated with a 
cancelled sell order is large the intensity of buy order submissions reduces.  Essentially, buy 
side traders tend to react significantly to the provision and withdrawal of liquidity in the pre-
opening period.  On the sell side, the results indicate that sell side traders are induced to 
submit orders when buy orders are revised closer to the top of the order book, thereby 
providing sellers with more favourable prices. 
The second essay (chapter 5) provides an in-depth investigation into the impact of order 
book information on order submission strategies employed by traders during the pre-opening 
period.  Specifically, variables are formulated to reflect the state of the limit order book at 
each moment in time including its depth, spread and height at various steps along the limit 
order book.  We analyse the impact of these variables on the aggressiveness of limit order 
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submissions, forward and backward price revisions, and cancellations on both sides of the 
order book during a market pre-opening period.  To achieve this, the aggressiveness of 
submissions, revisions and cancellations are ranked based upon the impact of the action on 
the execution probability of the order and taking into consideration the absence of trading.  
Aggressiveness is then modelled by utilising an order probit model and incorporating 
variables reflective of order book depth, height and spread.  Similar to the first essay, this 
analysis studies the three most active stocks in the MSE pre-opening period. 
The results provide support for the crowding out effect proposed by Parlour (1998) in that, 
an increase in depth on the buy side increases the aggressiveness of buy order submissions 
and forwards price revisions and reduces the aggressiveness of sell order submissions and 
forward price revisions.  In addition, an increase in the depth on the sell side reduces the 
aggressiveness of buy order submissions and forward price revisions.  This result is 
particularly interesting as it corroborates the relationship between aggressiveness and order 
book depth during the continuous trading period (see Cao et al., 2008; Griffiths et al., 2000; 
Hall and Hautsch, 2006, Pascual and Veredas, 2008; Ranaldo, 2004).  Hence, despite the 
absence of trading and binding orders in the pre-opening period, an increase in order book 
depth on the buy (sell) side induces traders to place more aggressive buy (sell) limit orders. 
The impact of the spread on aggressiveness in the absence of trading is consistent with 
previous findings in the literature.  A reduction in the spread increases the aggressiveness of 
order submissions and forward revisions on both sides of the order book.  In addition, 
whenever the spread is locked or crossed the effect is exacerbated.  This result suggests that 
the spread during the pre-opening period represents a cost to traders for improving the 
probability of execution at market opening.  Therefore, a reduction in spread reduces the cost 
of improving the order execution probability, resulting in an increased level of 
aggressiveness.   
The results also reveal that a reduction in height on both sides of the order book increases the 
aggressiveness of order submissions, forward price revision and cancellations on the buy 
side.  Additionally, the height on the ask side positively impacts the aggressiveness of sell 
order submission and forward price revisions.  Hence, traders in the pre-opening period 
interpret order book height as a cost of improving the probability of execution at the 
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opening, similar to the impact of the spread.  In essence, the results indicate that traders 
monitor the dynamics of both sides of the order book in determining their order placement 
strategies in the pre-opening period. 
The third essay of the thesis (chapter 6) focuses on measuring the proportion of price 
discovery attributable to the pre-opening period, and investigating which order book 
characteristic inform the price discovery process throughout the pre-opening period.  In this 
analysis the six most active stocks during the MSE pre-opening period are examined.  To 
measure the proportion of price discovery attributable to the pre-opening period, we utilise 
both the weighted price contribution (WPC) method and the Wang and Yang (2009) 
sequential trading period extension of the Hasbrouck (1995) information share (IS) measure.  
The information content of the order book is determined by measuring the impact of the 
relative height and depth of the overnight and opening order books, and changes that are 
attributable to order submissions and alterations during the pre-opening period.  This essay, 
therefore, attempts to quantify price discovery in the pre-opening and examine the order 
book information that that influences the return generated over the period. 
Computing both the WPC and the IS measures reveals that the pre-opening period 
contributes significantly to daily price discovery at a level averaging between 30% and 38%.  
In addition, there is no evidence to suggest that there is a significant difference between the 
contributions of the pre-opening to the daily price discovery process of stocks that are highly 
active compared to stocks that are significantly less active.  Furthermore, the results indicate 
that the proportion of price discovery attributable to the pre-opening period slightly reduces 
over the sample.  Hence, the relatively low trading volume compared to major exchanges 
and the proportionally long pre-opening period at the MSE seems to improve this period‟s 
importance in the price discovery process.  This result has potentially important policy 
implications for the design of stock exchanges in emerging economies. 
The empirical results reveal that larger relative height at steps two and five and relative buy 
depth at the top of the overnight order book positively impact the returns over the pre-
opening period for the three most active of the six stocks.  This indicates that the excess 
demand pressure in the previous trading session which results in relatively larger unexecuted 
buy order being queued in the overnight order book exerts upward pressure on prices in the 
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pre-opening period.  Cumulative increases in the relative depth below the top of the order 
book during the pre-opening for the less active stocks indicate that the price at the top of the 
order book is too low.  This results in a down ward pressure on prices, as sell side traders 
will have to submit orders with lower prices to secure the desired volume. 
Cumulative increases over the pre-opening in the relative buy side height from steps two to 
five, attributable to both order submissions and alteration of prices implies an increase in 
excess demand which places an upward pressure on prices.  In addition, despite the absence 
of trading, changes in the order book away from the top contain significant information 
about opening returns.  However, the less active three of the six stocks tend to react more to 
changes in relative depth and height during the pre-opening compared to the three most 
active stocks.  The results indicate weak evidence in support of a positive relationship 
between relative depth of the opening order book and opening return.  In addition, the 
relative height is significant only towards the top of the opening order book for both types of 
stocks.  Hence, this suggests that traders pay close attention to the evolution of the order 
book during the pre-opening to determine their order submission strategy, and less so on the 
actual size of the relative depth or height. 
Overall, the results presented throughout the thesis emphasises that the state of the limit 
order book in the pre-opening period contains significant information from which traders 
make inferences to aid their submission and alteration strategies.  Therefore, the main 
contribution of this study to the market microstructure literature is providing evidence on the 
role of order book information in determining the order submission intensity, aggressiveness 
in order placement strategies employed by traders and the returns generated over the pre-
opening period.  To my knowledge, this is the only study to undertake such an in-depth 
analysis into the microstructure of the market pre-opening period.       
It is important to note that throughout the three essays a consistent theme emerges regarding 
the information content of a locking or crossing of the spread.  For instance, in the first essay 
that investigates the impact of the order book on the intensity of order submissions, the 
results indicate that a locking or crossing of the spread by an incoming buy (sell) order 
increase the intensity of buy (sell) order submission and reduces the intensity of sell (buy) 
order submissions.  In the second essay that explores order placement strategies, a locking or 
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crossing of the spread increases the aggressiveness of order submissions and alterations on 
both sides of the order book.  The third essay revels that locking or crossing of the spread 
contains significant predictive power about the direction of opening returns.  In essence, 
when the spread is locked by an incoming buy (sell) order this normally results in an 
increase (decrease) in opening returns.  Hence, as Cao et al. (2000) suggest, a locking or 
crossing of the spread contains particularly significant information about the fundamental 
value of the security. 
A well designed pre-opening period serves as a method of liquidity formation and 
information aggregation in the absence of trading after an extended halt in the trading 
process.  The results outlined in this thesis have potential implications for the design of 
market pre-opening period, particularly for new and emerging stock exchanges.   The results 
highlight the informativeness and importance of the open limit order book in determining the 
intensity of order arrivals and order placement strategy in the pre-opening.   In addition, the 
interactions between the placement strategies seem to impact the results generated over the 
pre-opening period, as outlined in the thesis.  Market regulators in emerging stock exchanges 
can benefit from these results since they may provide a basis for improving the design of 
market regulation to advance the efficiency of the price discovery process.  
7.2 Limitations and Extensions 
One of the limitations of this thesis is that the three essays rely on either the three or six most 
active stocks traded on the Malta Stock Exchange.  For instance, chapter 4 and 5 utilises the 
three most active stocks while chapter 6 analyses the six most active stocks on the MSE. The 
main justification for the number of stocks selected lies with the type of analysis performed 
in the essays.  Since this thesis focuses on the information content of the order book at the 
event level, only a maximum of six stocks provides the level of order submission activity to 
make the study tractable.  While the low trading activity enhances the research questions, the 
robustness of the results would be enhanced if more of the stocks traded on the exchange 
could have been incorporated in this study. 
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Another limitation arising from the activity level of the MSE data is the inability to separate 
information from non-information days in the analyses.  This would enhance the study by 
revealing the extent to which the release of information impacts trader behaviour or the pre-
opening price discovery process.  An extension of this study could examine the 
incorporation of public and private information into pre-opening prices.  In addition, the 
analysis could investigate if only a few brokers or investor type brings information to the 
market and whether the revelation of this information impacts price discovery or order 
placement strategies by remaining brokers.  Similarly, the analysis could be further extended 
to determine the presence or extent to which broker participates in sunshine trading.  Hence, 
if sunshine trading is present, what strategies do traders implement to attract orders from the 
opposite side of the order book? 
The first essay, which examines the role of the order book in determining the intensity of 
buy or sell limit order submissions in the pre-opening period, can be extended in two ways to 
corroborate the findings.  First, the intensity of buy and sell order submissions are analysed 
in a univariate framework to measure the significance of order book information.  To extend 
on this analysis, it would be useful to examine order submission duration in a bivariate 
framework.  This would reveal not just the impact of the order book, but how the intensity of 
buy (sell) order submission impacts the intensity of sell (buy) order submissions in the pre-
opening period.  Second, the estimation employs a Weibull distribution for the errors in the 
duration model.  Another possible extension is to use a more general distribution such as the 
Generalised Gamma or the Burr distributions, which it is claimed, capture a greater level of 
dispersion that may be present in the series. 
A possible extension of the second essay, which investigates the role of the order book in 
determining order placement strategy in the pre-opening, is to separate traders into patient 
and impatient, then study their order choices separately in a fashion similar to Pascual and 
Veredes (2008).  This would reveal in greater detail whether the information content of the 
order book symmetrically impacts order strategy by patient and impatient traders in the pre-
opening period.  In addition, the aggressiveness of order strategy is examined in a univariate 
framework which focuses on the buy and sell side separately, similar to the first essay.  
Studying aggressiveness in a bivariate framework would facilitate analysing the impact of 
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aggressiveness on the buy (sell) side on the aggressiveness of subsequent buy or sell order 
submissions and alterations. 
The third essay utilises a fairly new and untested extension of the Hasbrouck (1995) IS 
measure to compute the proportion of daily price discovery attributable to the pre-opening 
period.  Comparing the estimates of the more established WPC method and the IS measure 
provides similar conclusions for the full sample.  However, the computations at the annual 
level in some cases provide different conclusions about the proportion of price discovery 
attributable to the pre-opening period.  An extension of this study could develop a 
comprehensive sensitivity analysis that would provide a greater understanding of the factors 
that lead to divergence between the two methods.   
Finally, the results of the third essay reveal that the information contained in the overnight 
and opening order books are somewhat concentrated towards the top, with only weak 
evidence supporting the claim that information away from the top is important.  Since this 
study focuses on the depth and height separately, a possible extension is to develop a 
comprehensive measure that incorporates the depth and height of the order book 
simultaneously.  Such a combined measure may provide a better measure of order book 
information and its impact on opening returns.                    
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